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Summary
This thesis investigates empirically three questions of key relevance for the life of disadvantaged
people in developing countries.
Using a sample of Ethiopian women and a regression discontinuity design exploiting age dis-
continuities in exposure to a law that raised the legal age of marriage for women, the first chapter
documents for the first time (a) the effect of increasing the legal age of marriage for women on
infant mortality and (b) the causal effect of early cohabitation on infant mortality. The analysis
shows that, even though it was not perfectly enforced, the law that raised the legal age of marriage
had a large effect on the infant mortality of the first born child. Furthermore, the estimates suggest
that the effect of a one-year delay in women’s age at cohabitation on the infant mortality of the
first born is comparable to the joint effect on child mortality of measles, BCG, DPT, Polio and
Maternal Tetanus vaccinations.
Using longitudinal data from northern Ghana, the second chapter shows that parents allocate
more schooling to children that are more cognitively able. These results provide evidence for the
main prediction of the model of intra-household allocation of resources developed in Becker (1981),
which concludes that parents allocate human capital investments reinforcing cognitive differences
between siblings.
The third chapter uses the 8.8 Richter magnitude earthquake that struck Chile in February
2010 as a case study and employs a difference in difference strategy to investigate whether natural
disasters have lasting effects on property crime. The results show that the earthquake reduced the
prevalence of property crime the year of the earthquake and that this effect remained stable over
the 4 post-earthquake years studied. The lasting drop in crime rates in affected areas seems to be
linked to the earthquake strengthening community life in these municipalities.
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1Introduction
Does child marriage affect infant mortality? Do parents in low-income countries allocate
schooling correcting or reinforcing cognitive differences between siblings? Do natural dis-
asters affect crime rates in a lasting way? The chapters that formed this thesis address
these research questions.
Chapter 1 focuses on examining the inter-generational effects of child marriage in
Ethiopia. Deeply rooted in tradition, gender inequality and poverty (Wahhaj, 2015),
child marriage affects more than 700 million women worldwide and 41% of women aged
20-24 in Ethiopia (UNFPA, 2012). Considered by UNICEF a form of violence against
women, several developing countries with high incidence of child marriage aimed to address
this problem through ratifying international conventions such as the Maputo Protocol or
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women that
promoted the approval and enforcement of minimum-age-of-marriage laws. In parallel
with these legal reforms, many of these countries and different international organizations
have launched ambitious programmes targeting the socioeconomic and cultural causes of
child marriage.
Despite plenty of resources have been spent in fighting child marriage, there is little
empirical evidence on the socioeconomic effects of policies aiming to reduce this practice.
There is also a lack of rigorous evidence in the literature on the assessment of its causal
effects on socioeconomic outcomes. Existing studies rely on the use of age at menarche as
an instrumental variable for the age at marriage, an approach that is challenged by some
2medical studies.
Using data from Ethiopia, chapter 1 addresses two questions of key importance on
the link between child marriage and infant mortality. First, the chapter investigates the
effects of a law that raised the minimum age of marriage for women from 15 to 18 years on
women’s age at cohabitation and on the infant mortality of the first born child. Second,
the analysis exploits this policy change to estimate the causal effect of women’s age at
cohabitation on the probability of infant mortality of the first born child.
The empirical results highlight that exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 years
relative to the possibility of getting legally married at 15, increases by 2 years the mean age
at first cohabitation for women and decreases by 7.9 percentage points the probability of
infant mortality of the first born child. The reduction in the probability of infant mortality
of the first born child caused by a one-year delay in women’s age at cohabitation during
teenage years is estimated at 3.8 percentage points.
This chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First of all, it provides the
first empirical evidence on the socioeconomic effects of minimum-age-of-marriage laws,
showing that they can contribute to reducing child marriage and infant mortality even
when they are not completely enforced. Second, this is the first study that provides causal
estimates on the effect of early cohabitation on infant mortality. Third, this study uses a
novel regression discontinuity design that can be used to (a) expand the analysis on the
effects of child marriage to other key outcomes and settings where similar laws have been
approved and to (b) test the robustness of the results from previous studies that rely on
age at menarche as an instrumental variable for age at marriage.
In 1980, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics Gary Becker proposes a theoretical
model to explain the intra-household allocation of resources based on the different returns
to investments on each household member. The model predicts that through allocating
more human capital resources to the most endowed children, parents reinforce cognitive
3differences between children.
Chapter 2 of the thesis investigates empirically this hypothesis through exploring how
between siblings cognitive differences affect the intra-household allocation of schooling.
For this, I use child level panel data on education collected for the impact evaluation of
the Millennium Villages Project in northern Ghana and the score in three cognitive tests
applied with the first round of the survey to every child in the sample aged 5-19 regardless
of whether the child has ever attended school.
The empirical analysis reveals that, in line with the prediction of Becker’s model and
with previous empirical evidence, parents tend to allocate more schooling to children with
better cognitive skills. Interestingly, the evidence provided in this chapter also shows
that some characteristics prevalent in sub-Saharan households such as large household
size, polygyny or poverty do not seem to affect the role played by cognitive skills in the
allocation of schooling across siblings.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. On the one hand, the
evidence presented adds to the small body of literature that uses cognitive tests to examine
empirically the effect of cognitive skills on the intra-household allocation of human capital
resources. Second, this is to the best of my knowledge the first study that assesses em-
pirically whether the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings
depends on household characteristics such as polygyny status, household size or wealth.
Chapter 3 uses data from household victimization surveys and a strong earthquake
that affected the centre-south of Chile in 2010 as a case study to explore the lasting
effects of natural disasters on property crime. The earthquake was followed by looting
and social chaos. However, the evidence also shows that the earthquake strengthened
community links in affected communities and the degree in which households committed
with the well-being of their neighbours (Grando´n et al., 2014). Thus, the earthquake
affected ambiguously the benefits and costs of crime and the assessment of its long-term
4effects on crime remains an empirical question.
Using a difference in difference strategy, the empirical analysis shows that the incid-
ence of property crime in areas affected by the earthquake fell dramatically the year of
the earthquake relative to communities far away from the hypocentre. Interestingly, the
difference in the incidence of property crime between earthquake affected and unaffected
municipalities remained stable and statistically significant during the 4 post-earthquake
years studied. The chapter also presents evidence on the mechanisms concluding that
the lasting drop in property crime in municipalities close to the hypocentre was mainly
caused by the positive effect of the earthquake on community links and on the adoption of
community-based measures to prevent crime by households living in these municipalities.
The contribution of chapter 3 is twofold. First, although previous papers discuss crime
in the aftermath of natural disasters, this is the first study testing whether the short-term
effects of natural disasters on crime last over longer periods of time. Second, the chapter
documents for the first time the role that social capital and informal guardianship played
as decisive factors that explain the effect of natural disasters on property crime.
Seemingly unrelated as these three chapters seem to be, there are three common themes
among them.
First, the three chapters address questions with important policy implications for the
well-being of disadvantaged people in low- and middle-income countries. Child marriage
and insufficient schooling investments are widespread problems among the most disad-
vantaged households in developing countries. For example, Klugman et al. (2014) show
that girls from poor households in sub-Saharan Africa are twice more likely to engage in
underage marriages than non-poor girls, and the lack of attendance to primary and sec-
ondary school in developing countries is strongly associated with household poverty (UN,
2013). Understanding the causes and consequences of these two phenomena has become
a priority for policy makers of international organizations and low- and middle-income
5countries that have signed conventions and have dedicated a large amount of resources to
promote universal schooling and increase the age at cohabitation for women.
In this context, chapter 1 documents the negative effects of child marriage on infant
mortality in Ethiopia, the country with the fifth largest number of women married before
the age of 18 years, and shows that raising the legal age of marriage can contribute to
decreasing infant mortality. On the other hand, chapter 2 provides evidence on how
parents in poor areas in Ghana tend to concentrate schooling investments in the more
able siblings rather than spreading the investments among all of them, casting doubts
on whether supply-side educational interventions such as reducing class sizes or providing
more books could benefit less able children.
Although there has been a rise in the incidence of natural disasters worldwide in the
last decade, the most disadvantaged people in poor countries faced most of the negative
consequences of them (Yonetani, 2012). Understanding the impacts of natural disasters
and minimizing the vulnerability to them have become priorities in the political agenda of
countries that are frequently exposed to natural disasters such as Bangladesh, Myanmar
or Chile (UNISDR, 2013). Through providing evidence on the lasting effects of natural
disasters on crime and on the role of informal guardianship in the aftermath of disasters,
chapter 3 contributes to shedding light on the socioeconomic consequences and social
dynamics that follow natural disasters in a country that is regularly exposed to geological
disasters.
The second common aspect is the central position of social norms in the development
problems studied and empirical results obtained in the three chapters.
Mackie et al. (2015) defines social norms as “what people in some group believe to be a
typical or appropriate action in the group”. The relevance of social norms as determinants
of economic and social outcomes was first highlighted by David Hume in his Treatise of
6Human Nature (1739)1. In the last decades, different studies have examined how social
norms can affect different dimensions of individual’s well-being. For example, Duflo and
Udry (2004) investigate how social norms affect the intra-household allocation of resources
and Mackie et al. (2015) argue that social norms contribute to the perpetuation of harmful
practices such as female genital mutilation or child marriage. In this sense, an important
part of chapter 1 is the assessment of whether a law that changed the legal age of marriage
could tackle effectively a social practice deeply enrooted in tradition: child marriage.
Equally, chapter 2 investigates whether the social norms that govern the intra-household
allocation of resources reinforce cognitive differences between the children of the household.
On the other hand, the evidence presented in chapter 3 suggests that natural disasters
are followed by changes in the social norms that function in affected communities, enabling
the adoption of community-based crime prevention strategies that could ultimately reduce
crime.
The third common theme among the chapters that formed the thesis is methodolo-
gical. The analyses conducted in them rely on econometric methods that fall within those
traditionally used in applied microeconomics for the identification of causal effects and
more recently, for the impact evaluation of policies or programmes.
Chapter 1 uses sharp and fuzzy regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to assess the
causal link between the legal age of marriage, the prevalence of child marriage and the
infant mortality of the first born. Firstly used by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) in
the field of educational psychology to investigate the motivational effect of public recogni-
tion, RDDs became widespread in economics in the last decade as a credible identification
strategy to assess causal effects and to evaluate social programmes.
Fuzzy and sharp RDDs can be used when the probability of treatment assignment for
each participant is partially or entirely determined by whether the value of the assignment
1Hume (2000)
7variable for a participant is above or below a certain cut-off point. In chapter 1, I exploit
the fact that women younger than 15 years when the law that raised the legal age of
marriage was enacted could not get legally married until they turned 18 years old while
those girls aged 15 or older when the law was introduced had the opportunity to get
legally married before they reached the age of 18. This age at policy discontinuity is used
to investigate the effect for women of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 on the
probability of infant mortality of the first born child and then, to calculate the effect of
women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years on infant mortality of the first born
child.
The main advantage of RDDs is the possibility of testing empirically their underlying
identification assumptions through examining the density of the forcing variable at the
cut-off and investigating discontinuities in placebo variables at the cut-off. On the other
hand, the main limitation of this method is that the estimates yielded by RDDs can only
be interpreted as local treatment effects at the cut-off. Thus, any generalization of the
effects to the whole sample should be conducted with caution.
The second chapter uses a Heckman selection model to account for potential sample
selection bias arising from the fact that a substantial amount of eligible children did
not take the cognitive tests. Introduced by Heckman (1979) to account for non-random
selection of women participating in the labour market, this method was quickly adopted
in the economics literature to deal with non-random censoring in the sample. The method
is also commonly used in the field of applied microeconomics to investigate causal effects.
Some examples are Cueto et al. (2014) and Briggs (2004), where Heckman selection models
are used to estimate the causal effects of school quality on educational attainment and of
a coaching programme on exam performance; while accounting for non-random selection
of participants into school attendance and exam uptake.
The third chapter relies on the use of difference in difference estimations. Firstly
8employed in the XIX century by John Snow to assess the effects of contaminated water on
cholera incidence in London (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), the method became very popular
in the last two decades. This estimation technique is widely used in the policy evaluation
literature when data before and after a policy change or programme are available.
Indeed, difference in difference techniques have been used in seminal papers to address
a large variety of crucial research questions such as the causal effect of minimum wage
on employment (Card and Krueger, 1994), the effect of school term length on student
performance (Pischke, 2007), or the effect of employment protection on outsourcing by
firms (Autor, 2003). In chapter 3, I use a difference in difference approach, comparing
the evolution of crime rates in areas far away and close to the earthquake hypocentre
before and after the strong earthquake that affected Chile in February 2010, to assess the
persistent effects of the earthquake on property crime.
9Chapter 1
Child Marriage and Infant Mortality: Evid-
ence from Ethiopia
1.1 Motivation
More than 700 million women worldwide first cohabited with a partner before the age of
18, with the vast majority living in developing countries (UNICEF, 2014). Considered by
UNICEF a form of violence against women, decreasing the incidence of early cohabitation,
also known as child marriage1, has become a priority for policy makers of international
organizations and developing countries. In the last decades, most of the countries with
a high prevalence of this practice have ratified different international agreements such as
the CEDAW2, CCMMAMRM3 or the Maputo Protocol4 that promote the setting and
enforcement of minimum-age-of-marriage laws. Furthermore, the fight against child mar-
riage mobilizes a large amount of resources in integrated programmes and national alliances
targeting the cultural, social and economic causes of this widespread practice. However,
although the overall prevalence of child marriage is declining over time, its eradication is
currently far from becoming a reality (Jensen and Thornton, 2003).
Using women-level data from different Asian and African countries, several studies
1UNICEF defines child marriage as the formal marriage or unmarried cohabitation before the age of 18
years. Although child marriage affects both girls and boys, the 82% of the children in the world that got
married or started cohabiting with a partner before the age of 18 are girls (UNICEF, 2014).
2Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979.
3Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriage, 1964.
4Ratified in 2003.
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reveal that child marriage is associated with worse levels of health, education, labour force
participation, mortality and participation in household decisions (Jensen and Thornton,
2003; Nguyen and Wodon, 2015; Wodon et al., 2016; Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2013; Wachs,
2008; UNICEF, 2014; Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2007; Solanke, 2015). However, the link
between child marriage and these outcomes might be driven in part by unobservable
traits or by reverse causality and therefore, the statistical associations identified in these
studies should not be interpreted as the causal effects of child marriage. Relying on
parental anxiety for marrying off their daughters once they reach puberty, some researchers
address the endogeneity in the link between child marriage and socioeconomic outcomes
through using age at menarche as an instrumental variable for age at marriage. Using this
approach, a handful of studies confirm the negative effects of child marriage on women’s
education and health; and document the intergenerational effects on the education, health
and cultural preferences of their children (Field and Ambrus, 2008; Chari et al., 2017;
Sekhri and Debnath, 2014; Hicks and Hicks, 2015; Asadullah et al., 2016; Asadullah and
Wahhaj, 2016). However, although this instrumental variable approach dominates the
literature on the causal effects of child marriage, it is not without its critiques5.
With the objective of reducing the high prevalence of child marriage among Ethiopian
girls, the Federal Government of Ethiopia approved in July 2000 the Revised Family Code
(RFC). This law increased the legal age of marriage for women from 15 to 18 years in
some regions of Ethiopia, while leaving unchanged at 18 the legal age of marriage for men.
Remarkably, exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 relative to the possibility of getting
legally married at the age of 15 decreased by 20 percentage points the incidence of child
marriage among the women in the sample and increased by approximately 2 years the
mean age at cohabitation for these women. However, the 2011 DHS survey shows that
the share of Ethiopian women cohabiting before the age of 18 remains above 20% even
among those women effectively exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18. One possible
cause for this is the lack of capacity of Ethiopian institutions to enforce the minimum
age of marriage established in the law. The fact that the RFC banned underage marriage
but not underage cohabitation could also help to explain why, even in the presence of a
strong social stigma associated with unmarried cohabitation (Jones et al., 2016), setting
the minimum age of marriage at 18 years has not eradicated underage cohabitation among
5Discussed in section 1.2.
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Ethiopian women.
This study investigates the impact of the approval of the RFC in some regions of
Ethiopia to pursue a twofold objective. First, I estimate the effect for women of exposure
to a legal age of marriage at 18 on the probability of infant mortality of the first born child.
Second, I assess the causal effect of delaying women’s age at cohabitation on the probability
of infant mortality of the first born child, assessing also the mechanisms through which
early cohabitation could affect infant mortality.
The novelty of the analysis presented in this study banked on three main contributions
to the literature. First, this is to the best of my knowledge the first study that provides
evidence on the socioeconomic consequences of increasing the minimum age of marriage
for women. Second, the study focuses on the link between child marriage and infant
mortality, a key development outcome that has been ignored by previous causal studies
assessing the consequences of child marriage. Third, unlike previous studies relying on
the use of age at menarche as an instrumental variable for child marriage, I address
endogeneity between women’s age at cohabitation and socioeconomic outcomes through
exploiting age discontinuities in the effective legal age of marriage faced by Ethiopian
women. A regression discontinuity design (RDD) is applied exploiting the fact that those
women younger than 15 years when the RFC was introduced were exposed to a legal age
of marriage at 18 years, while those women that were equal or older than 15 years at the
same time had the opportunity to get legally married before they turned 18 years old.
This methodological approach can be also used to expand the analysis on the effects of
child marriage to other outcomes of interest and to other settings where similar laws have
been approved.
The results show that the probability of infant mortality of the first born is 7.9 percent-
age points lower among women exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18 than among women
that had the opportunity to get married at the age of 15 before the approval of the law.
They also suggest that even if they do not completely end child marriage, laws setting the
minimum age of marriage for women at 18 years can be effective policies to reduce infant
mortality. The estimates for the causal effect of early cohabitation reveal that a one-year
delay in women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years decreases the probability of
infant mortality of the first born by 3.8 percentage points. The results are robust to the
use of different estimation techniques, bandwidths and windows for the forcing variable;
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and to different placebo tests ruling out the possibility that the impact on infant mortality
is driven by systematic differences between women born in different months of the year,
other interventions at the national level, other legal dispositions included in the RFC or
over time decreases in infant mortality.
The analysis of mechanisms indicates that the impact of raising the legal age of mar-
riage on the infant mortality of the first born is mainly channelled through the positive
effect of delaying cohabitation on the age of women at first birth. On the other hand, the
analysis suggests that the effect of early cohabitation on infant mortality is not driven by
any effect of the former on women’s marriage market outcomes, participation in household
decisions, education or labour force participation.
The study is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature on the socioeco-
nomic effects of child marriage. Section 1.3 discusses the incidence of child marriage in
Ethiopia and presents the law that raised the legal age of marriage for women from 15 to
18 years in some regions of the country. Section 1.4 introduces the identification strategy
and section 1.5 describes the data used in the main analysis. Section 1.6 presents the
main results, examining their robustness to the use of alternative estimation methods,
bandwidths and placebo tests. Section 1.7 investigates the channels thought which early
cohabitation could affect infant mortality. Finally, section 1.8 concludes the study.
1.2 Related Literature
The causes of child marriage have been extensively studied in anthropology and sociology.
In the first economic study that aimed to model child marriage, Wahhaj (2015) enumerates
three of the most commonly cited. First, young brides might be preferred because they are
on average meeker than older ones and because they have a longer childbearing life ahead
(Goody, 1990). Second, in opposition to western countries where newly married couples
are expected to live without the economic support of relatives, it is very common that
young couples in developing countries where the prevalence of child marriage is large are
economically supported by their families, providing incentives for early marriages (Dixon,
1971). Finally, in many of these countries, the social status of the households depends
strongly on the purity of the women of the family. In this context, families have to control
the sexual behaviour of the girls of the household after sexual maturation, providing
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parents incentives to marry their daughters as soon as possible after menarche (Moghadam,
2004). Consistent with the purity argument, Wahhaj (2015) develops a theoretical model
aiming to explain child marriage in developing countries. The latter paper sets a marriage
market model where women’s purity is noisily observed and perceived purity decreases with
time on the marriage market, providing households strong incentives for early marriages.
Using DHS and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), different studies assess the
link between child marriage and socioeconomic outcomes for women and their children. A
synthesis of this literature is provided in Parsons et al. (2015). The review concludes that,
overall, child marriage is associated with harmful socioeconomic outcomes for women in-
cluding lower levels of participation in household decision making and worse marriage mar-
ket outcomes (Jensen and Thornton, 2003; Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2007; Solanke, 2015),
lower labour force participation and educational attainment (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2013;
Field and Ambrus, 2008; Jensen and Thornton, 2003; Nguyen and Wodon, 2015; Wodon
et al., 2016), and worse maternal health (Field and Ambrus, 2008; Campbell, 2002). The
review also suggests that child marriage is associated with higher fertility, teenage preg-
nancy and lower age at first birth (Jensen and Thornton, 2003; Solanke, 2015). Besides,
the authors of the review find that child marriage seems to be also associated with negat-
ive outcomes for the children of these women, including lower educational attainment and
worse health (UNICEF, 2014; Wachs, 2008). Although not included in the review, Raj
et al. (2010) and Adhikari (2003) assess empirically the statistical association between wo-
men’s age at marriage, age at first birth and mortality of young children. While the former
paper provides evidence of a large and positive statistical association between infant mor-
tality and marriage before the age of 18 in India, the latter finds that being mother before
the age of 20 is strongly associated with larger levels of neonatal mortality in Nepal.
With the exception of Field and Ambrus (2008), the studies reviewed in Parsons et al.
(2015) examine the correlation between child marriage and the socioeconomic outcomes of
these women and their children. This could be problematic because the statistical associ-
ation between child marriage and these outcomes might be driven by reverse causality or
by unobservable factors correlated with both. A few studies address empirically this prob-
lem through using age at menarche as an instrumental variable for age at marriage. These
studies exploit the quasi-random variation generated by a delay in the age at menarche
as a source of exogenous variation for age at marriage for women. They argue that the
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arrival of puberty determines the entrance in the marriage market and they prove empiric-
ally that a delay in the age at menarche increases significantly age at marriage. Using this
approach, Field and Ambrus (2008), Asadullah et al. (2016) and Hicks and Hicks (2015)
find that early marriage decreases educational attainment for women and antenatal health
investments in Bangladesh, India and Kenya. Furthermore, Chari et al. (2017), Sekhri and
Debnath (2014), Asadullah et al. (2016) and Asadullah and Wahhaj (2016) document for
India and Bangladesh that early marriage also has intergenerational effects, leading to
negative impacts on the educational attainment, cultural values and health investments
received by the children of women marrying young. On the other hand, Hicks and Hicks
(2015) do not find any effect of early marriage on labour market outcomes, beliefs and
marriage market outcomes of women in Kenya; suggesting that the statistical association
between child marriage and these outcomes found in studies conducting correlation ana-
lysis could be driven by reverse causality or omitted variables bias. To the best of my
knowledge, this instrumental variable approach has not been used to investigate the link
between child marriage and infant mortality.
The correct identification of the effect of early marriage in these studies relies on the
assumption that conditional on height, socioeconomic background and location, age at
menarche does not affect women’s socioeconomic outcomes other than through delaying
age at cohabitation. Furthermore, to be a valid instrumental variable, age at menarche
should not be driven by unobservable factors that affect the outcome of interest. Although
Field and Ambrus (2008) rule out different mechanisms through which age at menarche
could affect the outcomes of interest, medical studies suggest that some childhood experi-
ences such as stressful family environment or sexual abuse that may have long-term effects
on socioeconomic outcomes seem to bring forward the age at menarche (Karapanou and
Papadimitriou, 2010; Barrios et al., 2015). Under the latter hypothesis, the instrumental
variable used might not satisfy the exclusion restriction and the estimates in these studies
should be interpreted with caution.
1.3 Child Marriage in Ethiopia and the Revised Family Code
The 2011 Demographic and Health Survey reveals that 41% of women aged 20-24 in
Ethiopia first cohabited with a partner before the age of 18. The total number of child-
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married women in the country is estimated at 1,974,000, making Ethiopia the country
with the 5th largest number of child marriages in the world6.
Ethiopia is a federal state formed by 11 regions, which are very diverse in terms of
ethnicity and religion. Although the practice of child marriage is conducted in all the
country, its prevalence ranges substantially across regions. Figure 1.1 displays the evolu-
tion of the prevalence of early cohabitation and of the mean age at first cohabitation in
Ethiopia. In order to illustrate the variation across regions, the figure also displays the
evolution of these indicators for a selection of three Ethiopian regions, including Addis
Ababa and Amhara, the regions with the largest and the lowest prevalence of child mar-
riage in Ethiopia. For women aged 25-29 years old, the figure shows that the incidence
of child marriage ranges between 70% in Amhara and 20% in Addis Ababa. Another
interesting pattern that emerges from the graph is that although during the last decades
the share of women cohabiting before the age of 18 has been decreasing in Ethiopia, the
trend is very different across regions and while for example the incidence of child marriage
has decreased sharply in Amhara or Addis Ababa, it has slightly increased in Gambela.
Figure 1.1: Child marriage over time in Ethiopia (DHS 2011)
In the last decades, increasing age at cohabitation for women has become a priority for
policy makers in Ethiopia. Following the ratification of the CEDAW, which encourages
governments to set and enforce laws and programmes to prevent early marriage and delay
age at cohabitation, the Federal Government of Ethiopia approved the Revised Family
Code (RFC) in July 2000. This law established the legal age of marriage for both men
and women at 18 years.
Before the Federal Government of Ethiopia passed the RFC, the legal age of marriage
for women and men was regulated by the 1960 Family Code. The latter law set a legal age
6Girls not Brides website.http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/where-does-it-happen/
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for marriage of 15 years for women and of 18 years for men. Thus, while the RFC raised
the legal age for marriage for women from 15 to 18 years, it left unchanged the minimum
age of marriage for men at 18 years. Additionally, the RFC provided women authority
to administer common marital property, abolished the right of husbands to forbid women
to work outside home and facilitated the divorce procedure. The potential confounding
effects of these additional dispositions are examined and dismissed in section 1.6.4. Finally,
the RFC recognized the validity of marriages celebrated before the approval of the RFC
that complied with the 1960 Family Code.
However, the approval of the RFC by the Federal Government of Ethiopia did not
imply the immediate application of the law over the entire country. Under the Federal
Constitution of Ethiopia approved after the fall of Mengistu’s government, the family law
is jurisdiction of the regional governments. In consequence, the approval of the RFC by the
Federal Government of Ethiopia in July 2000 only implied its immediate application in the
chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The application in the rest of Ethiopian
regions required the approval of the regional governments. Although the enactment of the
law by the Federal Government of Ethiopia paved the road, its approval by the different
regional governments was not immediate (Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo, 2015).
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 display the local linear density estimator (McCrary, 2008) of the
age at first cohabitation for those women that were 12-14 years old and for those women
aged 15-17 at the time of approval of the RFC in their region7. The figures show that
while for the younger cohort of girls, exposed only to a legal age of marriage at 18 years,
the most frequent age at first cohabitation is 18 years, the density function for the second
cohort of women, exposed at least for some time after they turned 15 to a legal age of
marriage at 15 years, reaches its peak at the age of 15 years. Furthermore, the figures
suggest that while for the older cohort there seems to be a discontinuity in the density of
women that first cohabited with a partner at the age of 15 and there is no discontinuity
at 18 years, for the younger cohort the discontinuity at 15 years seems to be smaller and
a new discontinuity emerges at the age of 18. In this line, figure 1.14 in appendix 1.B
compares in the same graph the distribution of the age at cohabitation for different cohorts
of women in the analytical sample. The figure shows that the distribution shift to the right
7These two figures are constructed using the sample of ever cohabited women in the 2011 Ethiopian
DHS that were older than 18 at the time of the survey and lived in one of the five Ethiopian regions that
introduced the RFC before 2008.
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for the younger cohort of women, exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18 years.
Figure 1.2: Age at 1st cohabitation (cohorts 15-17 at RFC): Discontinuities at 15 and 18
Figure 1.3: Age at 1st cohabitation (cohorts 12-14 at RFC): Discontinuities at 15 and 18
18
The shift in the distribution of the age at first cohabitation for these two cohorts
of women suggests that the rise in the legal age of marriage increased the mean age at
cohabitation for women. Indeed, the fact that the most frequent age at cohabitation in
each cohort is the legal age for marriage that they are exposed to could be indicating
that the minimum ages of marriage set in the 1960 and 2000 Family Codes were to some
extent enforced. On the other hand, the figures confirm that the percentage of women
that cohabit with a partner before reaching the minimum age of marriage is non-negligible
among women from both cohorts. Different reasons can explain why the introduction of
the RFC has not eradicated child marriage. First, although the RFC bans civil, religious
and customary marriages before the age of 18 years, underage cohabitation is not explicitly
forbidden in the law. Second, although underage marriage is not permitted in the RFC,
the criminal law did not sanction it until the year 2005. Third, the institutional capacity
to enforce the law is limited, particularly in rural areas where the presence of the state
administration is narrow (Jones et al., 2016). Fourth, the law attributes the obligation to
verify that both bride and groom are at least 18 years to the official or priest celebrating the
wedding. However, the lack of birth and school registers for wide sectors of the population
makes more difficult this checking procedure (Jones et al., 2016). For these reasons, and
despite unmarried cohabitation is stigmatized in Ethiopia (Jones et al., 2016), we cannot
expect the law to completely end child marriage.
Taken together, these patterns suggest that although it does not end with this prac-
tice, exposure to an effective legal age of marriage at 18 increases the mean age at first
cohabitation for women. In section 1.6.1, I examine whether this change is sharp at the
cut-off and statistically relevant to validate the estimations conducted in the study.
1.4 Identification Strategy
The RFC raised the legal age of marriage for women in Ethiopia from 15 to 18 years. This
legal change generated variation in the legal age of marriage faced by women of different
ages. First, those women that were younger than 15 years old when the RFC was approved
were only exposed to an effective legal age for marriage at 18 years. Second, those women
that were older than 18 when the RFC was approved were not directly affected by the
change in the legal age for marriage. Third, those women aged between 15 and 18 years
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old at the same time were exposed, at least for some time after their 15th birthday, to
a legal age of marriage at 15 years. Thus, these women had the opportunity to marry
legally before the age of 18. The identification strategy exploits the sharp reduction in
the mean age at cohabitation with a partner for those women older than 15 years at the
time of the approval of the RFC. At the extreme, the estimates rely on the change in the
mean age at cohabitation for those women that were 15 years and 1 month at the time of
the approval of the law; and therefore had the opportunity to get legally married at the
age of 15 before the introduction of the RFC, relative to those women that were 14 years
and 11 months at the same time, and could not get legally married until the age 18. If
the mean age at cohabitation increases sharply for those women younger than 15 at the
time of the approval of the RFC, the setting would be ideal for the implementation of a
regression discontinuity design (RDD) using age of the women at the time of the approval
of the RFC as the forcing variable.
The regression discontinuity framework used in this study has three particularities.
First, the approval of the RFC hindered child marriage for those women younger than 18
years and not yet married when the RFC was approved but did not eradicate it among
them8. In other words, exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 does not fully determine
in the sample whether a woman started cohabiting after the age of 18. Second, the forcing
variable is defined as the age of the women at the time of the rise in the legal age of
marriage measured in months, with the cut-off at the age of 15 years. I dropped from the
sample used in the analysis those women that turned 15 the month in which the RFC was
approved. The reason for this is that the DHS survey used in the analysis only collected
information on the month and year of birth, making it impossible to determine for those
women that turned 15 the same month, whether they did before or after the approval
of the RFC. In this context, the quality of the birth data collected plays a crucial role
enabling the use of the age at RFC as the forcing variable. At this point, it is important
to mention that DHS surveys are widely used by researchers in the field of fertility and
the high quality and accuracy of the information collected is showed in Pullum (2008)9.
Third, the RFC was not applied simultaneously in every Ethiopian region. Although this
variation is not exploited for identification purposes, the different timing in the application
8The possible causes for this are discussed in section 1.3.
9Furthermore, unlike in other surveys conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, the distribution of the birth
data collected for the DHS in Ethiopia does not show spikes in the age of surveyed individuals ended in 0
or 5.
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of the rise in the legal age for marriage across regions provides more variation in the current
age of women that were approximately 15 year old when the RFC was approved in their
region, making the results more generalizable.
In order to estimate (a) the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 on
women’s age at first cohabitation, (b) the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage
at 18 on the probability of infant mortality of the first born child and (c) the effect of
women’s age at cohabitation on the probability of infant mortality of the first born child,
I estimate the following three regressions:
Age at Cohab.i = α0 + α1(Age at RFC<15 i) + α3F (Age at RFC i) + α4Xi + µi (1.1)
InfantMortalityi = δ0 + δ1(Age at RFC<15 i) + δ2F (Age at RFC i) + δ3Xi + i (1.2)
InfantMortalityi = β0 + β1( ̂Age at Cohab.i) + β2F (Age at RFC i) + β3Xi + ui (1.3)
where InfantMortalityi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first born child of woman
i died within the first year of life, Age at RFC<15 is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the woman was younger than 15 when the RFC was approved in her region and
therefore, was exposed to an effective legal age of marriage at 18 years. X is a vector
of control variables including the region of residence, the age of the woman at the time
of survey, ethnic and religion affiliation, gender of the first born and a dummy variable
indicating whether the woman lives in a rural area. F(Age at RFC) is a function of the
age of the woman in months when the legal age for marriage was raised in her region.
Finally, ̂Age at Cohab.i is the predicted age at cohabitation for woman i estimated from
equation 1.1.
Equation 1.1 is the first stage regression. The parameter α1 measures the effect of
exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 on the age at first cohabitation, relative to
women that had the possibility of getting legally married at 15. Equation 1.2 is the
reduced form equation. The parameter δ1 yields the effect of exposure to a legal age of
marriage at 18 on the probability of infant mortality of the first born, relative to women
that had the possibility of getting legally married at 15. Equation 1.3 is the second stage
equation. It regresses infant mortality against the predicted age at cohabitation estimated
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in equation 1.1. The parameter β1 yields the effect of a one-year delay in women’s age at
cohabitation with a partner during teenage years on the probability of infant mortality of
the first born.
The estimation of equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 is conducted using non-parametric local
polynomial regressions based on triangular kernel functions. The study follows the state
of art procedure described in Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2016) for the
selection of the optimal bandwidth and for the calculation of bias-corrected RD estimates
with robust variance estimator. Standard errors are clustered at the running variable level
as recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010) for RDDs based on discrete forcing variables.
As a robustness check, I also estimate equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 using (a) two altern-
ative bandwidths equal to 0.75 and 1.5 times the optimal bandwidth, (b) conventional
and bias-corrected non-parametric RD estimation procedures with conventional variance
estimators, and (c) parametric methods with spline polynomials of order 1 to 4 for the
forcing variable and windows of 2, 3, 4 and 5 years at both sides of the cut-off.
Both when estimated using parametric and non-parametric methods, the identification
of the causal effects on infant mortality of early cohabitation and of the increase in the
minimum age of marriage relies on two main conditions. The first identification assumption
requires that facing an effective legal age of marriage at 18 years increases the mean age
at cohabitation. In other words, if the RFC did not change sharply the mean age at
cohabitation for those women at the cut-off, the estimated parameter β1 in equation 1.3
would not be efficient, potentially leading to a problem of weak instrument (Bound et al.,
1995). Equally, if the reform did not change the mean age at cohabitation for the women
at the cut-off, the expected coefficient of the parameter δ1 in equation 1.2 would be 0.
Although the descriptive analysis presented in section 1.3 suggests that the rise in the
minimum age for marriage led to an increase in the mean age at cohabitation, the existence
of a sufficiently sharp change in the mean age at cohabitation and in the incidence of child
marriage at the cut-off will be tested empirically in section 1.6.1.
The second identification assumption of the RDD is that the determinants of infant
mortality unaffected by the legal change should be continuously related to the forcing
variable at the cut-off. Although this condition cannot be tested for every determinant of
infant mortality, I examine in section 1.6.4 the existence of discontinuities at the cut-off
for some of these determinants that are unlikely affected by the legal age of marriage.
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If the placebo analysis shows discontinuities at the cut-off for these variables, we would
need to consider the possibility that confounding factors might be driving the results. In
addition to presenting the results of this placebo test, section 1.6.4 examines the robustness
of the results to other identification threats and discusses the feasibility of alternative
explanations for the results.
1.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in the analysis is from the Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) conducted in late 2011. DHS have been implemented in more than 100 low- and
middle-income countries across the world for more than three decades and they have been
used in numerous studies on health and fertility in developing countries. Indeed, the
vast majority of the studies and reports that explore empirically the incidence of child
marriage rely on these surveys (Parsons et al., 2015). Although the questionnaires are
mostly the same in DHS across the world aiming to produce comparable statistics, the
exact questionnaire and the size and characteristics of the sample vary in every DHS. The
2011 Ethiopian DHS collected household, male and female level information for a sample
of 16,702 households, representative at the national and regional level. The female module
of the survey was applied to all women aged 15-49 living in the households sampled. This
module includes questions on health, anthropometrics, demographics, fertility and women
status within the household, providing information on the birth and mortality history of
their children, as well as on the age at first cohabitation, which is used to measure child
marriage. On the other hand, the survey provides little information on labour market
outcomes and does not record the age at marriage. The questions on maternal health only
target the last child of the women and data on children’s health status are only recorded
for those children aged 0-5 at the time of the survey.
In total, the female survey was applied to 16,515 women aged 15-49 living in the 11
Ethiopian regions. Out of these women, 8,685 live in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, SNNP,
Tigray and Amhara, the regions that approved the RFC between 2000 and 2007 and that
will be used in the analysis. The remaining 6 Ethiopian regions were excluded from the
analysis for two reasons. First, four of these regions did not implement the rise in the
legal age for marriage before 2008. Therefore, even if the RFC was approved in these
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regions before 2011, women that were 15 when the RFC was approved would still be
underage at the time of the survey. Second, the regions of Gambela and Oromia were
excluded from the analysis because despite having approved the RFC before 2008, they
did not seem to enforce it in any way10. Thus, the inclusion of these two regions in the
analysis would decrease the magnitude and significance of the parameter of interest in the
first stage equation, reducing the efficiency of the parameter that yields the effect of early
cohabitation on infant mortality and potentially leading to a problem of weak instruments.
Out of the 8,685 women living in these 5 regions, I use in the analysis the sample of
5,078 women aged 18-49, that ever cohabited with a partner11 and gave birth to their first
child more than one year ago12. Table 1.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the main
variables used in the analysis for this sample of 5,078 women. However, it is important to
remark that the regression discontinuity analysis does not use all these women to estimate
the parameters of interest but only those that fall within the bandwidth used in the non-
parametric analysis or the relevant window in the parametric analysis. Given that the
estimates yielded by RDD are local in the sense that they are interpreted as the effects
for those women that were approximately 15 when the RFC was approved in their region,
the table also includes the mean of the variables for those women aged 14-15 at the time
of the rise in the legal age of marriage.
The table shows that the age in 2011 for the women aged 14-15 when the RFC was
approved ranges between 18 (in Tigray) and 26 (in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The
average number of years of education among these women is very low (less than 3), high-
lighting that most Ethiopian women are probably out of school by the time they start
cohabiting with a partner. The participation in the labour market among the women
in the sample exceeds 30% and approximately 60% of these women live in rural areas.
Interestingly, 13% of women aged 14-15 when the RFC was approved in their region had
separated or divorced from their first cohabiting partner.
10This pattern can be observed in figure 1.17 in appendix 1.B.
11The percentage of women that gave birth without ever cohabiting with a partner only represents the
1.1% of all the women that gave birth to at least one child in these regions.
12Because infant mortality is defined as mortality within the first year of life, the sample is restricted to
those women that gave birth to their first child more than one year ago to avoid censoring in the dependent
variable.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: Women that ever cohabited and ever bore a child in the regions
included in the study.
Full sample
Aged 14-15 at RFC. (Aged 18-49 2011)
Standard Diff (FS
N Mean deviation Min Max N Mean - 1y bw)
Women characteristics
Age (2011) 308 23.38 2.28 18 26 5,078 32.88 9.50
Age at policy 308 14.58 0.49 14 15 5,078 25.36 10.78
Work (0/1) 308 0.33 0.47 0 1 5,077 0.36 0.03
Anaemia (0/1) 292 0.20 0.40 0 1 4,824 0.17 -0.03
Years schooling (compl.) 308 2.89 3.93 0 15 5,078 2.16 -0.73
Rural (0/1) 308 0.58 0.49 0 1 5,078 0.71 0.13
Muslim (0/1) 308 0.31 0.46 0 1 5,078 0.21 -0.10
Eth. Oromiya (0/1) 308 0.23 0.42 0 1 5,078 0.12 -0.11
Marriage market
Age at 1st cohab 308 16.13 3.18 8 24 5,078 16.43 0.30
Child married (0/1) 308 0.66 0.47 0 1 5,078 0.65 -0.01
Currently partner (0/1) 308 0.86 0.34 0 1 5,078 0.83 -0.03
Divorced (0/1) 308 0.13 0.33 0 1 5,078 0.12 -0.01
Same partner (0/1) 308 0.73 0.45 0 1 5,076 0.62 -0.11
Empowerment index (0-2) 265 0.92 0.41 0 2 4,181 0.89 -0.03
Particip. social life decisions (0-2) 265 1.06 0.68 0 2 4,175 1.03 -0.03
Particip. health decisions (0-2) 265 1.01 0.62 0 2 4,170 0.97 -0.04
Particip. purchase decisions (0-2) 264 0.79 0.56 0 2 4,164 0.75 -0.04
Particip. husband earnings (0-2) 262 0.83 0.48 0 2 4,142 0.82 -0.01
Age difference with partner 266 6.35 4.58 -5 30 4,171 7.82 1.47
Years of schooling (partner) 307 4.12 4.59 0 16 4,999 3.53 -0.59
Wealth index (1-5) 308 3.48 1.55 1 5 5,078 3.18 -0.30
Fertility outcomes
N children 308 1.85 1.01 1 7 5,078 4.22 2.37
Age at 1st birth 308 18.30 2.78 11 25 5,078 18.89 0.59
Interval cohab. first child (months) 308 27.59 26.59 0 158 5,078 31.57 3.98
First born characteristics
Years since born 308 4.96 2.75 1 12 5,078 13.94 8.98
Male (0/1) 308 0.56 0.50 0 1 5,078 0.52 -0.04
Deceased before 1st year (0/1) 308 0.09 0.28 0 1 5,078 0.10 0.01
Maternal and infant health: First born
N antenatal visits 107 3.39 3.49 0 12 520 3.41 0.02
Delivery at home (0/1) 164 0.48 0.50 0 1 862 0.48 0.00
N vaccines (1-9) 144 6.44 2.76 0 9 781 6.44 0.00
Postnatal check (0/1) 66 0.06 0.24 0 1 312 0.06 0.00
Months breastfeed 63 23.14 12.14 0 51 240 20.69 -2.45
Note: Descriptive statistics are provided for two different samples: (a) women aged 18-49 in the five regions
of interest that ever cohabited with a partner and have given birth and (b) women aged 18-49 in the five
regions of interest that were 14-15 when the RFC was approved in their region, ever cohabited with a partner
and have given birth. The last column reports the difference in means between these two samples.
The mean age at cohabitation for the women in the full sample is approximately 16.4
years, and more than 60% of these women first cohabited with their partner before the
age of 18 years. If we focus on the sample of individuals aged 14-15 when the RFC was
introduced in their region, the incidence of child marriage falls from 70% among those
women aged 15 at the time of the RFC to 60% among those women aged 14 and therefore,
exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18 years. Similarly, the mean age at first cohabitation
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increases from 15.8 to 16.6 for the same groups of women13. The differences in terms of
age at cohabitation and prevalence of child marriage between women aged 14 and women
aged 15 at the time of the RFC are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance
levels.
In the full sample, the mean age of women at first birth is 18.9 years and the average
interval between cohabitation and first birth is 31.6 months. The mean age at birth
and the mean interval between cohabitation and first birth are smaller (18.3 and 27.6)
among those women aged 14-15 when the RFC was introduced in their region. The infant
mortality rate of the first born among the women in the full sample is 10%. If we focus
on the women aged 14-15 when the RFC was introduced in their region, the probability
of infant mortality of the first born falls from 12% among the women aged 15 when the
RFC was introduced to 5% among the women aged 14 at the same time and therefore,
exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18 years. This difference is statistically significant
at the 5% level of significance.
Figure 1.4: Age at cohabitation, age at birth and infant mortality of the first born (LOWESS
regressions)
Figure 1.4 displays the statistical association between women’s age at cohabitation, age
13The large incidence of child marriage and the low age at cohabitation among the youngest women in the
sample, which represent an important part of the women within one year from the cut-off, is mechanically
driven by the way in which the sample is selected. Because the sample only includes women aged 18-49 that
have given birth to their first child more than one year ago and have ever cohabited, it is very likely that
the vast majority of the youngest women in the sample (e.g. aged 18 or 19) cohabited with their partner
before the age of 18. The evolution of the prevalence of child marriage across age cohorts in Ethiopia could
be better observed in figure 1.12 in appendix 1.B, which is constructed using the women aged 18-49 in the
DHS data regardless of whether they ever cohabited or gave birth.
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at first birth and infant mortality of the first born during teenage years. The statistical
relation between the variables is estimated using LOWESS regressions for the sample of
women used in the analysis. Although these relations should not be interpreted as causal,
the figure shows a strong correlation between age at first birth and infant mortality during
puberty. The graph suggests that delaying age at first birth from 15 to 17 is associated
with a decrease in the incidence of infant mortality of the first born from approximately
13.5% to 7.5%. On the other hand, rises in the age at first birth after the age of 17
are associated with smaller reductions in the probability of infant mortality of the first
born. Although the slope of the estimated function that displays the statistical association
between age at cohabitation and infant mortality of the first born during early adolescence
is less pronounced, the negative statistical association between these two variables is also
evident in the graph.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 The Effect of the RFC on the Age at Cohabitation
The first condition for the validity of the identification strategy outlined in section 1.4 for
the estimation of (a) the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 on the probab-
ility of infant mortality of the first born and of (b) the effect of the age at cohabitation on
infant mortality of the first born, is the existence of a discrete change in the mean age at
first cohabitation at the cut-off. The size and statistical significance of this discontinuity
is yielded by the parameter α1 in the first stage equation. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of table
1.2 report the estimates for this parameter using non-parametric techniques with differ-
ent estimation procedures and bandwidths. The results of the preferred estimation are
reported in column 3 and show that exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 relative to
the possibility of getting legally married at 15 increases women’s age at cohabitation by
approximately 2 years. The coefficients of the variable when the alternative bandwidths
and non-parametric estimation procedures are used are also large and positive. Overall,
the coefficients measuring the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 across the
different non-parametric estimations are statistically significant at the 1% and satisfy the
relevance condition (F>10) required for the estimation of the second stage equation.
The results reported in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of table 1.3 show that the rise in the
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age at first cohabitation for women younger than 15 when the RFC was implemented in
their region remains large (0.8-1.8 years) and statistically significant when equation 1.1 is
estimated using parametric methods with several windows and spline polynomials for the
forcing variable. The sharp change in the mean age at cohabitation at the cut-off is also
evident in figure 1.5. Consistently, the results reported in column 1 of table 1.4 show that
the rise in the mean age at cohabitation is accompanied by a decrease in 20 percentage
points in the incidence of child marriage at the cut-off. The results of the first stage
equation are in line with the main conclusions of the descriptive analysis conducted in
section 1.3 showing how the distribution of the age at cohabitation changes across cohorts
of women exposed to a different legal age of marriage.
Figure 1.5: Main analysis: Age at first cohabitation at the cut-off
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Table 1.2: Non-parametric methods: RFC, age at first cohabitation and infant mortality.
Conventional Bias-corrected Robust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant
1st cohab Mortality 1st cohab Mortality 1st cohab Mortality
Bandwith A: Calonico et al. (2016)
Age<15 at RFC 1.774*** -0.073** 2.055*** -0.079** 2.055*** -0.079*
( 0.000) ( 0.034) ( 0.000) ( 0.021) ( 0.000) ( 0.051)
Age at 1st cohab. -0.041** -0.038** -0.038*
( 0.031) ( 0.044) ( 0.095)
N 5078 5078 5078
N effect. obs. 581 990 990
Bandwidth 24.0 40.3 40.3
Bandwith B: 1.5 × C C T
Age<15 at RFC 1.380*** -0.073*** 1.584*** -0.082*** 1.584*** -0.082***
( 0.000) ( 0.007) ( 0.000) ( 0.002) ( 0.000) ( 0.008)
Age at 1st cohab. -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052**
( 0.004) ( 0.005) ( 0.016)
N 5078 5078 5078
N effect. obs. 874 1451 1451
Bandwidth 36.1 60.5 60.5
Bandwith C: 0.75 × C C T
Age<15 at RFC 1.869*** -0.078* 2.081*** -0.082* 2.081*** -0.082
( 0.000) ( 0.074) ( 0.000) ( 0.059) ( 0.000) ( 0.122)
Age at 1st cohab. -0.042* -0.039* -0.039
( 0.068) ( 0.086) ( 0.172)
N 5078 5078 5078
N effect. obs. 453 733 733
Bandwidth 18.0 30.2 30.2
Note: Each coefficient provided in the table is estimated using a separate regression. The table reports the estimates
of interest for the first stage (FS), reduced form (RF) and second stage (SS) equations using different bandwidths
and the three procedures decribed in Calonico et al. (2016): conventional variance estimator, bias-corrected variance
estimator and robust variance estimator. The coefficients for the variable Age<15 at RFC measure the effect of
the RFC on the age at first cohabitation (first stage) in columns 1, 3 and 5; and the effect of the law on the
prevalence of infant mortality (reduced form) in columns 2, 4 and 6. The coefficients for the variable Age at 1st
cohab measure the effect of delaying one year the age at cohabitation during teenage years on the prevalence of
infant mortality (second stage equation). The results provided for Bandwidth A are estimated using the optimal
bandwidth calculated following Calonico et al. (2016). The results provided for Bandwidths B and C are estimated
using 1.5× the optimal bandwidth and 0.75× the optimal bandwidth. The specifications include the following
control variables: dummies for the regions of residence, the age of women at survey, ethnic and religion affiliation,
gender of the first born, a rural/urban dummy variable and a non-parametric function for the age of the women
at RFC. The sample size and the bandwidths used in the RF, FS and SS regressions are the same within each
estimation procedure and bandwidth used. Standard errors are clustered at the forcing variable. P-values are in
parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
The evolution of the prevalence of child marriage and mean age at cohabitation across
age cohorts observed in figure 1.5 deserves two additional comments. First, the large
discontinuity at the cut-off and the polynomial behaviour at the right of the cut-off are
consistent with the hypothesis that through pushing women slightly over 15 when the
RFC was introduced to get married before the approval of the RFC, the introduction of
the RFC could have reduced the mean age at cohabitation for the cohorts of women aged
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just above 15 at the time of the RFC. For example, a woman slightly older than 15 years
old when the RFC was approved had the possibility of getting legally married as soon as
she turned 15, but if she waited some months and the RFC is approved, she would not be
able to get legally married until the age of 18. This fact might push women aged 15 at the
time of the RFC that were planning to get married over the next 2-3 years to marry as
soon as they turned 15. This fact has an important implication for the interpretation of
the results: the estimates of interest in the first stage and reduced form equations measure
the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 relative to the possibility of getting
married at 15, rather than to exposure to a legal age of marriage at 15.
Table 1.3: Parametric methods using different time windows: RFC, age at first cohabitation
and infant mortality.
2 years window (N= 571) 3 years window (N= 849) 4 years window (N= 1,164) 5 years window (N= 1,432)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant
1st cohab mortality 1st cohab mortality 1st cohab mortality 1st cohab mortality
Spline Pol. order 1
Age<15 at RFC 1.707*** -0.076** 1.057*** -0.076** 0.919*** -0.053** 0.849*** -0.047**
( 0.000) ( 0.022) ( 0.001) ( 0.022) ( 0.001) ( 0.041) ( 0.002) ( 0.040)
Age at 1st cohab -0.045** -0.045** -0.058** -0.055**
( 0.012) ( 0.012) ( 0.041) ( 0.041)
Spline Pol. order 2
Age<15 at RFC 1.552*** -0.080* 1.565*** -0.070** 1.335*** -0.068** 1.159*** -0.058*
( 0.000) ( 0.054) ( 0.000) ( 0.035) ( 0.000) ( 0.029) ( 0.000) ( 0.051)
Age at 1st cohab -0.052** -0.045** -0.051** -0.050**
( 0.040) ( 0.025) ( 0.021) ( 0.039)
Spline Pol. order 3
Age<15 at RFC 1.552*** -0.080* 1.552*** -0.097** 1.321*** -0.069** 1.106*** -0.058*
( 0.000) ( 0.054) ( 0.000) ( 0.018) ( 0.000) ( 0.036) ( 0.001) ( 0.064)
Age at 1st cohab -0.052** -0.057*** -0.052** -0.052*
( 0.040) ( 0.010) ( 0.032) ( 0.055)
Spline Pol. order 4
Age<15 at RFC 1.552*** -0.080* 1.552*** -0.097** 1.782*** -0.100* 1.360*** -0.082**
( 0.000) ( 0.054) ( 0.000) ( 0.018) ( 0.003) ( 0.061) ( 0.002) ( 0.032)
Age at 1st cohab -0.052** -0.057*** -0.056** -0.060**
( 0.040) ( 0.010) ( 0.043) ( 0.030)
Note: Each coefficient provided in the table is estimated using a separate regression. The table reports the estimates
of interest for the first stage (FS), reduced form (RF) and second stage (SS) equations using the sample of women
aged within different age windows around the cut-off and spline polynomials of order 1 to 4 for the forcing variable.
The coefficients for the variable Age<15 at RFC measure the effect of the RFC on the age at first cohabitation
(first stage) in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7; and the effect of the law on the prevalence of infant mortality (reduced form)
in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. The coefficients for the variable Age at 1st cohab measure the effect of delaying one year
the age at cohabitation during teenage years on the prevalence of infant mortality (second stage equation). The
specifications include the following control variables: dummies for the regions of residence, the age of women at
survey, ethnic and religion affiliation, gender of the first born, a rural/urban dummy variable and a spline polynomial
function of order 1 to 4 for the age of the women at RFC. The order of the polynomial function for the forcing
variable used in every specification is reported above each estimation set. Standard errors are clustered at the
forcing variable. P-values are in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
Second, beyond the large discontinuity at the cut-off, the figure suggests that the
prevalence of child marriage is larger among the younger women in the sample, exposed to
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a legal age of marriage at 18. Although we cannot expect child marriage to be eradicated
among women exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18, the fact that the largest incidence
of child marriage in the sample is found for the youngest cohorts of women is apparently
puzzling. To reconcile this paradox, one should take into account that the sample used in
the analysis only includes women that ever cohabited with a partner and have given birth
to their first child at least one year before the survey. In this scenario, the prevalence
of child marriage among the youngest cohorts of women in the sample, barely aged 18
at the time of the survey, is expected to be very close to 100%. The true evolution of
the prevalence of child marriage across age cohorts in Ethiopia is presented in figure 1.12
in appendix 1.B. Using the full sample of women aged 18-49 included in the DHS data
regardless of whether they ever cohabited with a partner or have given birth, the figure
shows that the prevalence of child marriage is lower among younger cohorts of women,
and changed dramatically at the cut off.
1.6.2 The Effect of the RFC on Infant Mortality
The next step is determining whether the 20 percentage points drop in the incidence of
child marriage and the 2 years increase in the mean age at cohabitation at the cut-off for
women exposed to a legal age of marriage at 18 affected the probability of infant mortality
of the first born. This effect is yielded by the parameter δ1 in equation 1.2. The estimates
for this parameter using non-parametric estimations with different estimation procedures
and bandwidths are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 of table 1.2. The coefficients suggest
that exposure to a minimum age of marriage at 18 years relative to the possibility of
getting legally married at 15, decreases significantly the probability of infant mortality of
the first born by 7.3-8.2 percentage points, depending on the bandwidth and estimation
procedure selected. The preferred estimate is reported in column 6 and yields an effect
of 7.9 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10%. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of
table 1.3 provide the estimates for the parameter δ1 using parametric techniques with
different windows and spline polynomials of order 1 to 4 for the forcing variable. Overall,
the estimates presented in these two tables confirm the robustness of the results to the
use of parametric and non-parametric methods with different bandwidths, windows and
polynomial functions for the forcing variable. The discontinuity in the infant mortality
rate of the first born for those women older than 15 at the time of the approval of the
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RFC is graphically displayed in figure 1.6.
The magnitude of the effect of exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 on the infant
mortality of the first born at the cut-off seems large, particularly when compared with
the mean incidence of infant mortality of the first born among the women in the sample
(10%). However, the interpretation of this coefficient requires a few considerations. First,
women just above the cut-off had the opportunity of getting legally married as soon as
they turned 15, but if they wait a few months and the RFC is approved, they would
face a legal age of marriage at 18. The main implication for this, discussed in the next
to last paragraph in section 1.6.1, is that the parameter of interest in the reduced form
equation measures the effect on infant mortality of the first born of exposure to a legal
age of marriage at 18 relative to the possibility of getting legally married at the age of 15,
rather than to exposure to a legal age of marriage at 15 years.
Figure 1.6: Main analysis: Infant mortality rate at the cut-off
Second, the RDD estimates of the effects on infant mortality of the first born presented
in this section are larger but aligned with those obtained in simple correlation analysis.
For example, the results of the LOWESS analysis displayed in figure 1.4 reveal that delay-
ing the age of women at first cohabitation from 15 to 17, which is the approximate change
in mean age at cohabitation at the cut-off, would be associated with a decrease of approx-
imately 3.5-4 percentage points in the incidence of infant mortality of the first born.
Third, the estimates of the parameter δ1 discussed in this section should be interpreted
as local treatment effects: they measure the effect on infant mortality of exposure to a
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minimum age of marriage at 18 for those women in the sample that were approximately
15 years old when the RFC was approved in their region. These are women that when
they were surveyed in 2011, had an age ranging between 25 (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)
and 18 years (Tigray), have already cohabited with a partner and have given birth to their
first child more than one year before the survey.
1.6.3 The Effect of Women’s Age at Cohabitation on Infant Mortality
The causal effect of women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years on the infant mor-
tality of the first born is yielded by the parameter β1 in the second stage equation. The
results for the non-parametric estimations are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 of table 1.2
and reveal that a one-year delay in the age at first cohabitation decreases the probability
of infant mortality of the first born by 3.8-5.2 percentage points, depending on the band-
width and estimation procedure used. The preferred estimation, reported in column 3,
indicates that a one-year delay in the age of women at cohabitation decreases the probab-
ility of infant mortality of the first born by 3.8 percentage points. The effect is statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level. The results for the effect of women’s age at co-
habitation reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of table 1.3 confirm that the findings of
the non-parametric analysis are robust to the use of parametric techniques with different
windows and spline polynomials of order 1 to 4 for the forcing variable.
When interpreting the coefficients of the second stage equation, it is important to
consider that the estimated effect of early cohabitation on the infant mortality of the first
born is a local average treatment effect. More specifically, the parameter of interest in the
regression measures the effect of a one-year delay in the age at cohabitation during teenage
years for those women in the sample that were approximately 15 years old when the RFC
was approved in their region and delayed cohabitation because they were exposed to a
legal age of marriage at 18 years.
1.6.4 Robustness Checks
Using parametric and non-parametric methods, the previous section shows that exposure
to a minimum age of marriage at 18 relative to the possibility of getting legally married at
15 increases significantly age at cohabitation and decreases the incidence of child marriage
and infant mortality of the first born. In this section, I discuss and explore alternative
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explanations for the results.
Firstly, one important threat to the attribution of the effects identified on infant mor-
tality to the rise in the legal age for marriage would be that the RFC not only raised the
legal age for marriage but also set some additional provisions aiming to change the balance
of power within the household through facilitating the procedure of divorce, abolishing the
right of husbands to forbid women to work and providing women the right to administer
the common marital property. These legal changes may have improved women economic
status, empowerment and participation in household decisions ultimately affecting infant
mortality.
Table 1.4: RFC and different outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Child Age at 1st Paid Empowerment Decision Decision Decision Decision Divorced
marriage cohabit. work index relative visits HH purchases health husband earn (Only ever cohab)
Age<15 at RFC -0.200*** 2.094*** 0.098 -0.054 -0.318** 0.132 -0.059 -0.063 0.018
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.211) ( 0.395) ( 0.014) ( 0.247) ( 0.643) ( 0.275) ( 0.686)
N 5078 5078 5077 4181 4175 4164 4170 4142 5078
N effect. obs. 958 812 1176 1035 801 771 898 893 958
Bandwidth 39.2 33.1 48.1 49.3 38.0 37.4 42.2 42.9 39.5
Note: Each coefficient provided in the table is estimated using a separate regression. The table reports the estimates
of interest for the reduced form (RF) equation using the optimal bandwidth and the robust variance estimator
described in Calonico et al. (2016). The coefficients for the variable Age<15 at RFC measure the effect of the
RFC on the outcome variable analyzed. The regressions conducted include as control variables a set of dummies
for the regions of residence, the age of women at survey, ethnic and religion affiliation, gender of the first born, a
rural/urban dummy variable and a non-parametric function for the age of the women at RFC. Standard errors are
clustered at the forcing variable. P-values are in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
Although this seems a plausible possibility, the point here is that all of these norms
were applied retrospectively regardless of whether women were already married or not, and
therefore, they should not affect differently women aged just below and above 15 years
when the RFC was approved. Nonetheless, I examine empirically whether the law affected
differently labor force participation, divorce rates and participation in household decisions
of women at both sides of the cut-off. To measure woman participation in household
decisions, I use a set of questions in the DHS survey that provide information on who
decides on relative visits, household purchases, health expenditure and the administration
of the money earned by the husband. Each of these variables take the value of 0 if the
woman does not participate in the decision, 1 if the woman participates in the decision
and 2 if the decision is taken alone by the woman. Then, I construct a self-reported
empowerment index for each woman as an average score in these questions. Using each
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of these self-reported empowerment measures, labor force participation and divorce rates
as dependent variables, I estimate equation 1.2. The results reported in table 1.4 suggest
that, overall, the new dispositions included in the RFC aiming to change the balance of
power within the household did not affect differently labor force participation, divorce
rates and participation in household decisions of women at both sides of the cut-off. In
consequence, the evidence confirms that the effect on infant mortality identified in the
study is not driven by these additional norms aiming to improve women’s bargaining
power within the household.
Secondly, I examine the existence of discontinuities in variables that are plausibly
not affected by the reform including the ethnicity and religion of the women and the
gender of their first born. This is an indirect empirical test for the second identification
assumption discussed in section 1.4: the determinants of infant mortality should be con-
tinuously related to the forcing variable at the cut-off. In order to test this hypothesis,
I estimate equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 using the bias-corrected RD estimates with robust
variance estimator and an optimal bandwidth calculated following Calonico et al. (2014)
and whether the first born is male, whether the mother is Muslim or from Oromo ethnic
group14 as outcome variables. The results of these estimations are provided in columns
1-6 of table 1.5. The coefficients are small and largely insignificant, confirming that there
is not any discontinuity in the value of these placebo variables at the cut-off. The absence
of discontinuities at the cut-off for these placebo variables is also evident in figure 1.7.
Thirdly, I examine whether the difference in infant mortality rates of the first born
among women at both sides of the cut-off could be driven by systematic differences between
women born in different months of the year rather than by exposure to a different minimum
age of marriage. To assess this possibility, I re-estimate equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 setting a
placebo cut-off for women older than 19, rather than 15, at the time of the approval of the
RFC15. This exercise is equivalent to placing the cut-off as if the law was applied exactly
four years before the true date of approval (e.g. 4th of July of 1996 for Addis Ababa and
14Oromo is the most prevalent ethnic group in Ethiopia.
15The set of the placebo cut-off at 19 years is driven by the convenience of setting the false cut-off at
a value of the forcing variable that left out of the estimation the observations around the real cut-off.
Nonetheless, I have also conducted the analysis setting the placebo cut-off for women aged 16, 17 and
18 at the time of the approval of the RFC. This exercise is equivalent to placing the cut-off as if the law
was introduced exactly 1, 2 and 3 years before the true date of approval. Consistently, the results of
these placebo analyses, not reported in the study, show no statistically significant discontinuities in infant
mortality and age at cohabitation at the false cut-offs when the bandwidth drop from the estimation the
observations in the real cut-off
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Dire Dawa, etc). If the results of the study on infant mortality are driven by systematic
differences between women born in different months, we would expect a discontinuity in
the infant mortality rate of the first born among women born in different months every
year. The results of this placebo test are reported in columns 7 and 8 of table 1.5 and
they reveal no discontinuities for the mean age at cohabitation or the infant mortality rate
at the false cut-off, confirming that the main conclusions of the study are not driven by
systematic differences between women born in different months of the year.
Table 1.5: Robustness checks Infant Mortality: Placebo analyses.
Placebo outcomes
Ethnicity Gender Religion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS Age at SS/RF Ethnic. FS Age at SS/RF FS Age at SS/RF
1st cohab Oromo 1st cohab Male 1st cohab Muslim
Age<15 at RFC 1.984*** -0.015 2.068*** -0.039 1.999*** 0.037
( 0.000) ( 0.762) ( 0.000) ( 0.727) ( 0.000) ( 0.598)
Age at 1st cohab. -0.006 -0.018 0.017
( 0.834) ( 0.755) ( 0.648)
N 5078 5078 5078
N effect. obs. 874 874 874
Bandwidth 36.6 36.9 36.2
Placebo: RFC 48 months before Placebo: Other Ethiopian regions Control for year first born
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at SS/RF Infant FS Age at Infant
1st cohab Mortality 1st cohab Mortality 1st cohab Mortality
Age<15 at RFC 0.167 -0.001 -0.469 -0.007 1.107*** -0.074**
( 0.666) ( 0.961) ( 0.213) ( 0.789) ( 0.000) ( 0.023)
Age at 1st cohab. -0.007 0.015 -0.066*
( 0.963) ( 0.810) ( 0.053)
N 5078 2398 5078
N effect. obs. 2733 1458 1286
Bandwidth 89.5 106.9 53.1
Note: Each coefficient provided in the table is estimated using a separate regression. The table reports the estimates
of interest for the first stage (FS), reduced form (RF) and second stage (SS) equations using the optimal bandwidth
and the robust variance estimator described in Calonico et al. (2016). The coefficients for the variable Age<15 at
RFC measure the effect of the RFC on the age at first cohabitation (FS) and on the outcome variable analyzed (RF).
The coefficients for the variable Age at 1st cohab measure the effect of delaying one year the age at cohabitation
during teenage years on the outcome variable analyzed (SS). The sample size and the bandwidths used in the RF,
FS and SS regressions are common within every outcome analyzed. Columns 1-6 report the results for placebo
variables, arguably unaffected by the RFC. Columns 7 and 8 report the results of a placebo test with a false cut-off
set 4 years before the approval of the RFC. Columns 9 and 10 report the results of a placebo test using the regions
that did not approve the RFC by the time of the survey: Affar, Harari and Gumuz. The regressions conducted for
the estimation of the coefficients reported in columns 1 to 10 include as control variables a set of dummies for the
regions of residence, the age of women at survey, ethnic and religion affiliation, gender of the first born, a rural/urban
dummy variable and a non-parametric function for the age of the women at RFC. Ethnic, gender and religion are
not included as control variables in the regressions where these variables are the outcome variables. Columns 11
and 12 report the results for the infant mortality including as an additional control variable a time trend for the
year of birth of the infant, aiming to account for over time changes in the incidence of infant mortality. Standard
errors are clustered at the forcing variable. P-values are in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
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Figure 1.7: Placebo variables: ethnicity, religion and gender
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Figure 1.8: Placebo test: Cut-off at 19 years
Fourthly, it is also possible that the parameter could be capturing an odd time trend or
the effect of national level policies affecting differently women at both sides of the cut-off.
In order to test this hypothesis, I re-estimate the results using the Ethiopian regions of
Afar, Harari and Gumuz, setting falsely the approval date of the RFC in these placebo
regions in July 200016. I restrict the analysis to these three regions because none of them
passed the RFC before 200817 and therefore, the women used in the sample (older than
18 years at the time of the survey) were unaffected by the rise in the legal age at marriage
in these regions. The results of this placebo test are reported in columns 9 and 10 of
table 1.5 and they show that there is not any significant discontinuity in the mean age
at cohabitation or in the infant mortality at the cut-off in those regions that have not
approved the RFC, ruling out the possibility that the effect is driven by a national level
16The 4th of July of 2000 the Federal Government of Ethiopia approved the RFC and the law started
to be applied in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.
17I exclude the region of Somali because it is unclear their exact date of introduction (Hallward-Driemeier
and Gajigo, 2015)
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policy affecting differently women at both sides of the cut-off.
Figure 1.9: Placebo test: Discontinuity in other Ethiopian regions
Fifthly, since the law plausibly affected the age at first birth of women at the cut-off,
it is very likely that those women aged 14 years and 11 months at the time of the approval
of the RFC ended up having their first child significantly later than those aged 15 years
and 1 month. In this context, the parameters δ1 and β1 could be only capturing over-time
decreases in infant mortality unrelated with the age at first cohabitation. I investigate this
possibility through re-estimating equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 including the year of birth of
the first born as a control variable. The inclusion of this variable is aiming to capture time
trends in infant mortality18. The estimates provided in columns 10 and 11 show that the
direction and significance of the parameters estimated in sections 1.6.1, 1.6.2 and 1.6.3 do
not vary when the year of birth of the first child is included in the regression. The latter
18The year of birth of the first born is not included as control variable in the main results reported
in section 1.6 because the year of birth could be to some extent a fertility decision of the mother and
therefore, plausibly affected by the age at cohabitation. Thus, including it in the main regression could
lead to a bad control problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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suggests that the reduction in the rate of infant mortality of the first born at the cut-off
is not entirely driven by over time decreases in infant mortality.
Sixthly, the main results of the study are also robust to restricting the analysis to
the subsample of women that by the time of the survey were still living with their first
partner. The results of this robustness check are reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 1.7
in appendix 1.C.
Another potential threat to the interpretation of the estimates could be the possible
existence of selective migration. In other words, those women below the age of 15 when the
legal age of marriage was raised in their region that were particularly interested in early
cohabitation could have migrated to regions that did not raise the legal age of marriage. If
the share of women migrating for this reason is substantial, the results might be biased by
selective attrition at one side of the cut-off. Although the lack of information on women’s
region of origin hindered the assessment of this hypothesis, the fact that the incidence of
child marriage is above 10% in every Ethiopian region even among those women exposed
to a legal age of marriage at 18 years could be indicating that those women (or women’s
families) particularly interested in cohabiting before the age of 18 may not need to migrate
to another region to do so. Furthermore, the lack of discontinuity in the density of the
forcing variable at the cut-off evident in figure 1.11 in appendix 1.A suggests that the
migration of women slightly younger than 15 when the RFC was approved was not a
widespread phenomenon.
I also explore the robustness of the results to the use of neonatal mortality as a de-
pendent variable rather than infant mortality. For this, I re-estimate equations 1.1, 1.2
and 1.3 focusing on mortality of the first born within the first month of life, rather than
within the first year. The estimates obtained for neonatal mortality of the first born have
the same sign and statistical significance although the magnitudes are even larger than
those obtained for infant mortality of the first born19. Therefore, the evidence confirms
that the results of the study are robust to the definition of the dependent variable and
suggests that most of the effect of child marriage on the mortality of the first born occurs
during the first month of life of the newborn.
19These results are not reported in the tables provided in the study. The estimates reveal that exposure
to a legal age of marriage at 18 years relative to the possibility of getting married at 15 reduces the incidence
of neonatal mortality of the first born at the cut-off by 9.0 percentage points. The effect of a one-year
delay in women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years on the probability of neonatal mortality of the
first born is estimated at 4.5 percentage points.
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One important threat to the attribution of the effects identified on infant mortality
to the rise in the legal age for marriage would be that the RFC not only raised the legal
age for marriage but also set some additional provisions aiming to change the balance of
power within the household through facilitating the procedure of divorce, abolishing the
right of husbands to forbid women to work and providing women the right to administer
the common marital property. These legal changes may have improved women economic
status, empowerment and participation in household decisions ultimately affecting infant
mortality. Although this seems a plausible possibility, the point here is that all of these
norms were applied retrospectively regardless of whether women were already married or
not, and therefore, they should not affect differently women aged just below and above 15
years when the RFC was approved. Nonetheless, I examine empirically whether the law
affected differently labour force participation, divorce rates and participation in house-
hold decisions of women at both sides of the cut-off. To measure woman participation
in household decisions, I use a set of questions in the DHS survey that provide informa-
tion on who decides on relative visits, household purchases, health expenditure and the
administration of the money earned by the husband. Each of these variables take the
value of 0 if the woman does not participate in the decision, 1 if the woman participates
in the decision and 2 if the decision is taken alone by the woman. Then, I construct a
self-reported empowerment index for each woman as an average score in these questions.
Using each of these self-reported empowerment measures, labour force participation and
divorce rates as dependent variables, I estimate equation 1.2. The results reported in table
1.4 suggest that, overall, the new dispositions included in the RFC aiming to change the
balance of power within the household did not affect differently labour force participation,
divorce rates and participation in household decisions of women at both sides of the cut-
off. In consequence, the evidence suggests that the effect on infant mortality identified in
the study is not driven by these additional norms aiming to improve women’s bargaining
power within the household.
Finally, the possibility of women manipulating their reported age in the survey (the
base for the construction of the forcing variable) is examined conducting a McCrary test.
Figure 1.11 in appendix 1.A shows that the density of the age of women changes smoothly
at the cut-off suggesting that women just below or above the cut-off age did not systematic-
ally misreport their age in the survey. Finally, the potential bias induced by measurement
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error in the reported age at cohabitation in the second stage equation is addressed through
the use of women’s age at RFC as an instrumental variable in the regression.
Figure 1.10: RFC and women characteristics
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1.7 Mechanisms
One potential mechanism driving the effect of early cohabitation on infant mortality of the
first born could be the age of women at first birth. Figure 1.4 shows the strong negative
association between age at first born and infant mortality among early teenage girls in the
Ethiopian data. This negative association between age at first birth and infant mortality
during teenage years is well documented in the medical literature and could reflect that the
body of teenage women is still not optimal for the development of a successful pregnancy
and/or the effect of psychological maturity on the adoption of adequate antenatal and
postnatal health behaviours (Olausson et al., 2007, 1999).
To examine this mechanism, I re-estimate equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 using fertility
outcomes, antenatal and postnatal behaviours as dependent variables in the reduced form
and second stage equations. The results on fertility outcomes are displayed in columns
1 to 4 of table 1.6 and confirm that although delaying cohabitation causally reduces the
number of months between cohabitation and first birth, it also increases significantly the
age of women at first birth. In line with this age at birth mechanism, the results reported
in columns 7 and 8 suggest that the effect of age at cohabitation on infant mortality
vanishes for infants given birth after the first born.
On the other hand, the effect of the age at cohabitation on the adoption of antenatal
and postnatal health practices is mixed. The results reported in columns 17 to 26 indicate
that delaying cohabitation increases significantly the probability of conducting a postnatal
check. The coefficients measuring the effect of women’s age at cohabitation on the prob-
ability of giving birth at home and on the duration of breastfeeding have the expected sign
(negative the former and positive the latter) although the magnitudes are small and stat-
istically insignificant when the optimal bandwidths are used. However, the coefficients for
vaccinations and antenatal visits in the second stage equations have an unexpected negat-
ive sign, although statistically insignificant at conventional confidence levels. Nonetheless,
it is important to remark that the results on the adoption of antenatal and postnatal
health behaviours should only be interpreted as suggestive because DHS data only report
information on these variables when the first born is alive and was born less than 5 years
ago. For some of these variables, the information is only available if the child is also the
last birth of the women before the survey. This could be problematic because on the one
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hand the sample size used in the analysis is much smaller, reducing the statistical power of
the estimations and on the other hand, the limitations in the data collection may induce
a problem of sample selection bias.
Nonetheless, the age at cohabitation could also affect infant mortality of the first
born through other paths. For example, a younger age of the women at cohabitation
may lead to lower levels of participation in household decisions (Jensen and Thornton,
2003). Since women and men have different preferences for investment in children’s health
(Allendorf, 2007; Majlesi, 2014), early cohabitation may lead to higher infant mortality
rates. Similarly, a younger age at cohabitation may affect investments in child’s health and
infant mortality through constraining women’s education (Field and Ambrus, 2008) and
impacting labour market outcomes (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2013). On the other hand,
given the existence of a premium for early marriage in the marriage market (Wahhaj,
2015), it is also possible that early marriage impacts infant mortality through affecting
marriage market outcomes.
To investigate these paths of impact, I estimate the effect of early cohabitation on
different women outcomes including participation in household decisions, marriage mar-
ket outcomes, labour force participation and education attainment. The results of the
estimates for equations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 using these outcomes as dependent variables are
reported in columns 5 to 6, 9 to 16 and 27 to 28 of table 1.6. The results confirm that
exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 and delaying age at cohabitation do not seem
to affect relevantly labour force participation for women, participation in household de-
cisions, years of education and marriage market outcomes including age difference with
partner, wealth index and partner’s years of education.
Jointly, these results suggest that the effect on infant mortality of delaying age at
cohabitation during teenage years for women seems to operate mainly through increasing
the age at first birth. On the other hand and given the data limitations, we cannot rule
out that the effect is also channelled through larger levels of antenatal and postnatal
investments for girls cohabiting later. However, given the lack of effect of the age at
cohabitation on self-reported empowerment, labour market outcomes or education, any
potential effect of the age at cohabitation on infant mortality via antenatal and postnatal
investments would probably be linked to an older age at first birth and a more mature
behaviour leading to larger adoption of antenatal and postnatal health measures.
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1.8 Conclusions
This study uses a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact for women of ex-
posure to a legal age of marriage at 18 years on the incidence of child marriage, mean
age at cohabitation and infant mortality of the first born. Then, the study estimates the
causal effect of women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years on the probability of
infant mortality of the first born. The methodological design exploits age discontinuities
in exposure to a law that raised the legal age of marriage for women from 15 to 18 years
in some regions of Ethiopia.
The RDD estimates suggest that exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 years
relative to the possibility of marrying legally at 15 increases significantly the mean age at
cohabitation by 2 years and decreases the incidence of child marriage by approximately
20 percentage points. Besides, the analysis reveals that increasing the minimum age of
marriage in the law has beneficial effects on infant mortality. In the preferred estimation,
exposure to a legal age of marriage at 18 relative to the possibility of getting legally
married at the age of 15 decreases the probability of infant mortality of the first born
child by 7.9 percentage points. The reduction in the probability of infant mortality of
the first born child caused by a delay of one year in women’s age at cohabitation during
teenage years is estimated at 3.8 percentage points. These results are robust to the use of
different estimation methods, alternative bandwidths, windows and up to 4th order spline
polynomials for the forcing variable. Different placebo tests are also conducted to rule
out the possibility that the effects are driven by over time reductions in infant mortality,
systematic differences between women born in different months of the year, other legal
dispositions included in the RFC or by national level policies affecting differently women at
both sides of the cut-off. There is also no evidence of discontinuities in variables plausibly
unaffected by the change in the minimum age of marriage neither of manipulation in
the forcing variable at the cut-off. Finally, the results are robust to the use of neonatal
mortality as dependent variable, suggesting that most of the effect of child marriage on
infant mortality occurs during the first month of life.
The effects of delaying cohabitation on infant mortality are aligned with existing evid-
ence from studies that use correlation analysis to explore the link between early marriage,
teenage pregnancy and infant mortality. For example, Raj et al. (2010) find an odds
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ratio of 1.5, statistically significant at the 95%, for the statistical association between in-
fant mortality and women that marry before the age of 18 in India. In this line, using
household data from Nepal, Adhikari (2003) shows that neonatal mortality rates among
children of mothers 15-19 are 73% higher than among children of mothers 20-29. The
effect of one-year delay in women’s age at first cohabitation on the probability of infant
mortality of the first born found in this study is comparable to the joint effect on child
mortality at the village level of moving from 0% coverage of measles, BCG, DPT, Polio
and Maternal Tetanus vaccinations to 100% (McGovern and Canning, 2015)20.
However, although the effects on infant mortality found in the study are large, it is
important to acknowledge that the estimates yielded by the RDD employed are local and
therefore, any generalization of these results to the whole population of Ethiopian women
or to non-first born children should be avoided. Indeed, the analysis does not find any
effect of early cohabitation on the infant mortality of children that are not the first born.
The analysis of mechanisms suggests that the strong effect of early cohabitation on
infant mortality of the first born seems to be driven by the positive effect of delaying
cohabitation on the age at first birth. However, due to data limitations, it is not possible
to disentangle whether this age at birth effect is caused by purely biological reasons or by
a more mature behaviour raising the adoption of antenatal and postnatal health measures.
On the other hand, the analysis rules out the possibility that the effect of early cohabitation
on infant mortality of the first born is driven by an effect of the former on marriage market
outcomes, participation in household decisions, education or labour force participation for
women.
This study contributes to the thin literature that documents the negative effects of child
marriage, providing also a credible methodological alternative to previous studies relying
on instrumental variable that can be used to expand the analysis to other outcomes and
settings. Besides, although the effects estimated should be interpreted as local, the study
shows for the first time that, even if imperfectly enforced, laws increasing the legal age
of marriage can contribute to reducing infant mortality. Finally, the study provides the
first causal evidence on the beneficial effect on infant mortality of delaying women’s age
at cohabitation.
20Using DHS data from 62 countries, McGovern and Canning (2015) estimate at 0.73 the relative risk
of child mortality at the village level associated with moving from 0% coverage of measles, BCG, DPT,
Polio and Maternal Tetanus vaccinations to 100%. At the cut-off, the relative risk of the infant mortality
of the first born associated with a one-year increase in the age at cohabitation is estimated at 0.75.
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Appendix 1.A McCrary Test: Density of the Forcing Vari-
able at the Cut-Off
Figure 1.11: Density of the forcing variable at the cut-off.
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Appendix 1.B Additional Graphs
Figure 1.12: RFC and child marriage: Includes all women (not only those that ever cohabit
and gave birth)
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Figure 1.13: Age at first cohabitation and infant mortality of first born: Full sample of women
(18-49)
Figure 1.14: Age at 1st cohabitation by age cohort.
50
Figure 1.15: Mechanisms: Fertility, marriage market outcomes and other women outcomes
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Figure 1.16: Mechanisms: Maternity and child health for first born
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Figure 1.17: Age at first cohabitation at the cut-off for the Ethiopian regions that approved
RFC between 2000 and 2007
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Appendix 1.C Sample of Women Still Cohabiting with the
First Partner
Table 1.7: Only women still cohabiting with first cohabit.
Age at Infant
birth Mortality Years school Anaemia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FS RF/SS FS RF/SS FS RF/SS FS RF/SS
Age<15 at RFC 1.233*** 1.204*** 1.291*** -0.097* 1.324*** -1.020 1.268*** -0.094
( 0.005) ( 0.001) ( 0.003) ( 0.085) ( 0.002) ( 0.260) ( 0.003) ( 0.228)
Age at 1st cohab. 0.977*** -0.076* -0.766 -0.075
( 0.003) ( 0.082) ( 0.420) ( 0.351)
N 3126 3126 3126 2985
N effect. obs. 595 651 651 739
Bandwidth 34.8 37.9 37.1 43.0
Empowerment Years school Age
index partner Difference Work
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
FS RF/SS FS RF/SS FS RF/SS FS RF/SS
Age<15 at RFC 1.270*** -0.116* 1.286*** -0.028 1.336*** -0.964 1.258*** -0.014
( 0.004) ( 0.098) ( 0.003) ( 0.981) ( 0.002) ( 0.293) ( 0.004) ( 0.861)
Age at first cohabit. -0.091 -0.022 -0.692 -0.011
( 0.156) ( 0.984) ( 0.349) ( 0.874)
N 3118 3102 3112 3125
N effect. obs. 593 647 691 626
Bandwidth 34.4 37.9 39.2 36.5
Note: The analysis reported in the table is conducted using the sample of women 18-49 that ever bore a
child and still cohabit with first partner. Each coefficient provided in the table is estimated using a separate
regression. The table reports the estimates of interest for the first stage (FS), reduced form (RF) and
second stage (SS) equations using the optimal bandwidth and the robust variance estimator described in
Calonico et al. (2016). The coefficients for the variable Age<15 at RFC measure the effect of the RFC
on the age at first cohabitation (FS) and on the outcome variable analyzed (RF). The coefficients for the
variable Age at 1st cohab measure the effect of delaying one year the age at cohabitation during teenage
years on the outcome variable analyzed (SS). The sample size and the bandwidths used in the RF, FS
and SS regressions are common within every outcome analyzed. The regressions conducted include as
control variables a set of dummies for the regions of residence, the age of women at survey, ethnic and
religion affiliation, gender of the first born, a rural/urban dummy variable and a non-parametric function
for the age of the women at RFC. Standard errors are clustered at the forcing variable. P-values are in
parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
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Chapter 2
Cognitive Skills and Intra-Household Alloca-
tion of Schooling
2.1 Introduction
Understanding how households allocate resources among their members has been an in-
quiry of primary interest for economists for decades (Chiappori and Meghir, 2014), with
important implications for the intergenerational transmission of human capital (Datar
et al., 2010). One key aspect of the intra-household allocation of resources is the role of
cognitive skills in the distribution of school investments across the children of a household.
Do parents allocate more schooling to more able children or do they try to compensate
less skilled children with more schooling? Answering this question is of crucial import-
ance for the design of effective policies that pursue improvements in education for all the
population. For example, if parents focus their school investments in their most endowed
children, supply-side schooling interventions such as reductions in class size or schools
construction may benefit mostly the most able children while demand-side schooling in-
terventions that target the less able children such as conditional cash transfers could be
more effective in promoting universal schooling (Akresh et al., 2012).
The winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics Gary Becker proposes in his seminal
book A Treatise on the Family (Becker, 1981) a theoretical model that conceptualizes the
intra-household allocation of human and nonhuman capital investments across siblings.
One of the main predictions of the model is that siblings with higher returns to human
capital receive larger human capital investments. Assuming that returns to human capital
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investments are larger the higher the cognitive ability (Appleton, 2000; Becker, 1981),
the model predicts that parents reinforce genetic differences in cognitive skills through
allocating more human capital investments to more able siblings and compensate less
endowed siblings with more nonhuman capital investments.
Using longitudinal data from rural Ghana, this study builds in the existing literature
and tests one of the predictions of Becker’s model: Do parents allocate investments in
education reinforcing cognitive differences between siblings? More specifically, the study
assesses whether in a context in which the intra-household variation in school attendance
across siblings in compulsory and post-compulsory school age is large, better cognitive
skills relative to the rest of the siblings in the household affect the probability of attending
school. This chapter makes three contributions. First, the study adds evidence to the
thin literature that examines whether cognitive skills affect the intra-household allocation
of school investments. Second, to achieve this objective, the study uses 4 rounds of a
panel dataset from rural Ghana. The empirical strategy relies on the use of cognitive tests
applied in the first round of the survey as treatment variables to proxy for cognitive skills,
and school attendance the subsequent years as dependent variable in the specification.
Variables aiming to capture human capital investments before the implementation of the
cognitive tests are included as control variables in the specification to address endogeneity
concerns. Although this empirical strategy is not without its limitations, I show that
it represents an advantage relative to previous papers investigating the same question.
Finally, this is the first study testing whether the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation
of schooling across siblings depends on the gender of the child, household wealth, household
size or on whether the household is polygynous.
I find suggestive evidence that parents reinforce cognitive skills differences through
allocating more schooling to those children that score better in cognitive skills tests. These
results are aligned with previous papers that assess empirically the role played by cognitive
skills in the intra-household allocation of investments in education (Kim, 2005; Akresh
et al., 2012; Ayalew, 2005) and provide support for the main prediction of Becker’s model.
Furthermore, the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings
seems larger for boys than for girls although the evidence is not conclusive. On the other
hand, the results also suggest that the magnitude of this effect does not depend on the
household characteristics analysed.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the conceptual framework.
Then, section 2.3 summarizes the literature that investigates the role played by child
endowments in the allocation of resources across siblings. Section 2.4 introduces some
relevant aspects of the educational system in Ghana. Section 2.5 describes the data.
Section 2.6 presents the empirical strategy and section 2.7 discusses the main results of
the study. Then, section 2.8 examines whether the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation
of schooling across siblings varies across different types of households and depends on the
gender of the child. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual framework: Becker (1981)
This section summarizes the theoretical model developed in Becker (1981)1. This model
aims to formalize the intra-household allocation of human and nonhuman capital across
the siblings of a household. In it, parents maximize a utility function that depends on
their own current consumption and on the future wealth of their children:
U = U(c, I1, .., In) (2.1)
where c is the consumption of the parents in the present and Ii indicates the future wealth
of child i. The future wealth of a child is described as a function of the human capital and
nonhuman capital investments received by this child:
Ii = R
h
i (hi, ai)hi +R
mmi (2.2)
where hi and mi indicate the level of human and nonhuman capital resources that parents
allocate to child i. Rhi is the rate of return on human capital for child i, ai indicates
the cognitive skills of the same child, and Rm is the market rate of return on nonhuman
capital. The model assumes that while the rate of return on human capital function is
concave in the investment level and higher the larger the innate cognitive skills, the rate
of return on nonhuman capital is constant in the investment level and independent of
innate cognitive skills implying that it is the same across siblings. Formally, if Rhi (hi, ai)
and Rmi are the functions of marginal returns on human and nonhuman capital, Becker’s
model assumes that δRhi /δhi < 0, δR
h
i /δai > 0, δR
m
i /δmi = 0 and δR
m
i /δai = 0. The
1The notation used is based on Kim (2005).
57
assumption made in Becker’s model of a larger marginal rate of return on human capital
for better endowed siblings has some empirical support in the literature (Appleton, 2000).
Parents maximize their utility function through allocating human and nonhuman cap-
ital resources until the marginal rate of return on human capital is equal across siblings
and also equal to the rate of return on nonhuman capital. Formally, the latter condition
can be expressed as follows: Rh1 = R
h
2 = ... = R
h
n = R
m.
The model yields two main predictions. First, because they have higher returns on
human capital, more able siblings receive larger levels of human capital investments than
less cognitively endowed siblings. In consequence, with their human capital investments,
parents reinforce cognitive differences between siblings. This prediction is straightforward
in the model: if under optimal levels of investment across siblings Rh1(h1, a1) = ... =
Rhn(hn, an) = R
m, δRhi /δhi < 0, δR
h
i /δai > 0 and for the following two siblings we assume
a1 > a2, then h1 > h2. More generally, the model implies that δh/δa > 0.
The second prediction of the model is that parents compensate siblings with lower
returns on human capital through allocating them larger bequests or other nonhuman
capital resources (e.g. inter-vivos transfers unrelated with education or health). The
implication of this prediction is that less able siblings receive larger nonhuman capital
investments. To see how the model leads to this conclusion, I use as example a household
with two siblings where a1 > a2. In this household, parents maximize their utility when
δU
δI1
/
δU
δI2
= R2R1 , where Ri is the rate of return from additional investments in child i.
Because in the optimal level of investments R1 = R2 = R
m, the former condition can only
be satisfied when I1 = I2. Thus, if a1 > a2 and h1 > h2, the condition I1 = I2 can only
be achieved if m1 < m2.
Using a sample of Ghanaian children, the core of this study focuses on testing the first
prediction of the model using years of schooling as a measure of human capital investments
and the scores in different cognitive tests as proxies for cognitive skills. Furthermore, us-
ing the conceptual framework described above as a departing point, section 2.8 examines
whether the magnitude of the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across
siblings depends on the gender of the child and on household level characteristics such
as household size, polygyny status or household wealth. Unfortunately, the lack of in-
formation on the intra-household allocation of nonhuman capital resources precludes the
empirical assessment of the second prediction of the model.
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2.3 Related Literature
Several studies assess empirically the effects of child endowments on the allocation of
human and nonhuman capital resources across siblings, testing the predictions of the
Becker’s model presented in section 2.2. Most of these studies focus on examining the
effect of health endowments such as birthweight or body mass index (BMI) on the intra-
household allocation of health, schooling and other inter-vivos transfers. The evidence
is mixed and while some of these studies find that children with better health seem to
receive larger levels of health (Jere R. Behrman, 1994; Pitt et al., 1990) and educational
investments (Jere R. Behrman, 1994; Paul Miller, 1995), other studies suggest that parents
favour less endowed children with more education (Frijters et al., 2010; Griliches, 1979; Jere
R. Behrman, 1982; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000; Leight, 2014) and health investments
(Datar et al., 2010; Ayalew, 2005). The evidence is also inconclusive on whether children
with worse health receive more nonhuman capital transfers, including inter-vivos transfers
unrelated with health or education (McGarry and Schoeni, 1995; Dunn and Phillips, 1997;
Hochguertel and Ohlsson, 2009; Wolff, 2006) .
Although plenty of studies assess whether child endowments affect the intra-household
allocation of human capital investments, only a few of them investigate the specific role of
cognitive endowments. Indeed, there are only three studies that use data on cognitive tests
to explore empirically the role of cognitive endowments in the allocation of human capital
investments across the children of the household. The main methodological challenge
in these studies is the potential endogeneity in the link between the results in cognitive
tests such as IQ, Raven or Digit Span tests obtained by the child and the human capital
investments that this child has received.
The first study that addressed empirically this research question was Kim (2005).
Using data from high schools in the state of Wisconsin, in the US, the author shows
that conditional on a wide set of household and individual level controls, higher scores
in IQ tests are associated not only with receiving larger human capital investments but
also with receiving larger inter-vivos transfers unrelated with education. This finding
provides evidence in favour of the first prediction of Becker’s model but against the second.
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the statistical association between IQ
and investments received is partially driven by reverse causality.
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Using cross-sectional data from Ethiopia, Ayalew (2005) finds that while parents al-
locate more health investments to children with worse cognitive abilities, they also tend to
reinforce cognitive differences through allocating more educational investments to those
children that have better cognitive skills. To measure these skills, the author constructs
a proxy variable for innate cognitive ability as follows. First, the score obtained in the
Raven cognitive test is regressed against individual characteristics of the child including
age, gender and years of schooling. Then, the residuals in the latter regression are used as
a proxy for innate cognitive ability in a main specification that includes school attendance
as dependent variable and the residuals of the Raven score regression as the explanatory
variable. The main problem of this empirical strategy is that, in order to overcome the
endogeneity in the link between years of schooling and the Raven score in the first regres-
sion, years of schooling are instrumented with land and livestock owned. This solution
would violate the instrumental variables exclusion restriction if land or livestock owned
affect the performance in the Raven test through any mechanism other than through years
of schooling. If so, the estimated effect of innate ability on school attendance in the main
regression would also be biased.
The most recent paper that investigates the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation
of schooling investments across siblings is Akresh et al. (2012). Relying on panel data from
Burkina Faso, the authors show that higher scores in cognitive tests and better parents’
expectations regarding future earnings relative to the rest of the siblings in the household,
increase significantly school attendance. The study uses the results of Raven, Forward
Digit Span and Backward Digit Span tests as direct measures of cognitive skills. Then,
to test whether the results are driven by reverse causality, the authors exploit the panel
data dimension of the data restricting the analysis to (a) children aged 5 to 7 years old
and therefore, not yet enrolled in school at the time of the collection of the first wave of
surveys, and to (b) children in grades 1 and 2, for whom the authors argue that the score
in the cognitive tests is not significantly affected by school attendance.
Remarkably, the results of these three studies in terms of the effect of cognitive skills
on the allocation of investments in education across siblings are in line with the first pre-
diction of Becker (1981). On the other hand, both Kim (2005) and Ayalew (2005) fail to
find any evidence of reinforcing mechanisms in terms of other human capital investments
(e.g. health investments) or compensatory behaviour using nonhuman capital transfers.
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In the light of the existing evidence, some studies suggest that differences in parental
investments across their children might not be primarily caused by larger returns on in-
vestments in some of the children in the household (Kim, 2005; Mechoulan and Wolff,
2015). For example, Kim (2005) suggests that the allocation of human and nonhuman
capital resources across siblings could be mainly driven by parental differences in affection
for their children.
2.4 Education in Ghana
When Ghana achieved its independence in 1957, the vast majority of its citizens lacked ac-
cess to education (MacBeath, 2010). The post-colonial government implemented different
programmes with the objective of increasing access to primary and secondary education
across the country and although the process faced important challenges such as the lack of
qualified teachers, the enrolment rates raised dramatically in all the country (MacBeath,
2010; Addy, 2013). Over the following decades, a free and compulsory educational system
was consolidated in Ghana, with average levels of enrolment and gender parity above the
average for Sub-Saharan countries (UNESCO, 2014; USAID, 2009). World Bank data
from 2013 show that while the average net enrolment rates in primary and secondary
education in sub-Saharan Africa were 77% and 33%, the net enrolment rates in primary
and secondary education in Ghana were 87% and 52%. Furthermore, and unlike other
Sub-Saharan countries, the net enrolment rates in primary and secondary education in
Ghana are not significantly different for boys and girls (GSS, 2015).
However, despite achieving relatively large average enrolment rates and gender par-
ity, the education system in Ghana is facing important challenges. An analysis of some
of them is provided in UNESCO (2014). Together with the lack of infrastructure and
delayed attendance, two threats gather the attention from policy makers and interna-
tional organizations working in West Africa. First, different reports highlight that the
quality of primary and secondary education is deficient in many schools in both urban
and rural areas2. Indeed, Ghana took last position in the 2015 OECD Global Education
ranking in the category Math and Science. This report ranked internationally the qual-
ity of education for different subjects in 76 countries3. Second, Addy (2013) shows that
2See for example the UNICEF country report available at:http://www.unicef.org/about/
annualreport/files/Ghana_COAR_2010.pdf
3see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32608772
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school attendance remains low in the less-developed areas of the country, particularly in
the north of Ghana, where average enrolment rates in primary and secondary education
are significantly lower than national averages. For example, according to the 2014 Ghana
Demographic and Health Survey, the net enrolment rates in primary and secondary school
in the regions where the villages sampled are located were 68.1 and 30.0 in the Northern
Region and 73.1 and 30.4 in the Upper East Region (GSS, 2015). Interestingly, girls in
these regions are slightly more likely to be attending primary school than boys.
After the 2009 reform, formal education in Ghana is structured in three different parts.
The basic education starts at age 4 and finishes at 15, and it is free and compulsory. During
the basic education cycle, the students follow 2 years of pre-school education, 6 years of
primary education and 3 years of junior secondary school. In this education cycle, grade
promotion is automatic if the child attends school regularly during the year. At the end
of the third year of the junior secondary school, the students are eligible to take the Basic
Education Certificate Examination (BECE). Passing the latter exam gives students access
to senior secondary education or vocational education in Ghana. Both the senior secondary
education and vocational education last for three years and the state provides them for
free in public schools. However they are not compulsory and promotion at the end of the
year is based on school performance. At the end of secondary school, the students are
eligible to take the West African Senior School Certificate Examination, which is required
to access tertiary education. Although the duration of tertiary education depends on the
academic degree undertaken, bachelor degrees in public universities typically last for four
years and most students face small tuition fees.
2.5 Data
The analysis conducted in this study relies on four rounds of a household panel survey
conducted annually between 2012 and 2015 for the impact evaluation of the Millennium
Villages Project in the districts of Builsa and West Mamprusi in northern Ghana. The
survey targets every year the same 2250 households in 103 villages in the districts of Builsa
and West Mamprusi. During this period, a total of 2,080 households were successfully
interviewed every year.
With the first round of the survey, implemented in 2012, the enumerators applied
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three widely used cognitive tests aiming to measure cognitive skills of every person aged
5-19 in the sample regardless of whether this person ever attended school: the Raven’s
Progressive Matrices, the Digit Span Forward (DSF) and the Digit Span Backward (DSB)
tests. The Raven’s Progressive Matrices is a nonverbal test developed by John C. Raven
in 1936 that measures abstract reasoning and has been used to measure fluid intelligence.
The test administered includes 12 questions and the score ranges between 0 and 12. In
these questions, the children have to identify the missing element that completes patterns
of increasing difficulty until they get an answer wrong4. The test was designed to be
unambiguously interpretable and easy to administer (Raven et al., 1994). Although the
test was constructed to be affected as little as possible by education and experience, some
studies suggest that these two features may influence test performance. For example,
Ayalew (2005) and Alderman (1995) show that boys in rural areas in Pakistan and Ethiopia
obtain significantly higher scores in the Raven test than girls, casting doubts on whether
the score is influenced by human capital investments.
The DSF and DSB tests are components of the Wechsler memory scales (WMS) and
the Wechsler intelligence scales for adults and children (Woods et al., 2011). In these
tests, the children have to repeat different strings of numbers both in the order stated
by the enumerator (forward test) or in reverse order (backward test). The strings of
numbers increase in length as the child answers correctly up to a total of 8 digits and
the score ranges between 0 and 16. These tests measure working memory and ability to
concentrate5. Following Akresh et al. (2012), I compute age-adjusted z-scores6 for each of
these cognitive tests so that the mean and the standard deviation of the score in each test
for children of the same age in completed years are 0 and 1.
A crucial stage of the study is the construction of variables that measure investments
in education. Given that the study is set in deprived areas of a low-income country with
large intra-household variation in terms of school attendance, I follow Akresh et al. (2012)
and use school attendance as a measure of school investments. Information on school
attendance is collected yearly at the individual level in the survey during the period 2012-
2015. The survey includes two different questions aiming to record school attendance.
4An example of a question in the Raven Matrices test is provided in appendix 2.A.
5Examples of questions in the Digit Span Forward and Backward tests are provided in appendix 2.A.
6Age-adjusted z-score are computed through subtracting to every cognitive test score the mean score
of the same test for the children with the same age in completed years and then dividing by the standard
deviation of the score for these children.
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First, enumerators collect information on years of schooling for every child equal or older
than 3 years old. Using this information, I construct a measure of school attendance
between 2013 and 2015 as the difference in years of schooling reported in 2015 and in
2012. Second, the survey also asks whether children equal or older than 3 years old
attended school at any point during the previous 12 months. I use this information to
construct a variable that ranges between 0 and 3 and measures how many years during
the period 2013-2015 the individual has attended school at least once during the last 12
months.
The main concern with the second attendance measure is that it might not truly
capture relevant attendance because children that for example attend school for just one
week during the year might be categorized as attending school using this criteria. Indeed,
the percentage of children aged 5-18 that attended school at least once during the last
twelve months remains above 70% for children aged 5-18 and over 60% for individuals aged
between 19-21. Furthermore, since only 27% of the households with more than 1 child
in school age present between-siblings variation in terms of school attendance at some
point in the last 12 months, this measure of school attendance is not ideal to conduct
the analysis proposed. On the other hand, the main concern with the first attendance
measure is that it is constructed using years of schooling rather than attendance, which
might not be driven only by school attendance but also by the ability of the individual to
promote to the next school grade. Although this concern could be relevant for children
undertaking senior secondary school, tertiary education or vocational education where
access and grade promotion at the end of the school year is not automatic, the share of
children in the sample attending any of these educational levels at baseline is below 2%.
In the light of these facts and given the intermittent school attendance of most children
in the sample7, the school attendance variable based on the difference in years of schooling
reported in 2012 and in 2015 seems to be more adequate to measure investments in educa-
tion than the school attendance variable based on whether a child attended school at least
once in the last 12 months. Nonetheless, and although the main analysis uses the measure
of school attendance based on the difference between years of schooling reported in 2015
and in 2012 as the main dependent variable, I also test the robustness of the results to
the use of the alternative school attendance measure mentioned above.
7The prevalence of intermittent school attendance is discussed at the end of paragraph 10 in section
2.5.
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The sample of primary interest for the analysis are those children aged 5-18 that are
sons or daughters of the household head and live in a household interviewed every year
over the period 2012-2015 with at least two siblings aged 5-18 when the first round of
the survey was implemented in 2012. In total, 4,003 children from 1,468 households fulfil
these conditions. However, and despite all these children were eligible for the cognitive
tests, only 2,489 of these children from 1,010 households took at least one of the three
cognitive tests. The majority of children that did not take any cognitive test were not at
home at the time of the interview, accounting for 62-71% of the eligible children that did
not take the test, depending on the cognitive test examined. The rest of these children
were at home but decided not to take any cognitive test.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Individual characteristics of children aged 5-18 in 2012.
Took cognitive Did not take
test cognitive test
Standard Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation Difference
Individual level characteristics
Age 10.29 3.74 11.53 4.30 -1.23***
Female 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 -0.02
Sibling rank 3.41 2.20 3.67 2.65 -0.26**
Health insurance scheme 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.48 0.07***
Ever attend. school 0.85 0.36 0.74 0.44 0.11***
Attendance 2012 0.81 0.39 0.67 0.47 0.14***
N years attended 2013-2015 2.47 1.00 2.01 1.26 0.47***
Years of school 2012 3.59 2.89 3.77 3.63 -0.18
Years of school 2015-2012 1.51 1.20 1.36 1.26 0.16***
Paid work 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 -0.10***
Raven test results (1-12) 4.09 2.14
Raven age-adjusted z-score -0.01 1.00
Digit span forward results (1-16) 4.42 3.00
DSF age-adjusted z-score 0.00 1.00
Digit span backward results (1-16) 1.75 1.91
DSB age-adjusted z-score 0.01 1.01
N of households 1,010 765
N of children 2,489 1,514
Note: Values of individual level characteristics based on the first round of the survey (2012).
The number of households that corresponds to the 1,514 children eligible to take the test that
did not take it is 765 rather than 458 because some of these 1,514 children are from some of the
1,010 households where at least one child took a cognitive test.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on child level characteristics for the sample of
interest. The statistics are presented separately for children that took the cognitive tests
and for children that did not. The average number of correct answers in the sample of
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children that took the cognitive tests was 4.09 for the Raven Matrices test, 4.42 for the
DSF test and 1.75 for the DSB test. The share of girls in this sample is 0.46 and the mean
age of these children is 10.29 years.
The data reveal that 85% of the children aged 5-18 in 2012 that took the cognitive
tests ever attended school and that 81% of these children attended school at least once
in the last 12 months. Consistently, the table shows that the average number of years
during the period 2013-2015 that these children attended school at least once is 2.47. The
corresponding net attendance rate to primary and secondary school among this sub-sample
of children in the data is 53% and 23.4%8. The net enrolment rates found in the sample
are smaller than the net enrolment rates reported in GSS (2015) for the Northern and
the Upper East regions for primary (68.1% and 73.1%) and secondary education (30.0%
and 30.4%). When attendance during the same period is measured using the difference
between years of schooling in 2015 and 2013, the average number of years of schooling
completed during the relevant period for the sample of children that took at least one of
the cognitive tests is 1.51.
Figure 2.1 provides further insights into school attendance and years of schooling by age
for the sample of children that took at least one of the cognitive tests. The figure reveals
that the share of individuals aged 5-21 that attended school at some point in the last twelve
months remains over 70% until the age of 18 and over 60% at the age of 21. Interestingly,
the share of children attending school decreases slightly but constantly from the age of
10. Besides, the figure shows that the slope of the LOWESS regression that displays the
relation between the age and the years of schooling is well below 1 during all the period
of interest. Combined with the fact that the percentage of children that reports having
attended school at least once in the last 12 months remains above the 80% for children
younger than 16 years old, the small slope in every point of the function suggests that
despite attending school at some point during the year, many of these children might not
be attending school regularly during the year.
Worth to mention, table 2.1 also shows that children that did not take the cognitive
tests are on average 14 percentage points less likely to have attended school at least once
during the last 12 months, 1.2 years older, 10 percentage points more likely to have a job,
8Primary education includes the 6 years of primary education, excluding the 2 years of pre-primary
education. The group of reference for the calculation of the net enrolment rate in primary education are
children aged 6 to 12 years old. The secondary education includes the 3 years of junior secondary school
and the 3 years of senior secondary school. The group of reference are the children aged 13 to 18 years old.
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Figure 2.1: School attendance by age (year 2012)
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7 percentage points less likely to have a health insurance and have a higher sibling rank.
On the other hand, there is not any significant difference between children that did and
did not take cognitive tests in terms of gender, years of schooling at baseline and years of
schooling completed between 2012 and 2015.
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics on household characteristics collected in the
first round of the survey (2012) for the sample of households surveyed every year that have
at least 2 children that were eligible to undertake the cognitive tests. The information
is provided separately for those households in which at least one child took one or more
cognitive tests and for those in which despite having eligible children, none of them took
any of the cognitive tests. The descriptive statistics reveal that 88% of the households in
the sample with at least one child that took the cognitive tests live on a level of per capita
consumption below the national poverty line, 31% of them are polygynous and only 9%
of them are female headed. The average household size in the sample of interest is 8.18
and the average number of household members aged below 18 is 4.64.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Household characteristics of children aged 5-18 years in 2012.
HH took HH did not take
cognitive tests cognitive tests
Standard Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation Difference
Household level characteristics
P/c expenditure (cedis) 742.37 654.74 723.25 618.73 19.12
Poor 0.88 0.33 0.90 0.30 -0.02
Economic shock index (0-5) 3.46 1.31 3.47 1.37 -0.01
MVP area 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 -0.01
Polyg. household 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 -0.02
Monog. household 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.02
One-parent household 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 -0.00
Years school of HH 1.24 3.14 1.12 3.21 0.12
HH female 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.29 -0.01
HH age 46.97 12.93 48.54 12.48 -1.57**
N of hh members 8.18 3.08 8.96 4.05 -0.78***
N of children hh members 4.64 2.12 5.13 2.78 -0.49***
Ratio female members over total hh members 0.51 0.16 0.49 0.16 0.02**
Ratio female children over total children 0.48 0.26 0.47 0.26 0.02
N of households 1,010 458
Note: Values of household level characteristics based on the first round of the survey (2012). First sample is formed
by those household with at least one child aged 5-18 undertaking one cogntive test. Second sample is formed by those
households with eligible children in which none of the them took any cognitive test.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
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2.6 Empirical Strategy
This section introduces the empirical strategy for the estimation of the effect of cognitive
skills on the allocation of school attendance across siblings using four rounds of data
collected for the evaluation of the Millennium Villages Project in northern Ghana. The
main challenge for the identification of this effect arises from the fact that the link between
cognitive skills and school attendance is likely affected by reverse causality or unobservable
factors such as parental preferences. Indeed, although the cognitive tests used to measure
cognitive skills are designed with the intention of being unaffected by schooling, culture
and family background (see for example Raven et al. (1994)), it is not possible to rule out
the possibility that these measures are themselves affected by schooling or by any other
differential treatment that some children within the household may receive (Ayalew, 2005;
Glewwe, 1999; Akresh et al., 2012).
An additional challenge when estimating the effect of cognitive skills on years of school-
ing arises from the fact that approximately the 38% of the eligible children in the sample
did not take any of the cognitive tests. The restriction of the sample used in the analysis to
only the children that took the cognitive tests could lead to a problem of sample selection
bias. In line with this hypothesis, table 2.1 shows that those children that took at least
one cognitive test are different from those that did not in terms of key characteristics such
as labour force participation, sibling rank or school attendance.
To overcome these challenges, I follow Cueto et al. (2014) and propose the two steps
procedure developed in Heckman (1979). In the first stage, I estimate equation 2.3 using
a Probit model:
TakeCogTesti,h = ω1Xi,h + ω2Zh + ui,h (2.3)
where TakeCogTesti,h is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if child i in household h
took the cognitive test and X is a vector of child-level variables that are likely to affect
the probability of taking the cognitive tests. This vector of variables includes school
attendance, labour force participation, years of schooling, gender of the child, a proxy
for health investments, sibling rank, labour force participation and a vector of dummies
indicating the age in completed years of the child. Zh is a vector of household level
characteristics that could affect the probability of taking the cognitive tests. The vector of
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household level variables includes per capita expenditure, an index of exposure to economic
shocks, polygamy status, education and gender of the household head, household size, the
number of children in the household, the number of male household members under 18
years and enumerator, village and time at survey fixed effects9. Both the individual and
the household level characteristics included in the regression as right-hand side variables
are measured in the first round of the survey (2012).
Once equation 2.3 is estimated, the next step is the calculation of the Inverse Mills
Ratio (IMR), also known as selectivity correction term. The latter is calculated for every
child as the coefficient of the standard normal density function of the predicted probab-
ility of taking cognitive test for every child divided by the standard normal cumulative
distribution function of the predicted probability of taking the cognitive test for the same
child.
In the second stage, I estimate using OLS the following equation:
Y earsSchooli,h = ω1CognitiveSkillsi,h + ω2Xi,h + δh + ui,h (2.4)
where Y earsSchooli,h is the number of years that the child i in household h went to school
between the years 2013 and 2015, CognitiveSkillsi,h indicates the age-adjusted z-score in
the cognitive test taken in 2012 for child i and Xi,h is a vector of child level characteristics
in 2012 that includes gender, a proxy for health investments, sibling rank, a set of dummy
variables for age, the IMR, years of schooling and school attendance. The specification
also includes a dummy for every specific household surveyed. This vector of household
fixed effects dummies account for differences in all the factors that are constant within a
household. ui,h is the error term in the regression. The parameter of interest is ω1. Since
household fixed effects are included in the regression, ω1 yields the average effect on the
number of years that the child attended school between 2013 and 2015 of an increase in
one standard deviation in the cognitive test score of the child relative to the mean score of
his siblings. Note that since the values of the variable CognitiveSkills (measured in 2012)
are not affected by school attendance between 2013 and 2015 and because the specification
is already accounting for years of education and school attendance in 2012, the parameter
9The term fixed effects in this context implies that a dummy variable is included in the specification for
every specific value found in the data for the variable of interest. For example, village fixed effects implies
that a dummy is included in the specification for every village surveyed. The time at survey fixed effects
is a vector of dummies for the hour of the day in which the enumerators started surveying the household.
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ω1 is not affected by the reverse causality problem. Furthermore, sample selection bias
in equation 2.4 is addressed through the inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio (Heckman,
1979) as a control variable.
A potential limitation of the identification strategy presented in equation 2.4 is that in
addition to innate cognitive ability and school investments, the cognitive skills measured
in 2012 might be affected by other human capital investments. The household fixed effects
may account for this problem if the investments are equal across siblings. As described
in Akresh et al. (2012), the problem would arise if for example parents allocate more
health investments to those siblings that have worse cognitive skills. If this is the case and
the specification does not account adequately for health investments, the parameter that
measures the effect of cognitive skills on schooling would be biased downwards. The best
way I can cope with this problem is through including in the regression a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the child is registered with the National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS) and 0 otherwise. The NHIS is a health insurance provided by the state.
Registration with the NHIS is at the individual level and it is subject to a yearly fee that
varies depending on the socioeconomic situation of the household. In this context, I use
this variable to account for within household variation in the health investments received
by the children.
2.7 Results
Table 2.3 presents the results of the first stage regression. The table shows that the child-
level determinants of cognitive tests uptake are the same for the three tests examined.
Being male, school attendance and lower age are factors positively associated with the
uptake of cognitive tests. In the specifications with household fixed effects, the health
insurance variable is also positive and statistically significant. Among the household level
determinants, per capita expenditure, the number of male household members aged below
18 and whether the household head is male for the DSB test are negatively associated
with the probability of children undertaking the cognitive tests.
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Table 2.3: First stage (Probit coefficients): Participation of children in cognitive skills tests
(children 5-18 in 2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Take Raven Take Raven Take Take Take Take
Test Test DSF test DSF test DSB test DSB test
Female -0.130*** -0.151** -0.127*** -0.139* -0.117** -0.141*
(0.049) (0.076) (0.049) (0.075) (0.048) (0.074)
Years of school 2012 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.022
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)
Attendance 2012 0.438*** 0.570*** 0.411*** 0.564*** 0.426*** 0.543***
(0.070) (0.126) (0.071) (0.128) (0.070) (0.126)
Health insurance scheme 0.085 0.506*** 0.051 0.501*** 0.033 0.450***
(0.064) (0.142) (0.065) (0.146) (0.064) (0.137)
Paid work 0.005 -0.102 -0.074 -0.141 -0.046 -0.131
(0.068) (0.129) (0.067) (0.123) (0.067) (0.124)
Sibling rank -0.011 -0.007 -0.021* -0.017 -0.011 -0.005
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020)
Age -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.040*** -0.054*** -0.040*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
Ln P/c expenditure -0.103** -0.129*** -0.122**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
Economic shock index (0-5) 0.019 0.039 0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Polyg. household 0.022 0.036 -0.005
(0.066) (0.070) (0.068)
N of children hh members -0.010 -0.031 -0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
N of children-boys hh members -0.040* -0.049** -0.046*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
N of hh members -0.017 -0.001 0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Years school of HH 0.000 -0.001 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
HH female 0.171 0.147 0.194*
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106)
HH age -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Enumerator FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Time at survey FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Household FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 3,939 2,655 3,931 2,605 3,946 2,663
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in
parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
Table 2.4 reports the estimates for equation 2.4 using the three different measures of
cognitive skills collected in 2012: the score in Raven, DSF and DSB tests. The dependent
variable in the analysis is the number of years that a child attended school between 2013
and 2015, calculated as the difference in years of schooling reported in 2015 and in 2012.
Columns 1 to 3 of the table show the results for the three cognitive skills tests when
equation 2.4 is estimated without accounting for non-random uptake of the cognitive tests.
The results suggest that the effect of cognitive skills is positive and statistically significant
at the 1%: an increase of one standard deviation in the score in cognitive tests relative to
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the average score of the rest of the siblings in the household is associated with 0.126-0.178
more years of schooling between 2013 and 2015, depending on the cognitive measure used.
When the IMR is included as a control variable to account for sample selection bias, the
estimates displayed in columns 4 to 6 are very similar, with the effect of one standard
deviation increase in the score of the cognitive tests relative to the average score of the
rest of the siblings ranging between 0.128-0.178 years of schooling. Interestingly, the IMR
is not statistically significant in these equations suggesting that at least in these estimates,
the observed non-random uptake of the cognitive tests does not bias the estimation of the
effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings.
Table 2.4: Child cognitive skills and years of schooling 2012-2015 (children 5-18 in 2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school
2015-2012 2015-2012 2015-2012 2015-2012 2015-2012 2015-2012
Female 0.054 0.115 0.087 0.010 0.071 0.079
(0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.121) (0.114) (0.113)
Attendance 2012 0.667*** 0.657*** 0.665*** 0.813** 0.823** 0.717*
(0.142) (0.147) (0.148) (0.403) (0.374) (0.414)
Years of school 2012 -0.114*** -0.119*** -0.123*** -0.119*** -0.128*** -0.125***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Health insurance scheme 0.380*** 0.348** 0.409*** 0.429*** 0.389*** 0.415***
(0.141) (0.148) (0.139) (0.158) (0.150) (0.141)
Sibling rank 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.009 -0.005
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
Raven age-adjusted z-score 0.126*** 0.128***
(0.041) (0.041)
DSF age-adjusted z-score 0.167*** 0.176***
(0.046) (0.046)
DSB age-adjusted z-score 0.178*** 0.178***
(0.042) (0.043)
IMR 0.559 0.639 0.201
(1.592) (1.427) (1.540)
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,147 2,061 2,073 2,125 2,034 2,058
R-squared 0.576 0.573 0.580 0.576 0.575 0.579
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
A potential critique to the analysis reported in table 2.4 is that the dependent variable
measures school progression, which may not only be driven by school attendance but also
by the cognitive skills of the child, which may directly influence his school marks and
promotion to the next school year. Although grade promotion is automatic until senior
secondary school and only less than 2% of the sample is currently or ever enrolled in post-
junior secondary school educational levels10, it might be possible that the effects found are
10The educational system in Ghana is discussed in section 2.4.
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driven by the most able children passing the BECE exam and accessing senior secondary
school.
Table 2.5: Child cognitive skills and years of schooling 2012-2015 (Children 5-12 in 2012).
(1) (2) (3)
Years of school Years of school Years of school
2015-2012 2015-2012 2015-2012
Female 0.048 0.102 0.097
(0.204) (0.181) (0.182)
Attendance 2012 0.656 0.587 0.567
(0.715) (0.581) (0.668)
Years of school 2012 -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.044) (0.047) (0.046)
Sibling rank 0.025 0.028 0.017
(0.038) (0.043) (0.036)
Health insurance scheme 0.368* 0.281 0.354**
(0.217) (0.183) (0.167)
IMR -0.122 -0.266 -0.684
(2.971) (2.351) (2.623)
Raven age-adjusted z-score 0.116**
(0.055)
DSF age-adjusted z-score 0.174***
(0.064)
DSB age-adjusted z-score 0.211***
(0.065)
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,342 1,284 1,304
R-squared 0.630 0.634 0.635
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in
parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
To explore this possibility, I conduct the following two analyses. First, I re-estimate
equation 2.4 using only the sample of children aged 12 or below in 2012. During the
period studied, these children were only eligible for pre-school, primary or junior secondary
education, where there is automatic course promotion at the end of the school course. The
results of this analysis are reported in table 2.5. The coefficients of the cognitive tests are
positive, statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and similar in terms of
magnitude to those reported for the whole sample in table 2.4, suggesting that the effect
of cognitive skills on years of schooling during the period 2013-2015 identified in table 2.4
is not driven by less able children being unable to achieve grade promotion at the end of
74
the school year. Second, I re-estimate equation 2.4 using as dependent variable the sum
between 2013, 2014 and 2015 of a dummy variable collected yearly that is equal to 1 if
the child attended school at least once during the last 12 months. The estimates for this
analysis are reported in table 2.9 in appendix 2.A and show consistent results. The effect
of an increase in one standard deviation in the score obtained in cognitive tests relative
to the rest of the siblings in the household is positive and overall, statistically significant
at 10%. The magnitude of this effect ranges between 0.046 and 0.060 additional years of
school attendance during the period 2013-2015, depending on the cognitive test used and
on whether the selectivity correction term is included as an additional control variable.
The results presented in this section are consistent with the main prediction of Becker’s
model: parents reinforce cognitive differences with their human capital investments. In
a rural context where households have more than one child in school age and do not
send all of them to school, parents are ceteris paribus more likely to concentrate school
investments in the most able children in the household. This finding is also consistent
with the results of previous studies that assess empirically the role of cognitive skills in
the intra-household allocation of educational investments in Burkina Faso (Akresh et al.,
2012), Ethiopia (Ayalew, 2005) and the US (Kim, 2005).
2.8 Heterogeneous Effects
This section examines whether the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling
across siblings in a household depends on the gender of the child or on different household
level characteristics. First, I test whether in a context with larger rates of school attend-
ance among girls than among boys, the cognitive skills reinforcing mechanism operates
differently across gender. Second, I investigate whether the strength of this reinforcing
mechanism varies across polygynous and non-polygynous, larger and smaller and wealthier
and poorer households.
2.8.1 Gender
In the sample, school attendance is more widespread and the average number of years of
schooling is larger for girls (84% and 3.9) than for boys (77% and 3.5). GSS (2015) shows
that the larger rates of attendance to primary school among girls than among boys observed
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in the data is a well-established pattern in the Northern Region and in the Upper-East
Region, the areas where the districts sampled are located. At the national level, Ghana
has no gender differences in terms of net enrolment rates in primary education. One pos-
sible explanation for this could be the launch in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s of The
Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND) and the Compulsory Universal Basic Edu-
cation (FCUBE) programme promoting school attendance in Ghana, particularly among
girls and children from poor households (GSS, 2015).
The conceptual framework described in section 2.2 would predict a differential effect
of cognitive skills on school investments in boys and in girls if the degree in which the
returns to school for the child or for the parents depend on cognitive skills is different
for boys and girls. The latter premise would be consistent with low levels of labour force
participation for women. If returns to school depend more strongly on cognitive skills
for boys, the model would predict that the allocation of investments in education across
siblings reinforces more strongly cognitive differences between boys than between girls.
At this point, it is important to remark that a stronger effect of cognitive skills on school
investments for boys would not imply that returns to education are lower for women than
for men or that households find more profitable to allocate educational investments to
boys than to girls. Rather, I am testing whether cognitive skills play a different role in
understanding the intra-household allocation of schooling depending on the gender of the
sibling. Thus, a weaker effect of cognitive skills on school investments in women would not
be incompatible with the larger rate of school attendance for girls observed in the sample,
particularly when considering that the economic returns to education for girls and their
parents are not only limited to the labour market11.
To test whether the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of school investments
across siblings is different for boys and girls, I propose two different tests. First, I estimate
the following specification:
Y earsSchooli,h = ω1CognitiveSkillsi,h+ω2CognitiveSkillsi,h∗Femalei,h+ω3Xi,h+δh+ui,h
(2.5)
where CognitiveSkillsi,h ∗ Femalei,h is an interaction term of the score in the cognitive
11For example, using data from Zimbabwe, Ashraf et al. (2016) show that education has large and
positive effect in the bride price in the marriage market.
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tests with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the child is a girl. X is a vector of child
level variables that includes among others, a dummy variable that indicates the gender of
the child and the IMR. In equation 2.5, the parameter ω1 indicates the effect on school
attendance for boys of increasing in one standard deviation the score in the cognitive
test relative to the rest of the siblings. The effect for girls is yielded by the sum of the
parameters ω1 + ω2. The parameter of interest in the equation would be ω2. If the latter
parameter is larger (lower) than 0, the effect of cognitive skills on years of schooling would
be larger (lower) for girls than for boys.
Table 2.6: Effect by gender: child cognitive skills and years of schooling 2012-2015 (children
5-18 in 2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school Years of school
2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015
Female 0.007 0.066 0.081
(0.121) (0.115) (0.113)
Attendance 2012 0.821** 0.833** 0.721* 1.511* 1.559* 1.512
(0.402) (0.376) (0.415) (0.892) (0.888) (0.968)
Years of school 2012 -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.126*** -0.062 -0.114 -0.103
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.065) (0.076) (0.084)
Health insurance scheme 0.428*** 0.390*** 0.410*** -0.244 -0.409 -0.310
(0.156) (0.151) (0.142) (0.412) (0.462) (0.462)
Sibling rank -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 0.016 -0.008 0.054
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.124) (0.127) (0.125)
IMR 0.633 0.712 0.216 3.886 4.325 3.627
(1.590) (1.437) (1.546) (3.445) (3.132) (3.439)
Raven age-adjusted z-score 0.201*** 0.230*
(0.052) (0.137)
Female × Raven -0.155** -0.042
(0.069) (0.196)
DSF age-adjusted z-score 0.210*** 0.026
(0.059) (0.259)
Female × DSF -0.078 0.257
(0.074) (0.340)
DSB age-adjusted z-score 0.209*** 0.162
(0.056) (0.188)
Female × DSB -0.067 0.086
(0.074) (0.363)
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,125 2,034 2,058 252 249 234
R-squared 0.579 0.575 0.579 0.723 0.693 0.712
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
Second, I estimate equation 2.5 restricting the analysis to those households with all
the household individuals aged 5-18 years either all girls or all boys. In this estimation,
the variable CognitiveSkillsi,h ∗ Femaleh is an interaction term of cognitive skills with a
dummy variable defined at the household level that is equal to 1 if all the children aged
5-18 in the household are girls and 0 if all the children 5-18 are boys. In this case, ω1
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indicates the effect on school attendance of increasing in one standard deviation the score
in the cognitive test relative to the rest of the siblings in households where all the children
are boys. The effect in households where all the children are girls is yielded by the sum of
the parameters ω1 + ω2.
The estimates for these two analyses are reported in table 2.6 and show mixed results.
On the one hand, the interaction term Female × CognitiveSkills in columns 1 to 3 is
consistently negative suggesting that the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of
schooling across siblings is larger for boys than for girls although this coefficient is only
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels for the Raven test. On the other
hand, the estimations reported in columns 4 to 6 yield mixed results. While the interaction
term is negative for the Raven test, it is positive for the digit span tests although in none
of the cases is statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. In any case, the
sample size used in this second analysis is small and thus, the results should not be taken
as conclusive.
2.8.2 Household Consumption
An additional prediction of Becker’s model is that the reinforcing pattern in the alloca-
tion of human capital investments would be weaker (if any) in poor households because
nonhuman capital resources are limited in these households and therefore, disadvantaged
households would not be able to compensate less able children with larger nonhuman cap-
ital transfers. At this point, the reinforcing mechanism in households that cannot make
nonhuman capital investments would depend on the degree of parents’ aversion towards
sibling inequality: the stronger the aversion for sibling inequality, the smaller the differ-
ence in schooling investments received by more and less able siblings, and the larger the
differential effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings in poorer
and wealthier families. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following specification:
Y earsSchooli,h = ω1CognitiveSkillsi,h+ω2CognitiveSkillsi,h∗Consumi,h+ω3Xi,h+δh+ui,h
(2.6)
where CognitiveSkillsi,h ∗Consumh is an interaction term of cognitive skills with a set of
dummy variables defined at the household level that capture whether the household is in
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the first, second or third tercile in the distribution of per capita household consumption.
In equation 2.6, the parameter ω1 yields the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of
schooling across siblings in households in the top tercile of the per capita consumption
distribution. The vector of parameters ω2 are the estimates of first importance in this
analysis. If the latter parameters are larger (lower) than 0, the effect of cognitive skills on
schooling in these households would be larger (lower) than in the households in the richest
tercile.
Table 2.7: Effect by household characteristics: child cognitive skills and years of schooling
2012-2015 (children 5-18 in 2012).
(1) (2) (3)
Years of school Years of school Years of school
2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015
Female 0.104 0.108 0.113
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Attendance 2012 0.491 0.492 0.476
(0.377) (0.378) (0.378)
Years of school 2012 -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Sibling rank 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
IMR -0.880 -0.902 -0.946
(1.465) (1.471) (1.470)
Raven age-adjusted z-score 0.096* 0.139* 0.203**
(0.054) (0.077) (0.092)
Polygamous hh × Raven score 0.082
(0.083)
HH<4 children × Raven score -0.021
(0.118)
HH 4-6 children × Raven score -0.012
(0.096)
P/c Consump(Terc. 1)× Raven score -0.114
(0.110)
P/c Consump(Terc. 2)× Raven score -0.071
(0.112)
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,125 2,125 2,125
R-squared 0.573 0.573 0.573
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
The results of this analysis are reported in column 3 of table 2.7. Overall, they are
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consistent with the prediction of Becker’s model under some degree of aversion for sibling
inequality. The effect of cognitive skills on school investments in the richest tercile of
households is statistically significant at the 5%. The parameters that measure the dif-
ferential effect in households in the first and second tercile are negative indicating that
on average, the lower the per capita consumption in the household, the smaller the effect
of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings. However, although they
have the expected negative sign, the coefficients that measure the differential effects across
terciles are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
2.8.3 Polygyny
Defined as the marital life of one men and more than one women, the practice of polygyny
is widespread in West Africa. Although polygamy is not as high in Ghana as it is in other
West African countries such as Guinea Conakry or Senegal, the 31% of the households in
the data used in this study are polygynous
One assumption behind the predictions of Becker’s model is the alignment of incent-
ives across the parents of the children. However, polygyny could break the alignment of
incentives across parents if every mother prefer her own children to be more educated than
the children of the other women in the household regardless of their cognitive skills. To
examine whether the misalignment of incentives across parents in polygynous household
affects the role of cognitive skills in the allocation of schooling investments across siblings,
I estimate the following equation:
Y earsSchooli,h = ω1CognitiveSkillsi,h+ω2CognitiveSkillsi,h∗Polygh+ω3Xi,h+δh+ui,h
(2.7)
where CognitiveSkillsi,h ∗ Polygh is an interaction term of the score in the Raven test
with a dummy variable defined at the household level that is equal to 1 if the child lives in
a polygynous household and 0 otherwise. In equation 2.7, the parameter ω1 indicates the
effect on school attendance of increasing in one standard deviation the cognitive test score
in non-polygynous households. The effect in polygynous households is yielded by the sum
of the parameters ω1 + ω2. The key parameter is ω2. If this parameter is larger (lower)
than 0, the effect of cognitive skills on school attendance in polygynous households would
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be larger (lower) than in non-polygynous households.
Column 1 of table 2.7 shows the estimates for equation 2.7. The coefficient for ω2
is positive suggesting that cognitive ability relative to siblings is a stronger determinant
of educational investments received in polygynous household. However, although the
magnitude of the coefficient is non-negligible, it is also statistically indistinguishable from
0 at conventional confidence levels. The results suggest that the misalignment of incentives
across parents arguably existent in polygynous households does not seem to weaken the role
of cognitive skills in the allocation of schooling across siblings. Two potential explanations
for this could be that more cognitively able wives (that may have children with better
innate cognitive skills) achieve higher educational investments for their children or that
fathers in polygynous households decide alone on the allocation of schooling investments
across siblings.
Although the survey collects information on the nature of the relation of every house-
hold member with the household head, the survey does not collect sufficient information to
identify confidently the mother of most of the children in polygynous households. This fact
hinders the possibility of providing a deeper insight into the role played by mother charac-
teristics or wife rank in the intra-household allocation of school investments in polygynous
households.
2.8.4 Household Size
Children with a lot of siblings in school age may benefit from economies of scale in school
costs (e.g. books, uniforms) or in household chores. On the other hand, more siblings
can increase competition for scarce resources. In order to determine whether the effect of
cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling investments across siblings depends on the
number of children in the household, I estimate equation 2.8:
Y earsSchooli,h = ω1CognitiveSkillsi,h+ω2CognitiveSkillsi,h∗HhSizeh+ω3Xi,h+δh+ui,h
(2.8)
where CognitiveSkillsi,h ∗ HhSizeh is a vector of interaction terms of the score in the
Raven test with a set of dummy variables defined at the household level that indicate
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whether less than 4 children12, between 4 and 6 children or more than 6 children live in
household h. The thresholds used to define the three household size dummies resulted in a
division of the sample of households in three equal parts. In equation 2.8, the parameter ω1
indicates the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of school attendance across siblings
in the reference group, that is formed by those households with more than 6 children. On
the other hand, the vector of parameters ω2 measures the differential effect of cognitive
skills on school attendance in households with 4 to 6 children and in households with less
than 4 children relative to the reference group. If these parameters are larger (lower) than
0, the effect of cognitive skills on school attendance in these groups of households would
be larger (lower) than in the reference group.
The results of this analysis are reported in column 2 of table 2.7. The coefficients show
that on average, the larger the household size, the larger the effect of Raven score on years
of schooling. For example, the estimated effect of an increase in one standard deviation in
the Raven test score on years of schooling between 2012 and 2015 is 0.139 in households
with more than 6 children. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%. The
estimates provided show that the effect is 0.127 (0.139-0.012) in households with 4 to 6
children and 0.118 (0.139-0.021) in households with less than 6 children. However, it is
important to remark that none of the coefficients that measure the differential effect of
cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling in smaller and larger households is statistically
significant at conventional confidence levels. Therefore, in the light of the results, it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that the magnitude of the effect of cognitive skills on the
allocation of schooling across siblings does not depend on household size.
2.9 Conclusions
This study examines empirically a prediction of the model of intra-household allocation of
resources developed in the seminal paper Becker (1981): with their investment in schooling,
parents reinforce cognitive differences between siblings. Relying on 4 rounds of a household
panel survey conducted in 103 villages of the north of Ghana, I find evidence that cognitive
skills strongly determine the allocation of schooling across siblings. In the preferred set
of specifications, an increase of one standard deviation in the score of cognitive tests
relative to the rest of the siblings in the household, raises the number of years of schooling
12A child is defined as a household member aged below 18 years.
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attended in the following three years by 0.128-0.178, depending on the cognitive measure
used. These results are consistent with the main prediction of Becker’s model and are in
line with the results found in previous studies.
The evidence suggests that policies aiming to increase school attendance in northern
Ghana should take into account that parents target their educational investments towards
the most capable children rather than spreading these investments equally among all the
children in the household. In this context, demand-side educational interventions such as
conditional cash transfers that promote school attendance among less able siblings would
probably be more effective in promoting universal schooling than supply side interventions
such as reductions in class size (Akresh et al., 2012).
The study also investigates whether the magnitude of the effect of cognitive skills
on the allocation of schooling across siblings depends on the gender of the child or on
different household characteristics. On the one hand, the analysis suggests that the effect
of cognitive skills on schooling is larger for boys although the results should only be
interpreted as suggestive and they are not unambiguous. On the other hand, I do not find
any evidence that the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings
is significantly different in richer and poorer, polygynous and non-polygynous, and larger
and smaller households.
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Appendix 2.A Appendix
Table 2.8: First stage (Probit coefficients): Participation of children 5-18 in 2012 in cognitive
skills tests (school attendance).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Take Raven Take Raven Take Take Take Take
Test Test DSF test DSF test DSB test DSB test
Female -0.133*** -0.150* -0.138*** -0.154** -0.124** -0.150**
(0.049) (0.077) (0.049) (0.076) (0.048) (0.076)
Years of school 2012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015
(0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020)
Attendance 2012 0.400*** 0.539*** 0.378*** 0.529*** 0.394*** 0.509***
(0.071) (0.129) (0.073) (0.130) (0.071) (0.127)
Health insurance scheme 0.095 0.490*** 0.054 0.468*** 0.032 0.411***
(0.064) (0.143) (0.064) (0.146) (0.063) (0.139)
Paid work -0.009 -0.088 -0.082 -0.131 -0.054 -0.118
(0.069) (0.132) (0.068) (0.125) (0.068) (0.126)
Sibling rank -0.012 -0.005 -0.022* -0.014 -0.011 -0.001
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020)
Age -0.042*** -0.057*** -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
Ln P/c expenditure -0.100** -0.119** -0.118**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
Economic shock index (0-5) 0.012 0.034 0.020
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Polyg. household 0.027 0.044 0.005
(0.067) (0.071) (0.069)
N of children hh members -0.011 -0.030 -0.017
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
N of children-boys hh members -0.044* -0.056** -0.051**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
N of hh members -0.015 -0.001 0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Years school of HH 0.001 0.000 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
HH age -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HH female 0.206* 0.162 0.224**
(0.108) (0.106) (0.109)
Enumerator FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Time at survey FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Household FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 3,875 2,584 3,867 2,528 3,882 2,588
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
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Table 2.9: Child cognitive skills and school attendance 2013-15 (children 5-18).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N years attended N years attended N years attended N years attended N years attended N years attended
school 2013-2015 school 2013-2015 school 2013-2015 school 2013-2015 school 2013-2015 school 2013-2015
Female 0.042 0.062 0.051 0.067 0.111 0.151**
(0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.091) (0.079) (0.073)
Attendance 2012 1.236*** 1.271*** 1.280*** 1.147*** 1.105*** 0.941***
(0.121) (0.125) (0.121) (0.289) (0.250) (0.261)
Years of school 2012 0.047*** 0.037** 0.040** 0.049*** 0.041** 0.049***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Sibling rank 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.028 0.030*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
Health insurance scheme 0.385*** 0.387*** 0.378*** 0.361*** 0.364*** 0.341***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.129) (0.114) (0.112)
Raven age-adjusted z-score 0.046* 0.047*
(0.025) (0.025)
DSF age-adjusted z-score 0.052* 0.050
(0.031) (0.031)
DSB age-adjusted z-score 0.060** 0.056*
(0.028) (0.029)
IMR -0.443 -0.789 -1.538
(1.253) (0.928) (0.960)
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,132 2,046 2,057 2,110 2,019 2,042
R-squared 0.745 0.750 0.758 0.745 0.751 0.759
Note: Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1.
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Chapter 3
The Lasting Effects of Natural Disasters on
Property Crime: Evidence from the 2010 Chilean
Earthquake
3.1 Motivation
Aside from the images of destruction, one aspect often displayed by televisions and news-
papers in the aftermaths of natural disasters are scenes of chaos and looting. The evidence
suggests that the disorders that followed natural disasters such as the Katrina hurricane
or the 2010 Haiti earthquake seem to be closely linked to power cuts and to the collapse of
the police, decreasing temporarily the cost of crime (Frailing and Harper, 2007; Friesema
et al., 1979; Kolbe et al., 2010).
Although the break in the social contract often found in the aftermath of natural
disasters is usually limited to a few days or even hours (Quarantelli, 2001), temporary
reductions in the cost of crime could lead to lasting effects on crime rates if the personal cost
of committing crime is a decreasing function of the number of previous crimes committed.
Similarly, the negative effects of disasters on employment (Belasen and Polachek, 2008)
could also decrease in the long-term the opportunity cost of crime. On the other hand,
natural disasters may also strengthen community links (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1980;
Bailey, 2009), facilitating the adoption of community-based crime prevention strategies
and increasing the cost of committing crime. With mixed effects on the benefits and
costs of crime, the long-term impact of natural disasters on property crime is theoretically
ambiguous and is therefore an empirical question.
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I provide evidence on the lasting effects of natural disasters on property crime using
as a case study the 8.8 Richter magnitude earthquake that struck the Centre-South of
Chile in 2010. This earthquake caused 547 fatalities and economic damages estimated at
USD 15-30 billions (UNEP, 2011). In the aftermath of the catastrophe, the most affected
areas experienced looting episodes that involved hundreds of people and in response, the
Chilean government deployed the army and declared a curfew in these municipalities. The
main estimations presented in this study rely on difference in difference models comparing
crime rates in municipalities close and far away from the epicentre and use pre- and post-
earthquake data from 7 rounds of a household victimization survey conducted every year
in 101 urban municipalities in Chile.
The results of the study reveal that, depending on the specification, exposure to a
very strong earthquake intensity decreased the incidence of home burglary the year of
the earthquake by 16%-30% relative to areas not directly affected by the disaster and
that this effect remained constant over the 4 post-earthquake years studied. The results
hold when other sources of crime data and other types of property crime are examined,
ruling out the possibility of crime displacement from home burglary towards other types
of property crime. The results are also robust to the use of alternative samples and
earthquake intensity thresholds to define treatment and control municipalities.
I examine different mechanisms for lower property crime in earthquake affected areas.
The results show that the main channel that drove the lasting contraction in property
crime rates was the positive effect of the disaster on the strength of community life.
The improvement in the social capital at the community level boosted the adoption of
community-based measures to prevent crime, increasing the cost of crime in earthquake
affected areas. Alternative mechanisms such as an increase in the number of policemen
or a reduction in unemployment due to reconstruction activities in areas affected by the
earthquake are rejected in the light of the results. Furthermore, the estimates also suggest
that the lasting drop in the incidence of property crime was not caused by higher levels
of incarceration as a consequence of the institutional efforts in the aftermath of the earth-
quake to address looting or by a rise in the perceived risk of crime boosting permanent
adoption of crime prevention measures. Finally, the analysis shows that the persistent
reduction in property crime rates in earthquake affected areas was not driven by a lasting
effect of the deployment of the army or the curfew via a temporary increase in the cost of
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crime with long-term term consequences.
This study is primarily related with the body of literature that investigates the effect
of natural disasters on the incidence of crime. Indeed, the results are consistent with the
informal guardianship theory developed in sociology that argues that natural disasters
increase co-operation and the formation of social capital within damaged communities,
increasing the provision of informal guardianship in these communities and therefore the
cost of crime. In this context, the contribution of the study is twofold. First, unlike
previous studies that examine the evolution of crime rates over a maximum post-disaster
period of 12 months, this study explores the impact of natural disasters on property crime
over a longer period of time (4 post-disaster years). Second, this is the first study that
investigates empirically the mechanisms driving the effects of natural disasters on property
crime, providing empirical evidence that supports the different hypotheses of the informal
guardianship theory and showing the key role that social capital at the community level
can play in the reduction of property crime.
The study is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the conceptual framework.
Section 3.3 discusses the existing evidence on the link between natural disasters and crime.
Section 3.4 describes the context and the main political and social events that followed
the 2010 Chilean earthquake. Section 3.5 presents the data and section 3.6 introduces the
empirical strategy used to estimate the effect of the earthquake on property crime. Section
3.7 discusses the main results of the analysis and section 3.8 expands the analysis to other
types of property crime using an alternative source of crime data. Section 3.9 explores the
mechanisms through which the earthquake could have reduced property crime and section
3.10 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Mainly developed in the field of sociology, there are two opposing streams of literature
that set out different predictions about how crime rates evolve following natural disasters.
The first stream of authors hypothesises that crime rates increase following natural
disasters. There are three main mechanisms through which this effect might operate. The
first of them, known in the field of sociology as the routine activities theory, is described
in Cohen and Felson (1979). They argue that natural disasters are followed by a rise in
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crime rates because catastrophes increase the availability of suitable targets and reduce the
presence of capable guardianship. Another mechanism that explain why crime rates could
spike following natural disasters is that crime is more prevalent in those places character-
ized by the incapacity of the community to informally control crime due to factors such as
residential instability that might be severely damaged by natural disasters (Zahran et al.,
2009). This argument is interpreted in the context of the social disorganization theory
developed in Shaw and McKay (1942). These two mechanisms can be embedded in tradi-
tional economics of crime models that describe crime rates as a function of crime’s costs
and benefits (Ehrlich, 1973; Becker, 1968): Through causing a temporary or permanent
obstruction of law enforcement, generating power cuts and forcing some households to
leave their dwellings, natural disasters decrease the cost of committing crime, leading to
larger crime rates. The third path through which natural disaster may affect property
crime is the labour market. If employment represents the opportunity cost of crime, the
lasting negative effect of natural disasters on labour outcomes documented in Belasen and
Polachek (2008) could boost the incidence of crime.
The second stream of the literature argues that crime rates do not raise and might
even decrease following natural disasters. These authors highlight that although natural
disasters may decrease the capacity of formal institutions such as the police to enforce the
law, they also raise pro-social and altruistic behaviours (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1970),
fostering co-operation and the formation of social capital within communities and increas-
ing the level of informal guardianship (Cromwell et al., 1995). The authors argue that the
rise in the level of informal guardianship offsets the potential harmful effects of natural
disasters on crime arising from a reduced capacity of the police to enforce the law immedi-
ately after disasters or from the perverse effect of the disaster on other crime determinants,
eventually leading to lower crime rates. In a traditional economics of crime theoretical
model, the argument of these authors implies that far from reducing crime costs, the rise
in the provision of informal guardianship in affected communities compensates the reduced
capacity of formal institutions to provide capable guardianship, increasing the probability
of apprehension and the cost of committing crime in these communities.
The two streams propose different channels through which natural disasters can affect
the costs and benefits of crime with opposite directions. In the light of this literature, the
effect of natural disasters on crime predicted in theoretical models of economics of crime
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would be ambiguous, with the sign of the net effect depending on the superiority of some
channels over others and highlighting that the effect of natural disasters on property crime
is an empirical question.
3.3 Related Literature
The short-term evolution of crime rates following natural disasters has been empirically
investigated in different studies, with mixed results.
Most of the studies addressing this question find that crime rates increase after natural
disasters. For example, Roy (2010) exploits district-level panel data in India to investigate
the incidence of violent and property crime in districts that experienced a natural disasters
the same year. The paper shows that, overall, natural disasters are followed by increases in
most types of property and violent crime. Using known to the police crime data, Friesema
et al. (1979) show large increases in motor vehicle theft in Texas following hurricane Carla.
Frailing and Harper (2007) find a spike in the incidence of burglary in New Orleans after
hurricane Katrina, and Kolbe et al. (2010) suggest that the large earthquake that affected
Haiti in 2010 triggered sexual assaults in the weeks following the disaster. Leitner and
Helbich (2011) investigate the link between crime and natural disasters through studying
the daily evolution of crime rates before, during and after two hurricanes that affected the
city of Houston. The authors state that while burglary and motor-vehicle theft increased
immediately before and after hurricane Rita, crime rates did not change before, during
or after hurricane Katrina. They argue that the difference in effects might be driven
by the fact that while an order of evacuation was issued before hurricane Rita, no such
order was issued before or during hurricane Katrina in Houston. The empirical evidence
supporting the suggestion that natural disasters are followed by an increase in crime rates
is particularly strong for domestic and sexual violence offences such as child abuse (Curtis
et al., 2000), sexual assault (Kolbe et al., 2010) or gender violence (Peacock et al., 1997;
Enarson et al., 2006).
However, the evidence is not homogeneous and there are some empirical studies that
find either a decrease or a stagnation in crime rates after natural disasters. For example,
using qualitative data collected one month after hurricane Andrew in Florida, Cromwell
et al. (1995) show that although the hurricane increased the number of motivated offenders
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and unprotected victims, it also boosted informal guardianship leading to sharp decreases
in crime rates during the weeks that followed the hurricane. Similarly, Siegel et al. (1999)
find that exposure to the 1994 Northridge earthquake in California did not increase the
likelihood of suffering a violent or a property crime during the two months that followed
the disaster. Although the evidence is mixed, most of the studies that explore the evolution
of crime rates in New Orleans and neighbouring parishes after hurricane Katrina suggest
that except for burglaries, property crime rates decreased the months following the disaster
although the rates converged to pre-hurricane levels one year later (Leitner et al., 2011;
Bailey, 2009)1.
Zahran et al. (2009) bring the discussion a step forward arguing that the incidence of
different types of crimes might evolve differently after natural disasters. Using county-level
panel data from Florida and well-conducted fixed effects techniques, the paper provides
evidence that while natural disasters tend to decrease property and violent crime the year
of the disaster, they also raise the incidence of domestic violence.
Although the number of studies that explore the short-term effect of natural disasters
on crime is large, most of these studies lack methodological rigour. For example, only two
of the studies discussed (Roy, 2010; Zahran et al., 2009) use a counterfactual approach
to account for potential confounding factors and with one exception (Kolbe et al., 2010),
the literature relies on crime data from police records. The use of police records could be
problematic because changes in crime known to the police after natural disasters could
be reflecting an effect of natural disasters on the probability of reporting crime to the
police rather than on true crime rates. Furthermore, I am not aware of any previous study
investigating whether the effects of natural disasters on crime expand over more than one
year. Finally, and although some of the studies discuss them theoretically, this is the first
study that explores empirically the mechanisms driving the effect of natural disasters on
property crime.
3.4 The Context
The early morning of the 27th of February of 2010 an earthquake of 8.8 degrees in the
Richter scale shook the Centre-South of Chile. The epicentre was located approximately
1The evidence on crime dynamics after Katrina hurricane is mixed and some studies also show that
crime rates one year after the disaster were larger than pre-hurricane rates, particularly for murder (Van-
Landingham, 2009).
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90 km north west of Concepcio´n, the second largest Chilean city with a metropolitan
population above 1,000,000 inhabitants. The earthquake was followed by a tsunami with
waves striking approximately 500 km of the Chilean coast. Although the economic losses
affected a total of 6 regions that included the 80% of the Chilean population, the re-
gions of Biobio and Maule were particularly damaged by the earthquake and the tsunami
(Larran˜aga and Herrera, 2010b).
Different reports from the Chilean government, NGOs, universities and international
organizations provide an estimation of the economic damages and human losses caused by
the earthquake and the tsunami. Nahuelpan and Varas (2011) report that the earthquake
and the tsunami that followed caused a total of 547 deaths. Contreras and Winckler (2013)
attribute 181 of these deaths to the tsunami. Regarding the direct economic losses caused
by the earthquake and the tsunami, UNEP (2011) estimates in USD 15-30 billions the
damage caused to public and private assets, including 440,000 houses and numerous roads
severely deteriorated (CEPAL, 2010). Although identifying the losses caused only by the
tsunami is in most cases difficult, Contreras and Winckler (2013) argue that it damaged
17,392 houses in 24 different municipalities. The same report also highlights that the
tsunami affected many coastal infrastructures including different harbours and piers and
approximately 3,000 boats. Table 3.1 summarizes the main losses at the regional level for
the six regions affected by these natural disasters.
The earthquake also caused water, power and telephonic cuts. Power cuts affected the
80% of the population and lasted between a few hours and three days in the most damaged
areas of the country (OPM, 2010). After some looting episodes in the regions of Biobio
and Maule, the 28th of February the Chilean government declared the state of emergency
for 30 days in these two regions and a curfew in the municipalities that experienced looting
episodes. Following the declaration, the army was deployed in urban areas of these regions,
particularly in Biobio2. Nonetheless, looting did not completely stop and pillage episodes
were occasionally registered during the following week3. In total, there were looting events
in 33 municipalities (Ormen˜o, 2010). Some of these episodes were documented by the
media and involved hundreds of looters4.
2http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2010/02/28/actualidad/1267311602_850215.
html
3http://www.ambito.com/noticia.asp?id=510234
4see for example http://www.24con.com/nota/37127_Saqueos_la_gente_se_lleva_desde_
lechehastaplasmas
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Qualitative data and media reports point out that the earthquake was followed by
social chaos in heavily affected areas that ended with many people participating in looting
events mainly towards big supermarkets and shops5. However, despite the limited capacity
of the police to enforce the law the days following the earthquake, the looting of dwellings
and habited places was a very rare event (Grando´n et al., 2014; Larran˜aga and Herrera,
2010b). Remarkably, these reports also document widespread pro-social and altruistic
behaviours in the aftermath of the earthquake and communities organizing themselves to
overcome earthquake catastrophic consequences.
Perhaps influenced by the media coverage of the post-disaster events, the 32% of the
urban households interviewed for the 2010 ENUSC survey believed that the earthquake
caused an increase in the incidence of crime at the national level during the same year.
Interestingly, the percentage of households that reported such perception was higher in
the areas far away from the earthquake epicentre (32% in control municipalities) than in
areas close to it (27% in treatment municipalities).
Table 3.1: Fatalities and economic damage of the earthquake/tsunami by region
% Dwellings % Dwellings severe % Dwellings severe % HHs facing problem % pop >18 with symptoms
Fatalities severe damage damage (I quintile) damage (V quintile) from earthquake/tsunami post-traumatic stress
Valpara´ıso 25 7.4 11.3 2.4 51.9 8.3
O’Higgins 53 12.2 12.5 7.5 67 22.3
Maule 280 20.7 26.3 12.8 92.9 21.4
Biob´ıo 145 17.8 25.4 8.5 92.9 23.9
Araucan´ıa 17 5.1 10.2 0.5 59.3 11.5
Metropolitana 27 4.8 6.5 3.0 56 6.5
All regions aff. 547 8.8 12.0 4.6 64.7 12.0
Source: Larran˜aga and Herrera (2010a). Information on damages is only provided for the six regions affected by the
earthquake. The regions of Tarapaca´, Arica y Parinacota, Atacama, Coquimbo, Antofagasta, Los R´ıos, Los Lagos,
Aise´n and Magallanes are not included in the survey because the authors concluded that they were not directly
damaged by the earthquakey or the tsunami. The I quintile indicates the quintile of the Chilean population with
the lowest per capita income while the V quintile is the richest quintile of the Chilean population in terms of per
capita income.
3.5 Data
The crime data used in the main analysis correspond to seven rounds of the Encuesta
Nacional Urbana de Seguridad Ciudadana (ENUSC) survey for the period 2007-20136.
The ENUSC is a household survey conducted by the Chilean Ministry of Governance and
5 http://ciperchile.cl/2010/07/19/saqueadores_post_terremoto_ii_la_horda_que_nunca_
llego_a_las_casas
6The first publicly available ENUSC survey was conducted in 2007.
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applied every year to a cross section of more than 25,000 urban households living in the
largest 101 Chilean municipalities. The survey collects household level information on
victimization in the last 12 months for different types of crimes and on the adoption of
individual and community-based measures to prevent crime.
The main advantage of the ENUSC data relative to crime data from police records
is that while police records only include those offences reported to or unmasked by the
police, the ENUSC survey captures both the crimes reported to and unreported to the
police. On the other hand, the use of this dataset has two drawbacks. First, with the
exception of home burglary, the exact location of each crime is not reported. This could
be particularly problematic for the metropolitan areas of Santiago and Concepcio´n where
many individuals work and live in a different municipality. Second, the difference between
some types of property crimes such as larcenies, burglaries or distraction theft is in many
cases fuzzy. In consequence, some households might be unable to report reliably some
specific types of crime to the enumerator. For these two reasons, I restrict the analysis
conducted using the ENUSC database to home burglary; an offence that is unlikely to be
confounded with other crimes by the households interviewed or the enumerator and for
which the exact location is known.
Section 3.8 tests the robustness of the results and expands the analysis to other types
of property crime including motor-vehicle theft, non-home burglary, larceny and robbery
using crime data from police records. These records were obtained from the Subsecretaria
de Prevencio´n del Delito (SPD) in Chile and they report every month and year (a) the
number of crimes known to the police in each of the 345 Chilean municipalities by type of
crime7 and (b) the number of individuals apprehended by the police in every municipality.
The dataset on earthquake intensity is constructed using the geographical information
provided by the Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad
Pu´blica (ONEMI) on the coordinates, magnitude and depth of the earthquake hypocentre.
The distance to the earthquake hypocentre is then used to predict the Modified Mercalli
Intensity (MMI) at the municipality level using the method described in Barrientos (1980),
that predicts earthquake intensity in a given place as a function of the distance from the
place to the hypocentre and of the earthquake magnitude at its source8.
7The crime data are available at http://www.seguridadpublica.gov.cl/tasa_de_denuncias_y_
detenciones.html
8Using data from 945 measurements of earthquake intensity in different places after 73 earthquakes
Mw > 5.5 that struck Chile between 1906 and 1977, the paper estimates the following function that
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In the main analysis, I define as treatment municipalities those exposed to a predicted
MMI ≥ 7.5. The expected damages associated with a MMI = 7 are negligible damage in
buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary struc-
tures and considerable damage in poorly build or badly designed structures9. However, I
set the threshold in predicted MMI ≥ 7.5 because the predicting method developed in
Barrientos (1980) seems to overestimate intensities MMI > 7 for this particular earth-
quake (Astroza et al., 2010). Control municipalities are defined as those exposed to a
predicted MMI < 5.75. I set this threshold to define control municipalities because the
damages associated with a MMI < 6 are minimum (Astroza et al., 2010) and Mercalli
intensities are usually assigned on a half-point basis in the scale. The municipalities ex-
posed to a predicted 5.75 ≤ MMI < 7.5 are initially dropped from the analysis because
although the overall damages caused by the earthquake in these municipalities were small,
I cannot rule out the possibility that the earthquake affected poor constructions or gen-
erated power cuts in them, affecting the benefits and costs of committing crime. Because
the selection of the exact predicted intensity thresholds is to some extent arbitrary, I
will examine the robustness of the results to the use of alternative intensity thresholds to
define treatment and control municipalities and also to the use of the alternative method
to predict earthquake intensity described in Astroza et al. (2010)10.
Figure 3.1 shows maps with (a) the predicted earthquake intensities for Chilean muni-
cipalities calculated using the method developed in Barrientos (1980) and rounded at the
0.5 points in the MMI scale and with (b) treatment and control municipalities under the
default thresholds of MMI ≥ 7.5 for treatment municipalities and MMI < 5.75 for con-
trol municipalities. The configuration of treatment, control and excluded municipalities
under alternative earthquake intensity thresholds and calculation methods used to predict
earthquake intensities are presented in figures 3.8 and 3.9 in appendix 3.C.
predicts the intensity of an earthquake in a given location (measured in MMI) as a function of the distance
to the hypocentre and of the magnitude of the earthquake measured in Mw.
IMMI = 1.3844Mw − 3.7355log10(DistHC)− 0.0006DistHC + 3.8461 (3.1)
9The interpretation of the values in the Mercalli and MSK scales is reported in appendix 3.B.
10The paper measures MSK in 98 locations after the 2010 earthquake and estimate the MSK as a function
of the distance to the closest seismic asperity. They estimate the following equation for the 2010 Chilean
Earthquake:
IMSK = 43.11− 18.96log10(DistAs) + 0.0294DistAs (3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Predicted intensity: treatment and control areas
Note: In the maps that display the predicted earthquake intensities, the colour is assigned based on a
rounding of the predicted earthquake intensity at the 0.5 points. On the other hand, the construction of
the treatment and control groups of municipalities is based on whether the exact value of the predicted
earthquake intensity in the municipality is above or below a certain threshold. This is the reason why
for example, the municipalities exposed to a predicted earthquake intensity 7.25≤MMI<7.5 are coded as
MMI 7.5 in the maps that display the predicted earthquake intensities but they are not coded as treatment
municipalities in the other map.
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An advantage of using predicted intensity as a measure of whether a municipality is
affected by the earthquake is that while this only depends on the distance to the hy-
pocentre, the extent of human losses, economic damages or even observed earthquake
intensity (which is affected by the topography of the location) at the municipality level
could arguably be affected by pre-disaster factors that may influence crime costs and
benefits.
Table 3.2 summarizes the data used in the study. Descriptive statistics are provided
for three different samples. The first of them includes the municipalities exposed to either
a predicted MMI ≥ 7.5 or MMI < 5.75 that are also included in the ENUSC database,
and therefore, that are used in the main analysis of the study. For this sample, the table
reports the before-earthquake mean values for the variables of interest for the treatment
and control groups. The second sample includes all the municipalities exposed to either
a predicted MMI ≥ 7.5 or MMI < 5.75 regardless of whether they are included in
the ENUSC database. This is the sample of municipalities that is used in the analysis of
crime data from police records and in most of the analysis of mechanisms. For this sample,
the table reports the before-earthquake mean values for the treatment and control groups.
The third sample includes all the Chilean municipalities regardless of their predicted MMI
intensity. The table reports the mean values for the variables used in the analysis both
using only the before-earthquake periods and all periods available.
The descriptive statistics for the first two samples show that before the earthquake,
treatment and control municipalities were different in terms of some socioeconomic out-
comes. For example, the table reveals that before the earthquake, treatment municipalities
were significantly poorer, had higher rates of unemployment and lower per-capita public
budgets than control municipalities. These differences between treatment and control mu-
nicipalities are relevant in both the first sample (including only the municipalities surveyed
in the ENUSC database, mainly urban areas) and in the second sample (that includes all
treatment and control municipalities).
The pre-earthquake incidence of home burglary calculated using the ENUSC data was
approximately 2.4 percentage points larger in treatment municipalities: while the probab-
ility of suffering a home burglary during the last 12 months was 4.7% in control municip-
alities, the 7.1% of the households living in treatment municipalities experienced a home
burglary during the same period. The difference is significant at the 1%. On the other
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hand, the data from police records suggest that the incidence of known to the police crime
before the earthquake in treatment municipalities included in the ENUSC database was,
overall, not significantly different from the incidence in control municipalities. However,
some significant differences arise between treatment and control municipalities when the
sample is not restricted to those municipalities included in the ENUSC database, confirm-
ing a significantly higher incidence of home burglary and robbery and a lower incidence
of motor-vehicle theft in treatment municipalities before the earthquake. An interesting
pattern that emerges from the comparison between crime data from the ENUSC survey
and from police records is that although the exact comparison is not possible, the incid-
ence of home burglary in police records seems much lower than in the ENUSC data. The
difference could be partially explained by the fact that approximately the 50% of these
offences are not reported to the police11.
The information on the adoption of crime prevention measures collected in the ENUSC
survey shows that overall, individuals in treatment municipalities were more likely to adopt
individual and community-based crime prevention measures before the earthquake. On
the other hand, the number of policemen per capita was not significantly different before
the earthquake in treatment and control municipalities included in the ENUSC survey
although when all treatment and control municipalities are considered, the number of
policemen per capita before the earthquake in treatment municipalities was significantly
lower. Finally, the strength of social life and the income inequality did not seem to differ
before the earthquake in treatment and control municipalities.
3.6 Empirical Strategy
Earthquakes are natural disasters which its occurrence cannot be anticipated. However,
some places are more likely to be affected by strong earthquakes. For example, areas lying
in the interaction of two or more tectonic plates are more likely to suffer earthquakes of
high intensity. This is indeed the case for Chile, a country with almost its entire surface
lying in the border of the South-American, Nazca and Antarctic plates. Since 1900, Chile
suffered 14 earthquakes of Richter magnitude equal or larger than 8 with epicentre in
every Chilean region with the exception of the southern regions of Magallanes and Aysen.
However, although the exact location of an earthquake cannot be considered random not
11See table 3.11.
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even within Chile, the timing of its occurrence can be assumed so (Cavallo et al., 2010).
The exogenous nature of the timing in which an earthquake occurred and the impossib-
ility to anticipate it set an ideal scenario for the use of a difference in difference strategy
exploiting across-municipality and over-time variation in exposure to the earthquake for
the identification of the lasting effects of exposure to the earthquake on property crime.
Relying on comparing treatment and control units before and after exposure to a treat-
ment, the difference in difference approach has been used in seminal papers to address a
large variety of crucial research questions such as the effect of minimum wage on employ-
ment (Card and Krueger, 1994), the effect of school term length on student performance
(Pischke, 2007) or the effect of employment protection on firms’ outsourcing (Autor, 2003).
The results presented in table 3.2 suggest that treatment and control municipalities
were different in terms of some socioeconomic characteristics and of the incidence of crime
before the earthquake. However, the validity of the difference in difference approach in
our setting does not rely on the comparability of treatment and control groups before
the earthquake but on the assumption that in absence of the earthquake, crime rates in
control and treatment areas would have followed the same trajectory over time. This
identifying condition can be partially tested through assessing whether before the earth-
quake, property crime rates in areas close and far away from the epicentre followed the
same trend over time. If the evolution over time of crime rates was similar in treatment
and control municipalities before the earthquake, it would be reasonable to assume that if
the earthquake had not occurred, areas next to and far from the hypocentre would have
followed the same crime trend over time during all the period studied. Figure 3.2 plots
the evolution over time for the period 2007-2013 of the incidence of home burglary by
level of exposure to the earthquake. A visual inspection of the latter figure suggests that
although the levels are different, the evolution of the incidence of home burglary over time
before the earthquake was the same in the areas next to the hypocentre that are defined
as treatment municipalities and in the areas far from the hypocentre that are defined as
control municipalities. On the other hand, figure 3.2 also suggests that before the 2010
earthquake, the incidence of home burglary in those intermediate municipalities excluded
from the analysis was following a different trend over time. The lack of pre-earthquake
parallel trends in these municipalities is also confirmed empirically12, implying that the
12To test this hypothesis, I estimate a leads and lags model and test the joint significance of the lead
variables. The F-test is significant at the 10% confidence level.
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effect of the earthquake on crime rates in these intermediate municipalities cannot be
reliably estimated using a difference in difference strategy.
Figure 3.2: Incidence of home burglary over time
For the identification of the effect of the earthquake on property crime dynamics, I
estimate two models using the ENUSC database formed of seven repeated cross sections
of households and omitting from the sample the households living in intermediate muni-
cipalities. Following Autor (2003), I first estimate a leads and lags model:
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Burglaryimt = αm+
−1∑
τ=−q
βτ (Y eart×Earthquakem)mt+
r∑
τ=0
βτ (Y eart×Earthquakem)mτ +Y eart+µimt
(3.3)
where Burglaryimt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if household i in municipality m
and in year t has suffered a home burglary in the last 12 months and 0 otherwise.
Y ear is a vector of year dummy variables, αm is a vector of municipality dummies, and
(Y ear×Earthquake)mt is a vector of variables constructed as the interaction of the dummy
variable Earthquakem that is equal to 1 if the municipality m was exposed to a predicted
MMI ≥ 7.5 and 0 otherwise, with each year dummy. These interaction variables are
known in the literature as the lead and lag variables. In our specification, the lead vari-
ables are the interaction between year and earthquake exposure for the years before the
earthquake (from period τ = −q to period τ = −1). The lag variables are the interaction
between year and earthquake exposure for the years after the earthquake (from period
τ = 0 to period τ = r). The coefficients of the lead and lag variables yield the differential
variation in the home burglary rate in treatment and control municipalities in the year
of interest relative to 2009, the last year before the earthquake and the omitted category
in the regression specification. The coefficients of the lead and lag variables estimated
in equation 3.3 pursue a double objective. First, the estimated coefficients for the lead
variables provide an empirical test for the parallel trends condition. If these coefficients
are small and statistically indistinguishable from 0, the home burglary rate in treatment
and control municipalities was arguably following the same trend before the earthquake.
Second, if the coefficients for the lead variables are statistically indistinguishable from 0,
the coefficients for the lag variables yield the effect of the earthquake on the incidence of
burglary over time, providing information on the dynamics and persistence of this effect.
Second, I also estimate the following regression:
Burglaryimt = αm + β(Earthquake× POST )mt + Y eart + uimt (3.4)
where (Earthquake × POST )mt is an interaction term of the variable Earthquake that
indicates whether municipality m was exposed to a predicted MMI ≥ 7.5 and the variable
POST , that is equal to 1 for those periods after the earthquake. The parameter β yields
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the pooled effect of exposure to the earthquake on the incidence of home burglary over
the period of interest (2010-2013) relative to municipalities not directly affected by the
earthquake. Following the recommendation of Angrist and Pischke (2008) for difference
in difference estimations with several pre- and post-treatment periods, I clustered the
standard errors at the municipality level.
Although the earthquake plausibly caused negligible direct economic damage in control
municipalities, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the earthquake affected
indirectly economic outcomes in these municipalities. For example, the central government
might have allocated some investments planned for municipalities not directly affected by
the earthquake to the reconstruction of the most devastated municipalities. I discuss in
section 3.7 the existence of indirect effects of the earthquake in control municipalities and
the extent to which these indirect effects could affect the estimates reported in this study.
3.7 Results
Table 3.3 presents the main results of the study. Column 1 reports the estimates for
equations 3.3 and 3.4 when the treatment group is defined as those households living
in municipalities exposed to a predicted MMI ≥ 7.5; and the control group is defined
as those households living in municipalities exposed to a predicted MMI < 5.75. As
described in the previous section, those households living in municipalities exposed to
an intensity 5.75 ≤ MMI < 7.5 are excluded from the regression. The results of the
leads and lags analysis reported in column 1 are also displayed graphically in figure 3.3.
Columns 2-6 report the estimates for equations 3.3 and 3.4 when alternative earthquake
intensity thresholds and the alternative method developed by Astroza et al. (2010) to
predict earthquake intensities are used to define treatment and control municipalities.
The results of these analyses are also displayed graphically in figure 3.11 in appendix 3.E.
One of the advantages of the leads and lags approach is that it provides a direct test
for the parallel trends condition in difference in difference models with more than one
pre-treatment period. This condition would be satisfied if the coefficients that measure
the year-specific effects of the earthquake on crime the years before the earthquake (the
leads) are small and not statistically significant.
The estimates for the lag variables reported in table 3.3 show that for every threshold
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used to define treatment and control groups, the coefficients for the effect of the earthquake
for the years before its occurrence are very small and largely insignificant. On the other
hand, the table shows that the coefficients that measure the effect of the earthquake
on home burglary (the lag variables) are negative, large and statistically significant at
conventional confidence levels in the majority of the specifications. Overall, the results
suggest that the earthquake decreased significantly the incidence of home burglary the year
of the earthquake in areas close to the hypocentre relative to those areas far away from it.
The magnitude of this effect on the probability of experiencing a home burglary during
the last 12 months ranges between 1.1 and 2.1 percentage points (equivalent to a 16%-30%
reduction in the prevalence of home burglary relative to the last pre-earthquake period
in treatment municipalities), depending on the intensity threshold used to define control
and treatment municipalities. Furthermore, the effect of the earthquake remained stable
during the 4 post-earthquake years studied, confirming the persistence of this effect over
this period. Although the exact magnitude and level of significance for the year-effect
estimates vary with the definition of the treatment and control groups, the coefficients
are consistently negative and the pooled effect over the period of interest is statistically
significant at the 5% in all the specifications, highlighting that the results are robust to the
use of different predicted intensity thresholds to define treatment and control municipalities
and to the use of the method developed by Astroza et al. (2010) to predict earthquake
intensities.
A more detailed look at how the magnitude of the effect varies when different thresholds
are used suggests that the smaller (larger) the distance to earthquake hypocentre (pre-
dicted intensity) threshold used to define the treatment group, the larger and more signi-
ficant the effect of the earthquake is. In this sense, for example, the estimates in column 1
are larger in absolute value than those reported in column 2. Similarly, the larger (smaller)
the distance (predicted intensity) threshold used to define the control group, the larger
and more significant the effect of the earthquake is. The latter is illustrated by the fact
that estimates in columns 1 and 2 are larger than those in columns 4 and 5. These res-
ults suggest that the higher the earthquake intensity exposed to, the larger the effect on
home burglary. Furthermore, they also cast doubts on whether municipalities in the limit
between control and intermediate areas could have been somehow affected by the earth-
quake and suggest that the use of longer distances from the hypocentre to define control
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municipalities could be more convenient.
The results reported in columns 1-8 of table 3.8 in appendix 3.A confirm that the main
findings are robust to the inclusion of municipality time trends in the regressions. Further-
more, the estimates provided in columns 4 and 8 show that the effect of the earthquake
on home burglary is also robust to the exclusion of households living in municipalities
that were affected by the tsunami, suggesting that the impact of the earthquake is not
confounded by the effects of the tsunami in some earthquake affected municipalities. Fi-
nally, as expected, the inclusion of households living in intermediate municipalities as a
separate group in the regression hardly changes the magnitude of the estimates for the
treatment group. Indeed, although the lack of parallel trends requires to take with caution
the estimates for the intermediate municipalities, the smaller but negative and statistically
significant coefficient for this group relative to control municipalities suggests the possib-
ility that the earthquake may have also decreased the prevalence of property crime in
intermediate municipalities.
Finally, although the direct effect of the earthquake in control municipalities was likely
negligible, I cannot rule out the existence of indirect effects of the earthquake, ultimately
affecting crime in these municipalities. For example, the central government might have
allocated some investments planned for municipalities not directly affected by the earth-
quake to the reconstruction of the most devastated municipalities, potentially affecting
crime in control municipalities. If the effect of the earthquake in control municipalities
had the same direction (although smaller in magnitude) than in treatment municipalit-
ies, the effect of the earthquake on property crime estimated in this section should be
interpreted as a lower bound for the true effect. On the other hand, if the effect of the
earthquake in control municipalities had the opposite direction than the effect in treat-
ment municipalities, the coefficients estimated in this study would overestimate the true
effect. Although I cannot reject any of the last two hypotheses, figure 3.2 shows a sharp
break in the crime trends in treatment municipalities the year of the earthquake and a
smooth trend in control municipalities the same year, suggesting that if any, the indirect
effect of the earthquake on crime in control municipalities would be small.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of the earthquake on home burglary over time
3.8 Additional Analysis: Known to the Police Crime Data
This section uses the SPD database that includes yearly and monthly crime and appre-
hension data from police records to conduct the following analyses. First, I check the
robustness of the results presented in section 3.7 to the use of a different data source and
a longer pre-earthquake period, expanding also the analysis to other types of property
crime. Second, I examine whether the social chaos and the episodes of looting that oc-
curred in the aftermath of the earthquake were accompanied by sharp increases in the
incidence of property crimes reported to the police. Third, I test whether within 30 days
from the earthquake and in a context of looting, army deployment and the enactment
of a curfew, the number of individuals apprehended by the police raised in treatment
municipalities.
3.8.1 The Effect of the Earthquake on Known to the Police Property
Crime
Using the SPD database, I estimate equations 3.5 and 3.6 using the yearly incidence of
home burglary, non-home burglary, larcenies, motor-vehicle theft and robbery per 1,000
inhabitants as dependent variables:
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Crimemt = αm +
−1∑
τ=−q
βτ (Y ear×Earthquake)mt +
r∑
τ=0
βτ (Y ear×Earthquake)mτ +Y eart +µmt
(3.5)
Crimemt = αm + β(Y ear × Earthquake)mt + γXm + Y eart + umt (3.6)
where Crimemt is the incidence per 1,000 inhabitants of each specific type of property
crime in the municipality m in year t. The models are estimated using OLS and standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. Note that equations 3.5 and 3.6 are similar
to equations 3.4 and 3.3 although this section uses crime data available at the municip-
ality level and therefore, the regressions are estimated using municipalities as the unit of
analysis.
The estimation of equations 3.5 and 3.6 for every type of crime is conducted using two
different samples. The first of them includes the period 2007-2013, which covers the years
included in the ENUSC data used in section 3.7. The analysis conducted with this first
sample examines the robustness of the main results to the use of a different source of data,
utilizing the same time period employed in the main analysis. The second sample includes
crime data for a wider pre-earthquake period, covering the years 2003-2013. The analysis
of the latter sample yields information on whether the parallel trends condition still holds
when a longer pre-earthquake period of time13 is incorporated.
The results of the analyses using these two samples are reported in table 3.4. Overall,
the estimates are consistent with those obtained in the main analysis conducted in section
3.7. The coefficients reported in columns 1 and 2 suggest that earthquake decreased
significantly home burglary the year of the earthquake. The effect remained significant 4
years after the earthquake although the magnitude of the effect was smaller. The estimates
displayed in columns 3 and 4 show that the earthquake reduced the incidence of larceny
the year of the earthquake and the magnitude of this effect remained relatively stable and
statistically significant over all the period studied. The coefficients for the lag variables
that measure the effects of the earthquake on non-home burglary are reported in columns
5 and 6. They are consistently negative although only statistically significant for the first
post-earthquake year. Note however that the pooled effect of the earthquake on non-
13The first year for which the SPD database includes data for all the types of crime analysed in 2003.
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home burglary over the period of interest is negative and statistically significant at the
1%. The results reported in columns 7 and 8 reveal that unlike for the previous types
of crime, the earthquake did not seem to affect the incidence of motor-vehicle theft. The
results for the incidence of robbery are more ambiguous. While none of the coefficients
for the lag variables reported in columns 9 and 10 is statistically significant at the 10%,
the pooled effect of the earthquake on robbery over the period of interest is negative and
statistically significant in the sample that only includes the period 2007-13 and negative
but statistically indistinguishable from 0 at conventional confidence levels when the full
period 2003-2013 is analysed.
The results of the F-test for the lead variables suggest that although figures 3.4 and 3.5
reveal some differences in the pre-earthquake evolution of the known to the police incidence
of home burglary, non-home burglary, larceny and motor-vehicle theft in treatment and
control municipalities, these differences are not statistically significant in any of the two
time periods used in the analysis. On the other hand, the results of this test show that the
pre-earthquake evolution over time of the incidence of robbery is significantly different in
treatment and control municipalities, casting doubts on the estimates provided in columns
9 and 10 of table 3.4.
One potential concern when interpreting the coefficients reported in table 3.4 is that
unlike the ENUSC database, the SPD database only includes those offences reported to
or unmasked by the police. Therefore, the SPD database misses those crimes that were
neither reported to nor unmasked by the police. The reporting error in police records may
generate two problems. First, a substantial share of crimes unknown to the police would
lead to large standard errors. Second, if the share of crimes that is unknown to the police
is affected by the earthquake, the models would yield biased estimates of the effect of the
earthquake on true property crime rates. For example, at the limit, the results discussed
in table 3.4 might be explained by an effect of the earthquake on the share of crimes that
is reported to or unmasked by the police rather than by an effect of the earthquake on
true crime rates.
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I explore this hypothesis using information available in the ENUSC survey on whether
households report crimes to the police and estimating a difference in difference model in
which the dependent variable is the share of larcenies, motor-vehicle theft, robbery and
home burglary that is reported to the police. The results of this analysis, conducted
at the regional level, are reported in table 3.11 in appendix 3.D14. Both the regression
analysis and the visual inspection of figure 3.10 suggest that the earthquake does not
systematically affect the share of crime that is reported to the police. Nonetheless, and
even if the earthquake does not affect the probability of reporting crime to the police, the
fact that approximately 50% of the home burglaries and robberies and 75% of the larcenies
are not reported to the police introduces measurement error in the dependent variable,
leading to wider standard errors for the coefficients reported in table 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Incidence of crime over time (SPD data 2007-2013)
14The analysis is conducted at the regional level because the ENUSC survey does not provide the location
at the municipality level for most of the offences (larceny, motor-vehicle theft and robbery) that are used
to construct the dependent variable.
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Overall, the results presented in this section are consistent with the findings of the
analysis conducted in section 3.7 and show that the earthquake led to a lasting reduction
in the incidence of home burglary. Furthermore, the results on the different types of
property crimes also exclude the possibility that rather than decreasing property crime,
the earthquake simply displaced criminals from engaging in burglary to commit other
types of property crime. The latter hypothesis, studied by Bell et al. (2014) in the context
of the 2011 London riots, could be relevant if judges increased the severity of sentencing for
criminals committing burglaries in areas affected by the earthquake or if criminals falsely
perceived more severe sentencing for these crimes. Although the criminal law did not
change following the earthquake, the social awareness and media coverage of the looting
events may have induced judges in these areas, at least temporally, to increase the severity
of sentencing for burglary. However, the fact that the reduction in crime rates seems to
operate over different types of property crime precludes the hypothesis that the earthquake
simply displaced crime from burglary to other types of property crime.
Figure 3.5: Incidence of crime over time (SPD data 2003-2013)
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3.8.2 Crime and Punishment in the Aftermath of the Earthquake
Some treatment municipalities experienced looting episodes, the enactment of a curfew
and the deployment of the army during the two weeks that followed the earthquake.
Through incapacitating criminals or providing a first contact with crime for some looters,
the deployment of the army, the curfew and the looting episodes could have affected the
incidence of crime in treatment municipalities in a lasting way.
This subsection investigates crime and apprehension in the aftermath of the earthquake
through estimating the effect of exposure to the earthquake on the incidence of different
crimes and on the apprehension rate the month of the earthquake and one month after the
earthquake using the monthly SPD data. The dependent variables in these regressions are
the change in the incidence of crime between either the month of the earthquake (February
2010) or the first month after the earthquake (March 2010) and the last month before the
earthquake (January 2010). The regression includes as control variables the population of
the municipality and the incidence of crime in the last month before the earthquake.
The results of these analyses are reported in table 3.5. They suggest that property
crime did not increase sharply in the aftermath of the earthquake. Rather, the known to
the police incidence of home burglary, robbery and larceny one month after the earthquake
was significantly lower in earthquake affected municipalities. Although these results could
be surprising, Grando´n et al. (2014) suggest that the most prevalent type of property
crime after the earthquake was group looting towards large supermarkets and shops that
although involved many people, in terms of numbers of offences reported to the police
might be small. Furthermore, the same study highlights that the looting of houses or
small shops was an extremely rare event in the aftermath of the earthquake. In any case,
the latter estimates should be interpreted with caution because crime data from police
records aggregated at the monthly level might not be the most suitable for this analysis.
First, the cost of reporting to the police an offence might be larger the days followed
the earthquake due to institutional collapse, potentially leading to an underestimation
of the short-term effect of the earthquake on true crime rates. Second, the effect of the
earthquake on crime might be restricted to a few days or hours after its occurrence and
before the deployment of the army. However, the aggregation of the crime data at the
monthly level may not be adequate to assess the very short-term effects of the earthquake.
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The results reported in the last column in table 3.5 highlight that far from increasing,
the number of individuals apprehended per 1,000 individuals decreased in the aftermath
of the earthquake relative to control municipalities. These results dismiss the possibility
that the contraction in property crime rates in earthquake affected municipalities is driven
by a higher rate of incarceration in these municipalities as a consequence of the curfew
and the deployment of the army.
One explanation for the reduction in incarceration rates and in the known to the police
incidence of some types of property crimes in the aftermath of the earthquake could be
the deterring effect of the army deployment and of the curfew. If so, through temporarily
increasing the cost of crime, the presence of the army and the curfew may have persistent
effects on the incidence of crime. This hypothesis is explored in section 3.9 as a potential
mechanism for the lasting reduction in property crime after the earthquake.
3.9 Analysis of Mechanisms
Natural disasters are complex phenomena that may influence the benefits and costs of
crime through many channels. This section discusses the relevance of some of the most
evident ones. However, it is beyond the scope of the study to comprehensively examine
every individual path through which the earthquake could have reduced the incidence of
property crime over the post-earthquake period studied.
The lasting reduction in property crime after the earthquake is consistent with the
predictions of the informal guardianship theory. The latter argues that natural disasters
are generally followed by altruistic behaviours that strengthen community links and co-
operation, increasing the provision of informal guardianship in damaged communities and
therefore the costs of crime. The theory concludes that the rises in the levels of informal
guardianship offset the potential perverse effects of disasters on crime caused by their
negative impact on other crime determinants such as the capacity of the police to enforce
the law.
In order to test the informal guardianship channel, I estimate equation 3.4 at the
household level using as dependent variables the information collected in the ENUSC sur-
vey on adoption of different household and community-based measures to prevent crime.
The results of this analysis are displayed in table 3.6 and show that the earthquake boos-
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ted the provision of informal guardianship by households, mainly through the adoption
of community-based measures such as creating community alarms or sharing telephone
numbers with neighbours. Furthermore, the estimates reported in column 10 of table 3.8
in appendix 3.A suggest that the drop in the incidence of home burglary was more than
twice among households living in municipalities affected by the earthquake that increased
the provision of community-based strategies to prevent crime than among households liv-
ing in earthquake affected municipalities that did not increase it, although the effects are
not statistically different from each other at conventional significance levels15. Although
the rise in the incidence of community-based measures to prevent crime among treatment
municipalities was probably not random and therefore the results of this analysis should
not be interpreted as causal, the estimates point to this mechanism as an important path
through which the earthquake may have decreased crime. Also in line with the informal
guardianship theory, the coefficients reported in columns 9-11 of table 3.6 suggest that,
overall, the earthquake increased the number of community-based organizations. This
finding is consistent with a positive effect of the earthquake on the strength of community
life. Finally, qualitative studies analysing social dynamics in the aftermath of the earth-
quake remark the widespread prevalence of pro-social, altruistic and organized behaviour
in communities affected by the earthquake during the days that followed the natural dis-
aster (Grando´n et al., 2014; Larran˜aga and Herrera, 2010b).
However, the rise in the adoption of community-based crime prevention measures and
the provision of informal guardianship could be also driven by an increase in the perceived
risk of crime in communities affected by the earthquake. If so, the rise in the provision of
informal guardianship and the drop in crime could have happened even in the absence of
any effect of the earthquake on social capital. Although 10 months after the earthquake the
perception of crime was not significantly different in earthquake affected and unaffected
areas16, it is likely that the extensive media coverage of the looting events and the power
15Column 10 of table 3.8 reports the estimation using two separate treatment groups. The first treatment
arm includes those municipalities affected by the earthquake that increased the provision of community-
based strategies to prevent crime after the earthquake. A municipality is considered to have increased the
provision of community-based strategies to prevent crime when the average number of community-based
measures to prevent crime (including sharing telephone numbers with neighbours, organizing community
vigilance, coordinating with local authorities for the provision of security and hiring private vigilance)
adopted in post-earthquake years in the municipality is higher than in pre-earthquake years. The second
treatment group includes those municipalities affected by the earthquake that did not increase the provision
of community-based strategies to prevent crime after the earthquake.
16This analysis, conducted using the ENUSC data, is not reported in the paper but it is available upon
request.
116
cuts increased the perception of crime in earthquake affected communities even when the
looting of houses and small business was very rare in the aftermath of the earthquake.
In line with this argument, Larran˜aga and Herrera (2010a) remark that in the regions of
Biobio and Maule, the two regions most affected by the earthquake, the 37% and the 22% of
the population affected by the earthquake (93% of its population) organized collectively to
overcome the damage caused by the earthquake and the provision of security was the main
reported reason for collective organization in Biobio and the second (after the provision of
water and food) in Maule. Also, Grando´n et al. (2014) provide qualitative evidence from
the city of Concepcio´n that neighbours cooperated to provide informal guardianship and
protect their communities from looting during the week that followed the earthquake.
To explore whether the lasting drop in the incidence of crime in earthquake affected
areas was simply driven by an increment in the perceived risk of crime in these muni-
cipalities with lasting consequences in terms of adoption of crime prevention measures,
I examine whether the effect of the earthquake was significantly different in those treat-
ment municipalities that experienced looting events in the aftermath of the earthquake.
For this, I divide the municipalities affected by the earthquake in two separate groups.
The first group includes those municipalities affected by the earthquake that experienced
looting in the aftermath of the earthquake. The second group includes those municipal-
ities affected by the earthquake that did not. Arguably, the perception of crime in the
aftermath of the earthquake was higher among the first treatment group of municipalities.
The results are presented in column 9 of table 3.8 in appendix 3.A and show that the
magnitude of the effect of the earthquake in areas close to the hypocentre that experi-
enced looting and that did not experience it relative to control municipalities was very
similar and the difference between these two magnitudes is statistically indistinguishable
from 0 at conventional confidence levels. The latter results suggest that although in the
first instance the rise in the perceived risk of crime in earthquake affected areas could have
driven the adoption of crime-prevention measures, the rise in the perceived risk of crime
in the aftermath of the earthquake cannot explain the observed persistent reduction in
the incidence of property crime after the earthquake. Nonetheless, the eruption of looting
across some of the municipalities affected by the earthquake could have not been random
even among municipalities exposed to the same earthquake intensity and therefore, the
results of this analysis should only be interpreted as suggestive.
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In order to investigate the relevance of some of the alternative mechanisms, I first
assess at the municipality level the short-term effects of exposure to the earthquake on
different socioeconomic outcomes that the literature has linked to crime. I estimate the
short-term effects of the earthquake on the number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants,
population, poverty rate, extreme poverty rate, unemployment, rate of men 15-29 years
old, two measures of income polarization, enrolment in education for individuals 13-25 and
municipality budget at the municipality level. All of these factors have been discussed in
the literature as potential causes of crime17. The dependent variable in these regressions
is the change in the variable of interest between the first year for which data are available
after the earthquake (e.g. 2010 for administrative data and 2011 for variables constructed
using the CASEN survey) and the last year before the earthquake (2009 for all variables).
The regressions include as control variables the population of the municipality in the year
2009 and the level of the variable of interest in the year 2009.
The estimates are reported in table 3.7 and suggest that proximity to the hypocentre
decreased the population of the municipality and increased its unemployment level, poverty
and extreme poverty rate. On the other hand, the analysis shows negligible and statistic-
ally insignificant effects of earthquake exposure on inequality, number of policemen, budget
of the municipality, education enrolment and the rate of men 15-29 years old. Interest-
ingly, table 3.10 in appendix 3.A remarks that, with the exception of extreme poverty, the
earthquake did not affect in the short-term any of the variables analysed in the excluded
intermediate municipalities. This result is somehow expected because low earthquake in-
tensities are unlikely to damage constructions other than the poorest dwellings that might
be more vulnerable.
The results reported in table 3.7 suggest therefore that the lasting drop in property
crime rates was not caused by an increase in the presence of policemen or by reconstruc-
tion programmes in catastrophic areas reducing unemployment, which has been assessed
as a key determinant of crime (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). Another mechanism that
may have contributed to the reduction in the incidence of property crime observed in
earthquake affected areas would be a larger incarceration rate in these municipalities. To
cope with looting in the aftermath of the earthquake, the Chilean government declared a
curfew and deployed the army in the areas affected by riots. If these institutional efforts
17The evidence on the relevance of most of these factors as drivers of property crime is reviewed in Soares
(2004).
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led to larger apprehension and incarceration rates, the incidence of crime in earthquake
affected municipalities could have dropped as a consequence. However, in the previous
section, I show that the earthquake did not increase apprehension rates in the aftermath
of the earthquake. Consistently, the results reported in column 9 of table 3.8 in appendix
3.A show that the effect of the earthquake on the incidence of home burglary was not
significantly different in treatment municipalities that experienced looting episodes and in
those that did not. These two results suggest that the drop in property crime rates in
earthquake affected areas was not driven by higher incarceration rates in the aftermath
of the earthquake. Furthermore, the lack of a differential effect in municipalities that
experienced looting events also indicates that the presence of the army and the curfew,
that affected mainly those municipalities that experienced the larger looting events, did
not generate any differential effect on the incidence of property crime across municipalities
affected by the earthquake. This result dismisses the hypothesis that through temporarily
increasing the cost of crime and keeping out of crime some individuals, the curfew and
the deployment of the army could have driven the lasting reduction in the incidence of
property crime in the municipalities affected by the earthquake.
Another mechanism for lower property crime rates after natural disasters is a reduc-
tion in the benefits of crime. Through destroying economic assets and expanding poverty,
the earthquake may have decreased the economic returns to some property crimes. In
other words, through increasing poverty and destroying assets, the earthquake may have
decreased the expected benefit of larceny, robbery or home burglary. Although this argu-
ment seems intuitive, theoretical models of economics of crime predict an ambiguous effect
of poverty on property crime: Although poverty decreases the economic returns to prop-
erty crime, it also reduces its opportunity costs. Indeed, the existing empirical evidence
shows that different economic shocks increasing poverty in India, Mozambique and Russia
have boosted property crime rather than decreasing it (Fafchamps and Minten, 2006; Iyer
and Topalova, 2014; Ivaschenko et al., 2012).
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An alternative hypothesis that would help to explain why areas affected by the earth-
quake experienced strong decreases in crime rates is larger public investments in pro-
grammes that may reduce crime in the short- and long-term. In table 3.7 I show that
despite the existence of specific transfers from the central government to the municipal-
ities affected by the earthquake (accounting in average for approximately the 3% of the
budget of treatment municipalities), exposure to the earthquake did not increase the total
municipality budget per inhabitant. However, it is also possible that many of these large
investments conducted in damaged areas were not funded by the municipality but directly
by the central government. Unfortunately, I do not have the necessary information to test
this hypothesis and therefore, I cannot reject the possibility that the decrease in crime was
partially explained by a redistribution of public investments and infrastructure towards
the areas affected by the earthquake. Nonetheless, we know that if it existed, this effect
did not operate through reducing unemployment.
3.10 Conclusions
This study exploits across space variation in exposure to an 8.8 Richter magnitude earth-
quake in Chile to provide the first evidence on the lasting effects of natural disasters on
property crime. For this purpose, property crime data from household victimization sur-
veys and from police records are analysed using a difference in difference strategy. The
estimates show that exposure to a very strong earthquake intensity decreased significantly
the incidence of home burglary the year of the earthquake. Furthermore, the effect re-
mained constant over the 4 post-earthquake years studied. The results are robust to the
use of different sources of data, types of property crime, samples and alternative definitions
of treatment and control municipalities. Although I cannot rule out the possibility that
these results are affected by indirect effects of the earthquake in control municipalities,
the sharp break in the crime trend in treatment municipalities the year of the earthquake
and the smooth trend in control municipalities the same year suggest that if existent, such
an indirect effect would be small and could not explain entirely the results.
The study also explores some of the mechanisms through which the earthquake may
have reduced property crime in the medium and long-term. An important driver of this
effect was the lasting boost in the adoption of community-based measures to prevent
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crime in earthquake affected areas. More broadly, the results are consistent with the
stream of the literature that argues that natural disasters increase the level of cooperation
within neighbourhoods and the strength of community life leading to larger levels informal
guardianship in affected communities and increasing the cost of committing crime after
catastrophic events. Furthermore, the evidence highlights the role played by social capital
and cooperation at the community level in reducing crime, a question that has not been
empirically investigated so far. Alternative mechanisms to explain the lasting drop in the
incidence of property crime after the earthquake such as an increase in the number of
policemen in areas affected by the earthquake, higher incarceration rates, crime displace-
ment, an increase in the perceived risk of crime, lasting effects of the curfew and army
deployment and an increase in employment due to the reconstruction programmes are
tested and ruled out in the light of the results. However, natural disasters are complex
phenomena with numerous consequences and therefore, I cannot dismiss the possibility
that the lasting drop in the prevalence of property crime after the earthquake was also
channelled through other mechanisms not examined in this study.
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Appendix 3.A Robustness Checks: Using All Observations
and Heterogeneity of Effects
Table 3.8: Effects of the earthquake on home burglary: Different samples, municipality time
trends and heterogeneity of effects
Different samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Home Home Home Home Home Home Home Home
burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1)
Pooled effects
Earthquake × Post -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.026**
( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.010) ( 0.010) ( 0.010) ( 0.011)
Intermediate areas × Post -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011 -0.010
( 0.004) ( 0.005) ( 0.009) ( 0.010)
Pre-earthq. trends
F-test: Lead variables
H0 : βτ=−q = ... = βτ=−1 = 0 0.238 0.242 0.241 0.174 1.554 1.583 1.572 1.094
Municip. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. time trends No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67,540 177,889 111,622 57,100 67,540 177,889 111,622 57,100
Treatment areas MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5
Control areas MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75
Intermediate areas Excluded 5.75≤MMI<7.5 5.75≤MMI<7.5 Excluded Excluded 5.75≤MMI<7.5 5.75≤MMI<7.5 Excluded
Santiago excluded Santiago excluded
Tsunami affected municip Included Included Included Excluded Included Included Included Excluded
Heterog. of effects
(9) (10)
Home Home
burglary (0/1) burglary (0/1)
Pooled effects
Earthquake × Post -0.023***
(Munic with looting) ( 0.005)
Earthquake × Post -0.019***
(Munic without looting) ( 0.006)
Earthquake × Post -0.024***
(Munic δ CBS=1) ( 0.005)
Earthquake × Post -0.011***
(Munic δ CBS=0) ( 0.004)
Observations 67,540 67,540
Treatment areas MMI≥ 7.5 MMI≥ 7.5
Control areas MMI<5.75 MMI<5.75
Note: Columns 1-8 examine the pooled effects of the earthquake on home burglary over the period of interest
(equation 3.4) using different samples and specifications. The effect of interest is captured by an interaction between
the dummy variables that capture whether the municipality is affected by the earthquake and whether the year
is after the earthquake. A test for the common trends assumption is reported for every estimation. For this
test, I estimate a leads and lags model and use an F-test to examine the joint significance of the lead variables.
Columns 9-10 estimate the pooled effect of the earthquake using the same control group and splitting the treatment
municipalities in two different groups: Those treatment municipalities that experienced looting (column 9) or an
increase in the provision of community-based crime prevention measures (column 10) and those that did not. All the
regressions are estimated at the household level using ENUSC data. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level.***p<0.01;**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
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Table 3.10: The effects of the earthquake on other sociodemographic and economic variables
∆ Ln Munic. ∆ Ln ∆ Ln Polic. ∆ Poverty ∆ Extreme ∆ Unemp. ∆ Polariz ∆ Polariz. ∆ Rate ∆ Attending
p/c budget population 100M inhab rate pov. rate rate (75%vs25%) (90%vs10%) men 15-29 educ. (13-25)
Earthquake municip. -0.006 -0.005* 0.023 0.021** 0.014*** 0.017** -0.427 -0.143 -0.002 0.016
(0.014) (0.002) (0.023) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.419) (1.734) (0.004) (0.016)
Intermediate municip. -0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.001 0.008** 0.005 -0.082 -0.107 -0.003 0.015
(0.014) (0.002) (0.021) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.401) (1.281) (0.003) (0.013)
Observations 340 345 345 324 324 324 324 324 324 324
R-squared 0.012 0.045 0.020 0.151 0.473 0.169 0.202 0.429 0.217 0.346
Note: The table reports the short-term effects of the earthquake on different factors that have been identified in the literature
as potential causes of crime. The model estimated is ∆Yi = β0 + β1Earthquakei + β2Y 2009i + β3LnPopulat2009i + µ
where the dependent variable (∆Y ) is the change in the variable of interest between the closest available point after the
earthquake and the closest available point before the earthquake. Because the data on the budget is at the start of the
year, the first relevant post-earthquake year is 2011 for this variable. The first post-earthquake year for which information
is available is 2011 for poverty, unemployment, income polarization, age composition and education enrolment, and 2010
for population and policemen. The last pre-earthquake year is 2009 for all the variables. The regressions include as control
variables the Ln of population (LnPopulat2009) and the variable of interest (Y 2009) in 2009. The estimation is conducted
at the municipality level using OLS. Municipalities exposed to a predicted earthquake intensity 5.75 ≤ MMI < 7.5 are
included as a separate treatment group (intermediate municipalities). The difference in the number of observations across
the different regressions is explained by the fact that the survey used to construct the poverty, unemployment, polarization,
demography and education variables is not implemented in all the Chilean municipalities and the municipality budget data
does not include information for all the municipalities. Robust standard errors in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
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Figure 3.6: Incidence of crime over time (SPD data 2007-2013)
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Figure 3.7: Incidence of crime over time (SPD data 2003-2013)
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Appendix 3.B Earthquake Intensity Scales
Modified Mercalli intensity (MMI) scale measures the destruction capacity of an earth-
quake rather than the current destruction that it generates. Given a Richter magnitude,
the Modified Mercalli scale in a place depends on the distance to the hypocentre and on
the topography of the place. The interpretation of some of the values of the Modified
Mercalli scale relevant for this study is reported below.
• MMI IX (Violent): Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-
designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial build-
ings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.
• MMI VIII (Severe): Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable
damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in
poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments walls.
Heavy furniture overturned.
• MMI VII (Very strong): Damage negligible in buildings of good design and con-
struction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage
in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.
• MMI VI (Strong): Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few
instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.
• MMI V Moderate: Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows
broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.
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Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik (MSK) scale measures the severity of ground shaking
on the basis of observed effects in an area affected by an earthquake. Given a Richter
magnitude, the MSK scale in a place depends on the distance to the hypocentre and on
the topography of the place. The interpretation of some of the values of the MSK scale
relevant for this study is reported below.
• MSK IX Destructive: General panic. People may be forcibly thrown to the ground.
Waves are seen on soft ground. Substandard structures collapse. Substantial damage
to well-constructed structures. Underground pipelines ruptured. Ground fracturing,
widespread landslides.
• MSK VIII Damaging: Many people find it difficult to stand, even outdoors. Fur-
niture may be overturned. Waves may be seen on very soft ground. Older structures
partially collapse or sustain considerable damage. Large cracks and fissures opening
up, rockfalls.
• MSK VII Very strong: Most people are frightened an try to run outdoors. Furniture
is shifted and may be overturned. Objects fall from shelves. Water splashes from
containers. Serious damage to older buildings, masonry chimneys collapse. Small
landslides.
• MSK VI Strong: Felt by most indoors and by many outdoors. A few persons lose
their balance. Many people are frightened and run outdoors. Small objects may fall
and furniture may be shifted. Dishes and glassware may break. Farm animals may
be frightened. Visible damage to masonry structures, cracks in plaster. Isolated
cracks on the ground.
• MSK V Fairly strong: Felt indoors by most, outdoors by few. A few people are
frightened and run outdoors. Many sleeping people awake. Observers feel a strong
shaking or rocking of the whole building, room or furniture. Hanging objects swing
considerably. China and glasses clatter together. Doors and windows swing open
or shut. In a few cases window panes break. Liquids oscillate and may spill from
fully filled containers. Animals indoors may become uneasy. Slight damage to a few
poorly constructed buildings
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Appendix 3.C Maps: Treatment, Control and Excluded Mu-
nicipalities under the Use of Different Dis-
tance Thresholds
Figure 3.8: Treatment and Control areas
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Figure 3.9: Treatment and Control areas
132
Appendix 3.D Reporting Rate for Different Types of Crime
(ENUSC Data): Analysis at the Regional
Level
Table 3.11: Effect of the earthquake on the probability of reporting a crime to the police and
mean reporting rates (regional level analysis)
Share crime
reported to the police
POST × Catastrophic regions 0.021
( 0.020)
POST × Other affected regions -0.014
( 0.019)
Type of crime fixed effect Yes
N Observations 412
R2 0.688
Type of crime Share reported to the police
Home burglary 0.546
Larceny 0.268
Motor vehicle theft 0.862
Robbery 0.504
Note: The control regions are Tarapaca, Antofagasta, Arica y Parinacota,
Coquimbo, Atacama, Los Rios, Los Lagos, Aysen, Magallanes. Information
on reported crime for the regions of Los Rios and Arica y Parinacota for the
years 2007 and 2008 is not available. Catastrophic regions include the regions
of Maule and Biobio and other affected regions include the regions of Santiago,
Valparaiso, Araucania and Libertador O’Higgins. The regressions also include
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the years after the earthquake and a
vector of exposure to the earthquake fixed effects (catastrophic, other affected
regions and control). The dependent variable in the regression is the share of
crime reported to the police in each region and for each type of property crime
(larceny, motor-vehicle theft, robbery and home burglary). Robust standard
errors in parentheses.***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.1
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Conclusions
Using econometric methods traditionally applied for the identification of causal effects and
policy evaluation, this thesis provides empirical evidence on three central issues for the
well-being of disadvantaged people in developing countries.
Chapter 1 uses a legal change in Ethiopia as a case study to show the beneficial effects
on infant mortality rates of (a) increasing the legal age of marriage for women and of (b)
delaying women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years. The size of the effect of a
one-year delay in women’s age at cohabitation during teenage years on the probability of
infant mortality of the first born child is comparable to the joint effect on child mortality at
the village level of moving from 0% coverage of measles, BCG, DPT, Polio and Maternal
Tetanus vaccinations to 100%. The analysis of mechanisms reveals that the reduction
in infant mortality is strongly linked to the effect of delaying cohabitation on the age of
women at first birth.
The contribution of chapter 1 is threefold. First, it provides the first empirical evidence
on the socioeconomic effects of laws raising the legal age of marriage for women. Second, it
assesses for the first time the causal effect of early cohabitation on infant mortality. Third,
the chapter uses a RDD approach that can be used in Ethiopia or in other countries such
as Albania or Jordan that have approved similar laws over the last decades to expand the
analysis on the effects of child marriage to other key outcomes and settings, and to examine
the robustness of the results from studies relying on correlation analysis or instrumental
variables.
Future research using comprehensive data on postnatal and antenatal behaviours could
also disentangle whether the age at first birth mechanism is in itself driven by purely
biological reasons or by a larger adoption of adequate antenatal and postnatal health
practices by women that are older at first birth. Additional research is also needed to
understand whether the magnitude of the effect of the age at cohabitation on the infant
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mortality of the first born child depends on the gender of the infant. The larger incidence of
infant mortality among boys observed in both developed and developing countries seems to
be driven by a slower development of the immune system in boys and by a larger probability
of pre-term birth when the infant is a boy (Drevenstedt et al., 2008). If biological maturity
at first birth is the main mechanism through which age at cohabitation affects infant
mortality, one may hypothesise that the impact of early cohabitation on infant mortality
could also depend on the gender of the infant.
Using longitudinal data from northern Ghana, chapter 2 assesses whether parents
allocate human capital investments reinforcing or correcting cognitive differences between
siblings. The analysis reveals that consistent with the predictions of Becker’s model for
intra-household allocation of resources, parents allocate more schooling to the children
of the household that are cognitively more able. Furthermore, the results show that the
magnitude of this effect does not seem to depend on household characteristics such as
wealth, household size or polygyny status.
In policy terms, the results suggest that since parents may prefer to focus their school-
ing investments in the more able children rather than spreading them across all of them,
supply-side educational interventions such as reducing class sizes or providing more books
may not benefit the less able children.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it adds to the thin
literature that examines empirically the role of cognitive skills in the allocation of schooling
across siblings. On the other hand, this is the first study that tests whether the magnitude
of the effect of cognitive skills on the allocation of schooling across siblings varies across
different types of households.
More research is however needed to determine whether parents allocate more schooling
to more able children because these children have larger returns on human capital invest-
ments as suggested by Becker or because parents have a preference for these children
regardless of their returns. More generally, one way of testing the functioning of Becker’s
model would be through examining other predictions of the model. Two of them that are
worth to be investigated for Ghana are whether the reinforcing mechanism is also found
for health endowments and whether less endowed children receive more nonhuman capital
transfers.
Chapter 3 uses the 8.8 Richter magnitude earthquake that struck Chile in February
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2010 as a case study to investigate the lasting effects of natural disasters on property crime.
The results show that municipalities close to the earthquake hypocentre experienced a last-
ing decrease in the incidence of property crime relative to those municipalities unaffected
by the earthquake. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the reduction in crime was
closely linked to the positive effect of the earthquake on the strength of community links
and on the adoption of community-based measures to prevent crime.
This chapter is the first empirical study assessing the effects of natural disasters on
crime over post-disaster periods of time longer than a year. In addition, the evidence
presented in this chapter remarks the key role that community links and informal guardi-
anship can play to prevent crime. Although previous evidence discusses the link between
social capital and crime in the Netherlands and in Italy (Buonanno et al., 2009; Akco-
mak and Ter Weel, 2012), none of them focuses on community links and the provision
of informal guardianship. In this sense, the chapter opens the debate and calls for more
research assessing how community links and the provision of informal guardianship can
contribute to reducing crime, particularly in settings where formal institutions have limited
capacity to enforce the law.
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